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Vicente Cuñat, Daniel Ferreira, Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe, Dirk Jenter, Christian Jul-
liard, Paula Lopes-Cocco, Igor Makarov, Ian Martin, Martin Oehmke, Daniel Par-
avisini, Christopher Polk, Dimitri Vayanos, Michela Verardo, and many others for
the countless insightful interactions that have made my time at the LSE so im-
mensely instructive.
During my time at LSE I have certainly met some great friends who inspired me
and made my PhD journey an experience to cherish. Among them special thanks
go to Lukas Kremens and Marco Pelosi with whom I had the pleasure to share the
best row in the office. I am grateful to Andreea Englezu, Zhongchen Hu, Bruce Iwa-
date, Karamfil Todorov, Yue Yuan, Agnese Carella, Fabrizio Core, Alberto Pellicioli,
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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first, I study the impact of insti-
tutional investors on asset prices, by focusing on Collateralized Loan Obligations
(CLOs). I document that, in order to satisfy constraints based on the par value of
their assets, CLOs become forced sellers of leveraged loans. Loans sold for non fun-
damental reasons trade at depressed prices for up to nine months after the shock.
The effect cannot be explained by selection on ex-ante or ex-post loan character-
istics. A large fraction of the dislocation in secondary markets is transmitted to
the market of issuance: shocked companies due to refinance their loans substitute
away from institutional tranches towards other types of securities. I show that the
substitution is imperfect, causing an increase in the cost of borrowing for affected
firms.
In the second chapter, which is co-authored with Simona Risteska, we use data
on mutual fund portfolio holdings to extract fund managers’ stock return expecta-
tions. We use panel regressions and economic theory to demonstrate that we are
able to partial out the effect of time-varying stock and manager characteristics (e.g.,
risk-aversion) and show that subjective expected returns are significantly affected
by personal experience. Managers are more strongly influenced by recent returns
and those experienced at the early stages of their holding period.
The third chapter, co-authored with Marco Pelosi and Simona Risteska, pro-
vides evidence of the disparity in the incidence of property taxes levied at different
points in time. Housing demand is significantly less elastic with respect to taxes
deferred to the future relative to taxes levied at the moment of the purchase. We
attribute this difference to the lack of salience of future taxes at the moment of
purchase. We provide directions on the optimal tax mix between salient and non-
salient taxes with the help of a model.
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1. Contagion in the Market for Leveraged
Loans
FRANCESCO NICOLAI1
There is ample evidence that the supply of capital from institutional investors pos-
itively correlates with asset prices. It is however particularly challenging to deter-
mine whether institutional investors cause or respond to pricing conditions. This
paper provides evidence in favour of the former by analysing the price impact
of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) when they are forced to trade for non-
fundamental reasons. CLOs provide an excellent setting to study the causal impact
of institutional investors on the price of leveraged loans2 both in their primary and
secondary markets. The compensation of CLO managers is tested against the satis-
faction of constraints based on the historical value of their assets. In order to avoid
fire sales, these so-called over-collateralization (OC) constraints have been explicitly
designed to be insensitive to the market price and the rating of leveraged loans as
long as these securities are not impaired3. OC constraints have achieved their goal:
CLOs have mostly avoided fire sales during the 2007-09 financial crisis and the
market turmoil in March 2020 (Financial Stability Board, 2019; Kothari et al., 2020).
However, historical-cost-based constraints might have unintended consequences:
similarly to gains trading in the insurance industry (Ellul et al., 2015), when the
1I benefited from helpful comments by Ulf Axelson, Cynthia Balloch, Vicente Cunat, Daniel
Ferreira, Dirk Jenter, Lukas Kremens, Dong Lou, Marco Pelosi, Cameron Peng, Simona Risteska,
Karamfil Todorov, Yue Yuan and the seminar participants at LSE, the New Economic School, Uni-
versidad Carlos III de Madrid, BI Norwegian Business School, Tulane Freeman School of Business
and Cass Business School. I am grateful to the Paul Woolley Centre for the Study of Capital Market
Disfunctionality at the LSE Financial Markets Group for financial support.
2There is no standard definition of leveraged loans. Leveraged loans are usually structured
and arranged by a syndicate of investment banks and they satisfy one or more of the following
criteria: they are sub-investment grade securities rated at Ba1 (BB+) or below by Moody’s (Standard
& Poor’s); they have a spread of at least 150bps over LIBOR; they are secured by a first or second
lien against the issuer’s assets (S&P Global, 2020b). The approach of this paper is to consider as
leveraged loans the syndicated loans that are traded or held by CLOs.
3Leveraged loans are defined as impaired if their market price is below $85, their rating is at or
below Caa (CCC) according to Moody’s (Standard & Poor’s), or they have defaulted (CreditFlux,
2015).
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quality of some of their loans deteriorates, CLOs have an incentive to sell unre-
lated securities whenever they face binding constraints. A violation of these con-
straints would be extremely costly because it would force the management team
to divert cash flows from subordinated to senior notes and would significantly de-
crease their compensation. The management team, therefore, engages in trading
of securities that is fully aimed at avoiding CLO tests violations. This behaviour,
in turn, generates contagion in the secondary market for leveraged loans: shocks
spread from downgraded to otherwise healthy loans sold by distressed CLOs try-
ing to fix their balance sheets. Consistently with the evidence in Loumioti and
Vasvari (2019b) and the view of industry practitioners (Morningstar, 2018), I doc-
ument that managers of CLOs that barely passed their OC tests tend to sell unre-
lated high quality loans compared to otherwise similar CLOs that failed them. In
these regards I provide the following evidence: first, while OC constraints should
mechanically deteriorate after a downgrade to Caa (CCC), I show that this is not
the case, hinting at the fact that managers actively trade in order to restore their
OC constraints after a downgrade. Second, CLOs are usually allowed to keep on
their balance sheet up to 7.5% of Caa (CCC) or lower rated securities before their
OC tests are impaired: I document that there is no bunching in the distribution of
Caa (CCC) or lower rated securities at this threshold, suggesting that managers do
not fix their OC constraints by trading downgraded loans. Third, I show that CLOs
that have barely passed their OC tests sell securities that are trading at higher prices
compared to CLOs that just missed their tests. This behaviour is particularly pro-
nounced when the loans of a CLO have been downgraded to Caa (CCC). Fourth,
loans sold by distressed CLOs that barely satisfy their OC constraints tend to have
higher rating compared to those sold by CLOs that missed them.
I then proceed to analyse the impact on market prices of non-fundamental
trades done by distressed CLOs to restore their constraints. I show that the price
of loans sold by these CLOs is between 43.6bps and 71.8bps lower compared to
otherwise similar loans. The effect is robust to the inclusion of various fixed effects
which allows me to exclude selection based on ex-ante observable characteristics.
The results are also robust to the inclusion of issuer-time fixed effects that are meant
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to compare the price of different loans issued by the same company, capturing the
influence of any unobservable variable related to the fundamentals of the firm. I
then test whether these trades are motivated by access to private information and
refuse this hypothesis by showing that the loans sold by distressed CLOs to restore
their OC tests are marginally less likely to default, and the likelihood of a down-
grade following the trade is similar to the loans in the control group. This evidence
allows me to conclude that the price change of loans sold by distressed CLOs is
caused by their market impact rather than by their fundamentals. The price im-
pact is long lasting: loans sold for non fundamental reasons trade at depressed
prices for up to nine months after the event.
The effect of non fundamental trades is not restricted to the secondary market.
I document that companies whose loans have been sold by distressed CLOs in the
secondary market face a deterioration of their terms of financing when issuing new
loans. I also provide evidence that the deterioration is caused by a reduction in the
supply of funds from CLOs rather than by a reduction in companies’ demand. I
start by fixing the demand for capital along two dimensions: first I focus on firms
that are due to refinance their debt in the following twelve months in the spirit
of Almeida et al. (2011), and, second, I study the choice between institutional and
bank tranches for firms that end up issuing leveraged loans by taking advantage of
an identification strategy that is reminiscent of the one employed by Adrian et al.
(2013), Becker and Ivashina (2014) and Fleckenstein et al. (2020). My findings are
consistent with a reduction in the supply of institutional loans in the primary mar-
ket: first, firms whose loans have been sold by distressed CLOs in the secondary
market are between 3.9% and 11.7% less likely to include institutional tranches in
their new issuances, compared to otherwise similar firms. Even when they are able
to access the market for institutional tranches, these companies borrow between
5.5% and 11.3% less through this form of debt. Finally, the size of the tranches that
are meant to be subscribed by CLOs is between 23.5% and 34.2% smaller compared
to companies that did not suffer fire sales by constrained investors in the secondary
market. The previous findings are paired with the evidence that treated companies
face an increase in the cost of capital of up to 55bps, suggesting that indeed treated
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companies have to cope with a reduction in the supply of institutional capital from
CLOs. How can we rationalize these findings? I show that CLOs are more likely
to refinance in the primary market companies that they have previously invested
in and held on their balance sheet. Companies whose loans are widely held and
traded by distressed CLOs have a difficult time placing new loans that are issued
at par and do not help alleviate the already tight constraints their usual investors
are currently facing.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.1 places the findings of this
paper in the context of the existing literature; Section 1.2 explains the workings of
CLO constraints, and, in particular, over-collateralization tests; Section 1.3 presents
and describes the data used in the empirical analysis; Section 1.4 studies the trading
behaviour of CLOs and how it is affected by OC constraints; Section 1.5 moves to
the analysis of the price impact of CLOs in the secondary market for leveraged
loans, documenting how loans sold by distressed CLOs trade at depressed prices;
Section 1.6 proceeds to study how the distortions generated by CLO constraints
propagate to primary markets by showing how the cost of capital and the financing
decisions of companies are affected by shocks to distressed CLOs.
1.1 Existing Literature
The results briefly documented above add to various strands of the literature.
First I contribute to the debate on the distortions generated by market-based and
historical-cost-based constraints. In these regards, the closest papers to mine are
Ellul et al. (2014) and Ellul et al. (2015) showing how historical cost accounting dis-
torts the trading behaviour of insurers and spreads shocks across unrelated corpo-
rate bonds. CLO constraints, where the greatest majority of the assets are counted
at their par value, are similar to historical cost accounting. As in Ellul et al. (2015),
I show that a degree of insensitivity to fluctuations in market prices helps reduc-
ing the likelihood of fire sales, but leads to the spread of shocks from distressed to
unrelated securities.
Second, I add to the literature on the propagation and amplification of shocks
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through financial intermediaries. Many have studied the impact of institutional
investors on asset prices: in these regards, Shleifer and Vishny (2011) provide a
comprehensive survey of the literature. Plenty of papers have been written on the
relationship between mutual fund flows and asset returns both in equity and fixed
income markets. Among others, Warther (1995), Wermers (1999), Nofsinger and
Sias (1999), Coval and Stafford (2007), Frazzini and Lamont (2008), Lou (2012), An-
ton and Polk (2014) study the impact of mutual funds on equity markets. Schmidt
et al. (2016), Chernenko and Sunderam (2016), Goldstein et al. (2017), Morris et
al. (2017), and Zhu (forthcoming) focus on the impact on fixed income securities.
A standard approach in the literature on mutual funds price pressure is to rely
on shocks to flows as an instrument to study their price impact. However, it is
particularly hard to disentangle whether flows cause or predict the subsequent
movements in asset prices (Warther, 1995). On the other hand, the setting of the
present paper presents a cleaner identification: the constraints on CLOs provide an
incentive to trade unrelated securities compared to the ones that have been down-
graded. These securities are often of good quality, guaranteeing that there is limited
scope for reverse causality in my findings. Finally, it is relatively easy to control for
ex-ante and ex-post measurable loan features allowing me to establish a chain of
causation that goes from CLO forced trades to a deterioration in loan prices.
Third, I contribute to the literature on the trading and pricing of loans in the
secondary market. Beyhaghi and Ehsani (2017) analyse the cross-sectional proper-
ties of loan returns in the secondary market; Gande and Saunders (2012), Allen and
Gottesman (2006), Ivashina and Sun (2011b) and Addoum and Murfin (2020) study
the relationship between loan prices and equity returns; Fabozzi et al. (2020) docu-
ment inefficiencies in the secondary market for leveraged loans that are exploited
by CLOs. I add to this literature by displaying how the prices for leveraged loans
are affected by non fundamental CLO trades.
Fourth, this paper adds to the growing recent literature on CLOs. Benmelech
et al. (2012) and Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) show that CLOs do not increase
adverse selection in corporate loans and often lead to lower loan spreads; Bozanic
et al. (2018) show that CLOs contribute to standardize the terms of loans contracts.
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Loumioti and Vasvari (2019a) and Loumioti and Vasvari (2019b) are the first to
study in detail the incentives generated by over-collateralization constraints on
CLOs, documenting that tighter constraints lead to strategic trading aimed at over-
coming tests based on them and, ultimately, cause a deterioration in performance.
I confirm their findings, showing that CLO managers engage in loan trading that
is ultimately motivated by the satisfaction of these constraints and use this feature
to study the impact that CLOs have on the price of leveraged loans. Liebscher and
Mählmann (2017), Fabozzi et al. (2020) and Cordell et al. (2020) provide evidence
in favour of skill in CLO managers collateral selection and trading. Elkamhi and
Nozawa (2021) analyse the trading behaviour of CLOs in periods of diffuse de-
faults or downgrades focusing on the effect that portfolio similarity across CLOs
has on systematic risk. Fleckenstein et al. (2020) study the effect of CLOs on com-
panies’ financing outcomes. They use CLOs origination and repricing as an instru-
ment for their appetite for new leveraged loans in the primary market and show
that CLOs actively determine the amount of issuance in this market and are the
main responsible for its cyclicality. This work adds on Fleckenstein et al. (2020)’s
findings, with a particular focus on the heterogeneity of the impact of CLOs across
companies: the firms whose loans have been sold by distressed CLOs fare worse
outcomes independently of the aggregate appetite for leveraged loans by CLOs.
My findings are also consistent with Allen and Gale (1994) who prove that, with
endogenous market participation, relatively small idiosyncratic shocks can have
large price effects on the underlying securities. The closest paper is the contempo-
raneous work by Kundu (2021) which replicates most of the findings in this article
by employing a shift-share instrument and focusing on interest diversion rather
than over-collateralization constraints.
Finally, I add to the abundant literature on the interaction between capital sup-
ply and companies’ financing decisions. Among the others, Faulkender and Pe-
tersen (2006), Frank and Goyal (2009), Leary (2009), Sufi (2009), Lemmon and Roberts
(2010). In the last part of the paper I employ an identification strategy that is simi-
lar to the one in Adrian et al. (2013) and Becker and Ivashina (2014), who show that
firms with access to the bond market have shifted away from bank loans during
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the 2007-09 financial crisis, hinting at the fact that the credit collapse was due to
a contraction in credit supply rather than demand. Ivashina and Sun (2011a) and
Fleckenstein et al. (2020), on the other hand, study the substitution between institu-
tional and bank tranches in the syndicated loan market; I expand on their findings
by showing how issuer specific shocks in the secondary market force companies
to rely on non institutional tranches at the expense of an increase in the cost of
borrowing. This complements the literature on firms arbitraging capital market
distortions4. I show that companies are able to only partially reduce the impact of
shocks in the secondary markets by shifting from institutional to non-institutional
loans, consistent with the idea of debt specialization (Colla et al., 2013).
1.2 The Mechanics of CLOs
A collateralized loan obligation (CLO) is a bankruptcy remote5 investment vehi-
cle whose purpose is to invest in fixed income assets, usually leveraged loans, and
whose liabilities are represented by notes with decreasing seniority which is strictly
enforced. Similarly to other types of securitizations, the interest and principal pay-
ments to noteholders come with a predetermined seniority, with senior notes re-
ceiving the first cashflows available to be distributed according to predetermined
rules, followed by less senior notes and, eventually, equity holders. To enforce
the seniority of the liabilities of a CLO, each tranche is subject to a battery of tests
making sure that the priority of repayment is maintained. At each payment date
CLO notes are tested against prespecified thresholds before the CLO is able to de-
termine the distribution of cashflows to the noteholders. We can divide the tests
into those that force the management team to divert cashflows from the junior to
4Loughran and Ritter (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2000), Dong et al. (2012) provide evidence on
firms arbitraging equity markets misvaluations. Baker et al. (2003), Greenwood and Hanson (2013)
and Harford et al. (2014) on firms timing debt markets. Gao and Lou (2013) and Ma (2019) on timing
across different markets.
5Each party involved in the creation of a CLO, i.e., the originator, the arranger, the trustee and
the manager, is separate from the assets which are placed in and legally held by a special purpose
vehicle (SPV). The same applies to the CLO’s liabilities. This guarantees protection from bankruptcy
of the CLO for the parties involved and protection from bankruptcy of the parties involved for the
owners of CLO’s liabilities. This separation is highly sought after in order to guarantee that the
creditworthiness of CLOs’ liabilities is fully and uniquely determined by their assets. In order to
obtain bankruptcy remoteness, the SPV must be a separate legal and operational entity, the assets
must have been transferred via a true sale, and the originator cannot exercise control over the SPV
(CreditFlux, 2015).
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the senior notes, and the so called maintain-or-improve tests. The latter group - in-
cluding tests on the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of assets, the weighted
average spread (WAS), the industry concentration, and the weighted average life
(WAL) of the collateral - are meant to reduce the riskiness of the CLO holdings, but
have minimal impact on the trading behaviour of the management team (Loumioti
and Vasvari, 2019b) because they tend to have ample slack and do not cause any
diversion of cashflows from one class of notes to another. The other group, which is
comprised of the over-collateralization (OC) and interest coverage (IC) tests, have
more serious consequences for noteholders and have material consequences on the
trading behaviour of the management team. Often OC tests are considered among
the most onerous hurdles CLO managers have to face (CreditFlux, 2015). OC tests
are a key tool in enforcing the seniority of the principal value of the notes of a CLO
by guaranteeing that the value of the assets under management remains above
a certain multiple of the par value of CLO tranches, while IC tests are meant to
maintin the order of seniority of interest distributions. Given the paper mostly fo-
cuses on OC tests, I will describe their workings in greater detail. If we start from
the most senior note (which I denote with the letter A) a CLO manager needs to
make sure that the following constrain is not violated:
ÕC
A ≡ Par Value of Assets + Excess Cash
Par value of Class A Tranche
+
Market Value of Impaired Assets
Par value of Class A Tranche
≥ OCA
(1.1)
where OCA is a tranche specific threshold. It is obvious from equation (1.1) that,
at the numerator of the test, assets under management are counted at par value
(usually $100 for leveraged loans in the United States) unless they have been im-
paired; in that case they might incur haircuts. The OC tests of CLO 2.0, i.e., the
greatest majority of CLOs issued during and after the 2007-09 financial crisis, de-
fine as impaired securities all those assets that have defaulted or are at imminent
risk of default, i.e., those rated at Caa1 (CCC resp.) or below by Moody’s(Standard
& Poor’s)6. Defaulted securities are counted at the lower between their market
value and the assumed recovery rate. The haircut for Caa (CCC) securities is more
complex: each CLO has a Caa (CCC) bucket with a predetermined threshold, usu-
6Securities purchased at a deep discount, i.e. below $85-$80, are usually counted at their market
value, as well.
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ally 7.5% of the value of the CLO’s collateral7, and the loans above this limit with
the lowest market value receive a haircut equal to the difference between their par
value and their market price. Given that Caa (CCC) securities are generally traded
at a significant discount compared to par, this guarantees that the numerator of the
OC test is reduced whenever a CLO has more than 7.5% of securities rated at Caa
(CCC) or below.
The same mechanism applies to any other tranche with lower seniority; for
instance, for tranches with seniority equal to k = B, C, ..., the OC test can be repre-
sented in the following way:
ÕC
k ≡ Par Value of Assets + Excess Cash
∑k′≤k Par Value of Tranche k′
+
Market Value of Impaired Assets
∑k′≤k Par Value of Tranche k′
≥ OCk
(1.2)
where the denominator sums over the par value of all the tranches k′ with higher
seniority than k. It is not an accident, but rather a featured design, that OC tests
have little sensitivity with respect to swings in loan prices, given that, in their cal-
culation, the greatest majority of assets are treated at their par value. The same
holds true for any change in ratings that does not involve the Caa (CCC) bucket.
On the other hand, managers are particularly sensitive to changes in ratings
that have a material effect on the Caa (CCC) bucket, given that breaching the limit
of 7.5% forces managers to significantly reduce the value of their securities. Vio-
lating OC tests has serious consequences for a CLO manager: their compensation
is, in fact, directly tied to the satisfaction of this metric. In particular, we can split
the compensation of managers in three parts, two of which are conditional on the
satisfaction of the OC test limit. The managing team first receives a senior fee which
is a constant fraction of assets under management, usually 0.2%, and does not de-
pend on the performance of the portfolio of loans. This fee is senior to any other
payment to the noteholders and it is meant to be used to carry on with the daily
management duties of the CLO. Second, we have the junior fee, which is earned
after all the coupons to noteholders have been paid: this fee is approximately 0.3%
of assets under management and it is meant to incentivize the management team
7Some deals, usually called ”enhanced CLOs”, are allowed to reach higher limits. They are
however rare representing less than 0.3% of the market in 2019 (Goldfarb, 2019; S&P Global, 2019).
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to make sure that the CLO’s cashflows are sufficient to repay noteholders. Finally,
we have the incentive fee. The incentive fee is paid after the equity holders of the
CLO have achieved a pre-specified hurdle rate and consists of 20% of the cashflows
above the prespecified hurdle.
Failing any of the OC tests (1.2) will reduce the compensation of the manage-
ment team: any interest received must be diverted from paying notes with a lower
seniority compared to the one that has failed the test; second, to make sure that
the test is satisfied in the future, any principal repayment is diverted into repaying
the principal of all the notes with a higher seniority; third, and most importantly,
the management team does not receive neither the junior nor the incentive fee, de-
facto cutting their income by more than half. It is therefore crucial for a manager
to avoid breaching any OC test. While this high-powered incentive is designed to
make sure that the interests of the management team are aligned with the interest
of the liability holders, it might also be responsible for a distortion of the objective
of the management team. It is an empirical question whether and how the threat of
failing an OC test affect the trading behaviour of CLO managers: this specific issue
is tackled in Section 1.4. Before delving into this topic, the next section introduces
the data I use in the rest of the paper.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
In order to analyse the trading behaviour of CLO managers and their effect on
leveraged loans, we need to collect data on the holdings and trades of CLOs, to-
gether with the characteristics of the underlying loans. All the data on CLOs come
from the CreditFlux Clo-i dataset. CLOs are required to provide their investors
with a quarterly payment report and a monthly trustee report which have been
collected by CreditFlux starting from 2009. More specifically, I make use of granu-
lar data on the universe of CLOs’ holdings at their reporting dates, all the transac-
tions that CLOs have completed between reporting dates and all the results of the
OC tests which constrain the CLOs in my sample. The focus of the paper is on US
based CLOs in the period between January 2009 and December 2019. Overall I have
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access to 89,111 unique reports from 2,601 distinct CLO deals, supervised by 218
distinct managers. Summary statistics are provided in Table A1, where Panel A re-
ports the statistics for each individual CLO deal at each reporting date, while Panel
B presents data aggregated at the management team level. The average (median)
CLO deal has $434.73Mln ($408.86Mln) assets under management, comprised by
213.82 (203) unique securities from 168.2 (157) distinct issuers. Each security, on av-
erage, represents 1% of the total portfolio. The average age for a CLO is 2.57 years,
reaching up to 11.90 years. If we look at the characteristics of the securities held by
CLOs, the median fraction of assets rated at Caa (CCC) or below is about 6%, with
a mean of 9%. On the other hand the median fraction of defaulted assets is equal to
2%, while the median is equal to 5%.8. The typical team contemporaneously man-
ages 5.57 CLOs for a total of $2.505Bln of assets. The average number of securities
held is 565.32 issued by, on average, 257.45 distinct companies. Management teams
are on average 4.70 years in sample.
I then proceed to analyse the transactions carried out by CLOs whose summary
statistics are reported in Table A2. First of all, it should be noted that CLOs do not
report a trade in roughly 18% of the months (i.e., they have zero trades for 16,596
reports out of 89,111 total reports). When they do trade, the average number of
transactions is equal to 29.73 while the median number of transactions is 19. If we
analyse purchases and sales separately, CLOs do not buy any security in 26.5% of
the reports, while they do not sell any security in 26.8% of the reports. CLOs tend
to purchase securities in the ramping-up period when they are trying to reach the
desired amount of assets under management, while sales happen during the whole
life of the deal: this implies that the average number of purchases is larger than the
average number of sales (19.25 vs 13.69) given that securities are usually bought in
bulk at the beginning of the life of a CLO. This is confirmed by the figures on the
total amount of transactions: on average CLOs report purchases for $22.44Mln and
sales for $10.84Mln. These figures are highly skewed with the largest amount pur-
chased equal to $2.37Bln and the largest amount of securities sold equal to roughly
8Some CLOs end up having 100% of assets rated at CCC or below before they are shut down,
skewing the mean towards larger values. The same holds true for defaulted securities.
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$1Bln. The typical security is sold at a price of $98.20, while the typical purchase
price is $98.99. There are two possible explanations for this divergence: either
CLOs tend to sell worse performing and purchase better performing securities, or
CLOs tend to purchase securities in periods of relative calm and become forced
sellers in periods of distress. I will show in Section 1.4 that the latter explanation
is the more plausible among the two: in periods of distress, when downgrades be-
come more prevalent, CLO managers become forced sellers. Further statistics on
CLO holdings and transactions are provided in Appendices A.4 and A.5.
Finally, the analysis in Section 1.6 focuses on the impact that forced sales have
on the primary market for U.S. syndicated loans. The data on loan originations
is collected from Refinitiv’s Security Data Company (SDC) Platinum9. The dataset
includes historical information on more than 315,000 global corporate loan transac-
tions since the early 1980s. In the paper I will focus on loans issued by companies
domiciled in the United States between January 2009 and December 2019. In order
to compute the exposure of issuers to loan rollover I also include all the loans ma-
turing after January 2009, but potentially issued before my sample period starts.
The overall sample includes 76,610 unique tranches from 48,757 facilities issued by
19,378 distinct borrowers. No common identifier between the SDC Platinum and
the CLO-i dataset exists; for this reason, Appendix A.3 outlines the matching pro-
cedure used to link the two datasets. The analysis in Section 1.6 makes use of the
number of loans, the tranche size and the All-in Spread Drawn (AISD) obtained
from SDC Platinum.
1.4 Trading Behaviour
In Section 1.2 I have outlined how the compensation of CLO managers is tied to the
satisfaction of OC tests. In this section I analyse how managers’ portfolio choices
are affected by the incentives generated by OC tests and whether their trading be-
haviour responds to the deterioration of this metric. Equation (1.2) clearly shows
that OC tests are affected by external shocks only when securities default or when
9Thomson Financial, I. (2001).
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they are downgraded to Caa (CCC): in what follows, I focus on the second type
of shock10. In particular, in the remaining of this section, I show the following:
managers do actively trade in order to restore their OC constraints when hit by
downgrades to Caa (CCC); because there is a certain degree of freedom in book-
ing Caa (CCC) rated securities at an inflated value on the balance sheet of CLOs,
managers avoid directly selling them; CLOs restore their OC tests by building par,
namely by selling high quality securities that trade at or above par and buying low
quality securities that trade well below par.
I start by providing evidence that managers actively trade in order to restore
their OC constraints. When a security is downgraded to Caa (CCC), if the Caa
(CCC) bucket is already above the 7.5% threshold, the marginal Caa (CCC) se-
curity receives a haircut which, in turn, impairs the OC test. This implies that,
absent any active measure by the manager, OC tests should mechanically deteri-
orate when a CLO is hit by a downgrade. I therefore measure the slack of an OC







i,t is the realization of the OC test for tranche k and CLO i,
while OCki is the predetermined test threshold. I then construct two dummy vari-
ables: Shockedi,t which takes a value of one whenever a CLO has been hit by down-
grades to Caa (CCC), and Above 7.5%i,t which takes a value of one when the Caa
(CCC) bucket is above the threshold of 7.5%. I proceed by regressing the percent-
age slack of a CLO’s OC tests on these variables and report the results in Table
A3, from which we can conclude that there is no mechanical relationship between
tests and shocks. In particular, columns (1)-(4) show that, after having been hit by
downgrades to Caa (CCC), the slack of OC tests is neither higher nor lower: these
results are robust to the inclusion of time, CLO deals, and type of test (Junior vs
Senior) fixed effects. When the interaction Shockedi,t×Above 7.5%i,t is included in
column (5), there is still no evidence that the slack of CLOs hit by downgrades to
Caa (CCC) and whose Caa (CCC) buckets are above 7.5% is lower than average.
10Table A1 shows that defaulted securities tend to be a relatively small fraction of CLOs’ collat-
eral; moreover, defaulted securities are usually first downgraded to Caa (CCC): conditionally on
being rated Caa (CCC), the probability of default within one year is about 25% (Elton et al., 2001;
Fei et al., 2012; S&P Global, 2020a).
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Recall that there should be a mechanical negative relationship between the slack
of an OC test and the number of Caa (CCC) rated securities as shown in equation
(1.2). The lack of any correlation between the two hints at the fact that managers
respond to incentives and actively trade to restore their OC tests. When assets are
downgraded to Caa (CCC) between reporting periods, managers actively trade be-
fore the next report to make sure their compensation is not reduced. As a result,
the slack of CLOs that suffered a downgrade is no different from the slack of the
ones that did not.
After having determined that managers respond to incentives and actively trade
to restore OC tests, we are left wondering what actions can a manager undertake
in order to improve this metric. There are only two ways to gain slack on the OC
test: the first way is to directly get rid of Caa (CCC) securities or any security that
is counted at market value, while the other is to build par. Selling Caa (CCC) loans
that are recorded at their market value can help as long as the marginal security,
i.e., the security that was crossing the 7.5% threshold, does nor receive a haircut
and is recorded at par-value or if the proceeds are used to purchase securities that
trade at a discount. This is, however, a relatively ineffective strategy for two rea-
sons. First there is a purely quantitative consideration: Caa (CCC) loans trade at
large discounts hence it takes a relatively large number of securities to gather a
sizeable amount of cash. Second, selling a Caa (CCC) security would force the
manager to recognize a capital loss that could possibly be avoided. This is because
distressed loans usually receive a haircut that is in line with their market price if
they have been recently traded; managers, however, can value distressed loans at
a theoretical bid price obtained from a dealer in case there is no pricing informa-
tion(CreditFlux, 2015). This price is then certified by the CLO trustee. Managers
may have some freedom in recording Caa (CCC) loans at a higher price compared
to the one they could realise by selling the security. In order to test this hypothesis
I make use of the fact that, since September 2017, CLO-i reports data on the price
at which each loan has been recorded on CLOs’ monthly reports. I can therefore
directly compare the price at which loans are recorded on the balance sheet of a
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CLO with their closest market price by running the following regression:
discountj,t = αj + αt + β1Transactionj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.3)
discountj,t = 100× log(100/Pj,t) is the discount compared to par11, Transactionj,t is
an indicator variable equal to one whenever the price comes from an actual trans-
action (purchase or sale) by a CLO and zero otherwise, αj and αt are issuer and
time fixed effects, while Xj,t includes a set of fixed effects for rating, industry and
interest rate of the loan. Table A4 reports the results of regression (1.3), with Panel
A focusing on all loans, while Panel B restricting the attention to loans with a rat-
ing of Caa (CCC) and below. As expected, the results indicate that managers have
a certain freedom in keeping loans at inflated prices on their balance sheet. After
having controlled for the effect of confounders, the average transaction happens at
a discount of 87bps compared to the average price at which the loan is recorded
on the trustee report by CLO managers. The result is robust to the inclusion of
Year×Month×Issuer fixed effects that are meant to partial out any unobservable
issuer characteristics. The impact is much larger when we focus on Caa (CCC)
loans in Panel B: the average loan rated at Caa (CCC) or below is usually traded
at a discount of 400bps compared to the average price recorded on CLO monthly
reports. Selling these securities is particularly costly in order to gain slack in the
OC constraints.
CLOs, however, are not required to sell their entire bucket of Caa (CCC) securi-
ties: the management team needs to make sure that the number of Caa (CCC) loans
does not exceed the threshold of 7.5%. This implies that it might be optimal for the
CLO to guarantee that these securities never cross the 7.5% and we can use this fact
to check whether managers actively trade these loans to pass the OC tests.This is
the aim of Figure A1 plotting the empirical distribution of Caa (CCC) securities as
a fraction of assets. The figure shows that there is no obvious discontinuity at 7.5%.
I formally test the presence of such a discontinuity using Cattaneo et al. (2020) lo-
cal polynomial density estimator. Table A5 provides no evidence in favour of such
11For a loan with price Pjt = $100− $X and par value of $100, the discount is equal to 100×
log($100/($100− $X)) ≈ X percent.
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a discontinuity, suggesting managers do not actively keep the pool of Caa (CCC)
securities at the 7.5% threshold.
If managers do not trade loans recorded at their market value, they can engage
in par building in order to improve their OC tests. Par building involves a trade
whereby a manager sells a highly quality security, possibly trading above par, in
favour of a lower quality security, trading below par. For instance, a CLO in need of
$100 of par value can adopt the following strategy: sell nine loans that are currently
trading at $100; the transaction will generate proceeds for $900 which the manager
will immediately use to buy ten loans that are currently trading at $90. In market
value terms the transaction is neutral, given that the proceeds from the sale can be
used to buy the new loans. However the OC test will improve: nine loans trading
at par contributed for 9 × $100 = $900 in the OC test, while ten loans trading at $90
will contribute for their full par value in the OC test,i.e., 10 × $100 = $1000 in the
numerator of the OC test. The rest of the section will show that, indeed, managers
resort to par building in order to improve their OC tests.
First, par building should be more aggressive for those CLOs whose OC con-
straints are close to be binding. In order to test this hypothesis, I divide CLOs in
seven buckets12 based on the slack of their OC tests. I measure the amount of par













where Pj,t−1 is the last transaction price available for security j before being traded
by CLO i. Notice that the lagged price Pj,t−1 is not affected by the CLO transac-
tion and captures the price a manager faces when deciding which loans to sell
in order to restore their OC tests. I then sum across all the transactions by a











12The buckets are the following: [-100%,-5%), [-5%,0%),[0%, 5%), [5%,10%),
[10%,15%),[15%,20%),[20%, 100%).
13To understand the construction of the gain, it might be instructive to look at a specific example.
If a CLO with assets of $10,000 sells nine loans trading at $100 then the gain is equal to −($100−
$100)× 9$10,000 = 0, while if the manager buys ten loans trading at $90 the gain is equal to ($100−
$90) × 10$10,000 = +0.009. The two transactions have generated an increase in par value equal to
($100−$100)×10+(100−90)×9
$10,000 = +0.009. If we multiply by 100 we get the figure in percentage terms, i.e.
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The left panel of Figure A2 plots the average amount of par gained as a function
of the slack of Junior OC tests, while the right panel as a function of the slack of
Senior tests. It is clear that CLOs whose Junior OC tests are binding, i.e. those with
slack close to 0%, are more likely to engage in par building compared to any other
CLOs. The large discontinuity between the CLOs that have just missed an OC test
and those that have barely passed it suggests that par building is a key tool used by
managers in order to guarantee the satisfaction of their constraint and is consistent
with previous evidence by Loumioti and Vasvari (2019a,b). Figure A16 confirms
that indeed there is a clear discontinuity in par gained between these two groups
of CLOs. No such a discontinuity is present in Senior OC tests, signalling that these
are less important in determining the trading behaviour of CLO managers.
After having performed this unconditional analysis we can study the behaviour
of CLOs that have a binding constraint in the month when they are hit by down-
grades to Caa (CCC). For this purpose I construct a dummy variable Shockedi,t that
is equal to one whenever the loans of a CLO have been downgraded to Caa (CCC)
and a dummy variable Constrainedi,t that is equal to one whenever the slack of a
CLO is between 0% and 5%, i.e., the CLO is in the group that we have shown to be
more likely to engage in par building. Columns (1) and (2) in Table A6 report the
results of the following regression:
gaini,j,t = α+ β1Constrainedi,t + β2Shockedi,t + β3Constrainedi,t× Shockedi,t + εi,t
(1.4)
while, columns (3) and (4) report the results of the following regressions, where I
sum across all the transactions of a CLO at time t:
gaini,t = α + β1Constrainedi,t + β2Shockedi,t + β3Constrainedi,t × Shockedi,t + εi,t
(1.5)
Columns (1) and (3) measure the slack in terms of Junior OC tests, while columns
(2) and (4) in terms of Senior tests. From all the regressions we can infer that
shocked CLOs are more likely to engage in par building: each transaction of a
0.9 percent.
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shocked CLO contributes towards increasing par by between 0.005% and 0.006%,
while when we sum across all the transaction carried out by a CLO, we can con-
clude that shocked CLOs build between 0.033% and 0.050% more par compared to
the CLOs in the control group14. When we compare the differential effect of Junior
and Senior tests, i.e. we contrast the results in column (1) and (3) with those in
columns (2) and (4), we can conclude that only Junior tests matter for par building:
CLOs whose Junior slack is between 0% and 5% build 0.035 more par per period
compared to other CLOs, while being shocked adds an extra 0.069 in par. The over-
all effect for CLOs that are constrained and have suffered from downgrades is of
15.4bps (i.e., 3.5bps + 5bps + 6.9bps).
Similarly, we can analyse the probability of selling securities that trade above
par or that are rated Caa (CCC) in the month other loans on the same balance sheet
have been downgraded. Figure A3 and A4 show that CLOs that barely passed their
OC tests are more likely to sell securities above par and less likely to sell securities
that are rated Caa (CCC) or below in the month of a downgrade. It should be
stressed that CLOs that barely passed their tests are likely to be different from those
that missed them along many dimensions. However the scope of the paper is to
study the impact of CLOs on the price of loans. Therefore even if the two groups
of CLOs differ systematically, this does not invalidate the identification strategy
employed to study the price impact of CLOs. We only need to prove that the loans
sold by constrained CLOs are sold for non fundamental reasons. Even if the subset
of securities held by the two groups were systematically different, we could control
for this difference with the help of issuer fixed effects that would take care of this
type of selection.
It should be pointed out that par building helps a manager in locking-in trading
gains by selling well performing loans and buying loans that are trading at a lower
price. However this does not represent a free-lunch: the loans that are sold might
be significantly safer compared to the ones that are purchased, resulting in risk-
shifting. It is intuitive that constrained and unconstrained CLOs might engage
14While these figures might seem small, notice that each transaction represents a small frac-
tion the assets of a CLO. Moreover notice that the improvement in OC tests is equal to gaini,t ×
Principal Balancei,t
Par Value of Note ki,t
where k = Junior, Senior.
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in par building for different reasons: in normal times CLOs want to improve the
quality of their collateral, while - when the constraint is binding - to gain slack on
their OC tests. One way to test this hypothesis is to look at the riskiness of the loans
that are sold and purchased by constrained and unconstrained CLOs: if indeed
the trading behaviour of constrained CLOs is motivated by a desire to restore the
strength of OC tests, then we should expect them to sell safer loans to finance the
purchase of riskier ones. In order to investigate this hypothesis, I measure the
riskiness of a loan with its rating factor. CLOs are, in fact, subject to tests on the
Weighted-Average Rating Factor (WARF) of their assets, where loans are assigned
a numeric value on a scale from 1 to 10,000 which is supposed to capture their
riskiness. I make use of Moody’s rating mapping (reported in Table A7) in order
to transform the ordinal ratings into a meaningful cardinal value. The rating factor
increases with the riskiness of a security, ranging from 1 (Aaa) to 10,000 (Ca-C). The
typical rating for a loan on the balance sheet of a CLO is B2, commanding a factor
of 2,720, while the average and median WARF are 2,923.48 and 2,737, respectively.
As one should expect, WARFs tend to vary and follow the business cycle, as Figure
A14 shows.
Table A8 formally tests whether constrained CLOs tend to sell higher qual-
ity securities by regressing the rating factor of loans sold and purchased on the
Shockedi,t and Constrainedi,t dummies. The table shows that unconstrained CLOs
sell lower quality loans (average rating factor of 3025) compared to the ones they
buy (average rating factor of 2641), implying that - in normal times - their trading
decisions make their collateral safer. When CLOs are hit by downgrades, however,
they sell loans of slightly higher quality and purchase loans of lower quality: on
average, the assets they sell have a rating factor that is 151.6 points lower, while
their purchases have a rating factor that is 67.5 points higher. The coefficient on
the Constrainedi,t dummy, suggests that, when they have not been hit by down-
grades, the quality of the loans they sell is slightly worse (73.9 points), while there
is no difference in the loans they purchase. Finally the coefficient of interest, i.e. on
Shockedi,t×Constrainedi,t, shows that after having suffered a downgrade to Caa
(CCC), CLOs whose constraints are binding sell loans that are significantly safer
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(-514.2 points), while they purchase riskier loans (105.8 points). The results in the
table suggest that the average rating factor of loans sold by distressed CLOs is
591.9 points (i.e., -151.6 + 73.9 - 514.2) lower compared to the CLOs in the control
group, while the average rating factor of their purchases is 166.4 (i.e., 67.5 - 6.9 +
105.8) higher. Column (3) in Table A8 allows us to analyse how OC constraints
affect the portfolio composition of each individual CLO by aggregating across all
the trades executed between reporting periods. The variable of interest is now the
change in the WARF caused by all CLO trades between reporting dates, namely:
∆WARFi,t = ∑j RFi,j,t ×
Amt. Purchasedi,j,t
∑j Amt. Purchasedi,j,t
− ∑j RFi,j,t ×
Amt. Soldi,j,t
∑j Amt. Soldi,j,t
. As the previ-
ously results suggested, CLOs - when unconstrained - make their portfolios safer
with their trades, as shown by the fact that, on average, they experience a change
in WARF of 441.3 points. CLOs whose loans have been downgraded to Caa (CCC),
however, deteriorate the quality of their assets by 316.2 point, while those whose
Junior slack is between 0% and 5% by 374.5. CLOs whose constraints are binding
and whose loans have been downgraded to Caa (CCC) do even worse by decreas-
ing the quality of their portfolio by a further 79.1 points, implying that their assets
are, on average, 769.9 points riskier compared to CLOs in the control group and
328.6 points compared to the counterfactual where they did not execute any trade.
To conclude, the evidence in this section suggests that when hit by downgrades
to Caa (CCC), constrained CLO managers sell high quality securities in order to
pass their OC test requirements compared to managers that decided to fail their
tests or could not do otherwise. These loans are sold for non fundamental reasons,
allowing us to use downgrades to Caa (CCC) as an exogenous source of variation in
the supply of loans held by the CLOs affected by the shock. Consider, for instance,
the following thought experiment: there are two ex-ante identical loans, LA and
LB, which are held by CLOs α and β. An otherwise unrelated loan, say LC, is
downgraded to Caa (CCC). Imagine, LC is held by CLO α, not by β. Once α is hit
by a downgrade, LA is more likely to be sold to restore α’s OC constraint; if the
market for LA is not liquid enough to absorb the excess supply, price might fall
compared to LB as long as arbitrageurs are unable to spot the mispricing and bring
it back in line. The usual issue with this type of reasoning is that α’s management
CHAPTER 1. CONTAGION IN THE MARKET FOR LEVERAGED LOANS 34
team endogenously chooses to sell LA, and this might happen for reasons that are
unobservable to the econometrician. This is, however, less likely to represent an
issue in this case: we have shown in this section that OC tests incentivize managers
to sell their best performing loans, implying that, if present, selection is likely to go
against finding any price impact, that is, other investors should be willing to buy
high quality assets which are sold by distressed CLOs. If, on the other hand, we
find that the price of LA is depressed compared to LB, we should conclude that
this is due to the price impact of CLOs and to the fact that it might take some time
for arbitrageurs to direct their capital towards the secondary market for leveraged
loans (Duffie, 2010). The next section will analyse and test this hypothesis in greater
detail.
1.5 Impact on Prices
In the previous section I have shown how the presence of binding OC constraints
can distort the trading behaviour of CLO managers; in particular I have shown
that whenever a loan is downgraded below Caa (CCC), managers affected by the
downgrade engage in par building by selling higher rated securities, especially so
if their junior OC tests are binding. This trading behaviour gives us an instrument
to investigate the extent to which the prices of loans are effected by forced sales that
are unrelated to fundamentals. I can therefore trace the impact of the forced sale
on the loan’s price controlling for ex-ante measurable characteristics to get an esti-
mate of how the secondary market for leveraged loans absorbs supply shocks. The
endogenous choice of selling a security might bias the results towards finding no
effect, given that loans that are sold by distressed CLOs tend to be of higher quality
compared to the ones sold by non-distressed ones. One might still be worried that
selection happens through unobservable characteristics that cannot be measured
by the econometrician. To alleviate this concern, I show in Section 1.5.1 that this is
not the case even when we assess the extent of ex-post selection: conditioning on
ex-ante observables, loans that are sold by distressed CLOs are not more likely to
be downgraded, to default, nor they display worsened liquidity. We can therefore
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conclude that the results in this section provide a lower bound for the impact of
CLOs on the secondary market for leveraged loans.
In order to measure the impact of CLOs, I compare the average discount of
loans sold by distressed CLOs after unrelated downgrades to Caa (CCC) with the
average discount of a group of control loans. The identification assumption is that,
after having controlled for time varying loan characteristics, the average discount
of the two groups of loans would be identical if not for the fact they have been
sold by distressed CLOs in order to restore their OC tests. The effect should be
largest among loans that receive more selling pressure: for this reason I proceed by
constructing a dummy variable, Shockedj,t, that is equal to one whenever a loan
has been sold by an above median number of distressed CLOs, where a CLO is
considered distressed if their loans have been downgraded to Caa (CCC) or lower
and the Junior OC slack is between 0% and 5%. These two conditions have been
proven to be related to non fundamental par-building in the previous section. I
then construct a dummy variable Postj,t that is equal to one in the twelve months
after a loan has been sold by an above median number of distressed CLOs. I then
proceed by running the following regression:
discountj,t = β1Shockedj,t + β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.6)
The matrix Xj,t contains various controls that are supposed to partial out the ef-
fect of measurable characteristics and exclude selection on ex-ante observables: the
regressions include fixed effects for the time-to-maturity (TTM), the rating, the in-
dustry and the interest rate of the loan, all interacted with year×month fixed ef-
fects, assuring that the discount of treated loans is compared with loans with iden-
tical characteristics trading in the same month. I also include the lagged average
discount on loans by the same issuer to control for the average discount on loans is-
sued by the same company15,16. Column (1) in Table A9 shows that shocked CLOs
15Table A31 includes issuer fixed effects instead of the lagged average discount per issuer. The
key difference between these two specification lies in the fact that the latter control for the average
discount on the issuer’s loans before and after the treatment date and, hence, might be influenced
by the treatment itself. The results are, however, similar to the ones in Table A9 suggesting there is
no selection in this direction.
16Figure A10 in the Appendix shows the fraction of variation explained by each fixed effect in-
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sell expensive loans to improve their OC tests: loans sold by shocked CLOs trade
at 39.5bps premium compared to their control group, confirming the findings in
the previous section. This difference, however, becomes insignificant once we add
time varying fixed effects for time-to-maturity, rating, industry and interest rate
in columns (2)-(5), implying that most of the unconditional differences in prices
between the treatment and control loans is absorbed by ex-ante measurable char-
acteristics; this points to the fact that fixed effects take care of most of the selection
between treatment and control groups in the choice of which securities should be
sold. When we look at the impact of sales by shocked CLOs on prices, we can no-
tice that treated loans trade at a discount of 71.8bps compared to untreated loans.
The result is still statistically significant and large when we add the other fixed
effects in columns (2)-(5), with the coefficients ranging between 43.6 and 49.4bps.
I then proceed to analyse whether loans sold by distressed CLOs trade at a
significant discount compared to other loans issued by the same company k by
including time varying issuer fixed effects which are meant to control for any un-
observable time varying firm characteristics. I report in Table A10 the results of the
following regression:
discountj,k,t = αk,t + β1Shockedj,t + β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,k,t (1.7)
where αk,t are year×month×issuer fixed effects. Loans sold by distressed CLOs
trade at 12bps discount compared to otherwise similar loans issued by the same
borrower. Two considerations are however in order. First, the median (average)
number of loans per issuer actively traded in any given month is 2 (3.1) and 33.6%
of the time an issuer has a unique loan traded in a given month, implying that
a large fraction of the observations do not have a loan in the control group. If
we take into account the fact that companies with fewer traded loans tend to be
smaller and less liquid, this might explain the reduction in magnitude of the coeffi-
cients compared to Table A9. Columns (2)-(4) in Table A10 confirm this hypothesis:
when I restrict the sample to issuers having at least 2,5 and 10 actively traded loans
cluded in the regressions, ranging from year×month rate fixed effects, which explain 15% of the
variation, to loan issuer × year ×month fixed effects, which explain 90% of the variation.
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the impact of CLOs grows to 12.6bps, 15.3bps and 17.9bps, respectively. Second,
loans tend to be priced by comparables (Murfin and Pratt, 2018) and it is likely
that the shock to a specific issue reverberates across all the loans issued by the
same company even when this shock is non fundamental, proof being the fact that
the issuer×year×month fixed effects explain a large fraction of the variation in dis-
counts. The spillover from loans sold by shocked CLOs to loans issued by the same
company implies that the estimate of β2 is likely to underestimate the true magni-
tude of the effect in this specification. On top of that, notice that the Postj,t dummy
takes into account the average difference in discounts in the twelve months follow-
ing the shock: if the impact of the shocks lasts less than one year, we should expect
this coefficient to be downward biased, given that it is already incorporating part
of the reversal. In order to check whether this is the case, and trace the impact of a
shock across time, I construct a set of dummy variables tracking the discount every
month around the forced sale, which allows me to run the following regression:




βsShockedj,t × 1(t + s) + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.8)
where Shockedj,t is defined as above and 1(t + s) is a set of dummies that are
equal to one s = −6,−5, ..., 11, 12 months around the event of the sale at time t.
The results are provided in Table A12 and plotted in Figure A517. The results in
Table A12 show that the direct impact of CLOs is between 22bps and 25.9bps in
the month when loans are sold. The gap between the treatment and control group
starts widening in the months after the sale with the difference reaching its maxi-
mum around six months after the sale when treated loans trade at between 54.4bps
and 103bps discount compared to loans in the control group. Shocked loans need
between ten and twelve months before their discount is not statistically different
from the discount of the control group, but their difference starts to reduce signif-
icantly between the seventh and the ninth month. Figure A22 plots the average
discount of loans in the treated group showing that their discount jumps imme-
17Figure A5 plots the results for model (4) in Table A12, including year×month×time-to-maturity,
year×month×rating and year×month×industry fixed effects. The other results are plotted in Fig-
ure A21.
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diately on impact; however, CLOs are more likely to have binding OC constraints
in months when the market for leveraged loans is in distress. In the months after
the shock, treated loans recover at a slower pace compared to those in the con-
trol group, widening the gap in average discounts up to seven/nine months when
the treated loans slowly converge back to the control group. The presence of sig-
nificant price reversal towards the control group is suggestive of the fact that the
increase in discounts is more likely due to price pressure rather than changes in the
fundamental value of the assets (Coval and Stafford, 2007); the fact that the market
for leveraged loans is dislocated between seven and nine months after the fire sale
is consistent with the evidence in Elkamhi and Nozawa (2021) who find a price
impact of 35-40 weeks for loans sold by CLOs.
Finally, I turn to loans that distressed CLOs have purchased to build par. We
can expect an asymmetry between sales and purchases in times of distress: dis-
tressed CLOs have a hard time finding investors willing to buy their assets, while
it might be easier to meet with an investor willing to sell in periods of distress. I
proceed to analyse the effect on loans purchased by distressed CLOs by running a
difference-in-differences regression similar to the one in equation (1.5). If we look
at the coefficient on Shockedj,t × Postj,t in Table A11 we quickly realize there is no
evidence of upward price pressure on loans purchased by distressed CLOs. The
coefficient is never statistically significant, with the exception of column (2) which
includes only year×month×time-to-maturity fixed effects, suggesting that the dis-
count on loans purchased by shocked CLOs is not different from other loans pur-
chased in the twelve months after the event. The dynamic responses of discounts
to forced purchases by shocked CLOs are reported in Table A33 and Figure A23.
Overall, the evidence in this section is conclusive of the fact that CLOs exer-
cise a statistically and economically significant price pressure on the loans they
are forced to sell whenever their OC tests bind because of a shock to their Caa
(CCC) bucket. I have previously argued that any selection in the treated loans is
likely to generate downward bias in the magnitude of the price pressure. The ad-
dition of fixed effects based on loan characteristics has made sure that, conditional
on ex-ante observables, there is indeed no selection between treated and control
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groups. However, the following section tests whether there is any selection ex-post
by analysing whether shocked loans are more likely to default or be downgraded.
1.5.1 Absence of Selection
By including time, time-to-maturity, rating, industry and borrower fixed effects
we can be confident that the effect on loan discounts documented in the previous
section is not motivated by ex-ante observable characteristics. In the specification
where with year×month×issuer fixed effect, we can be confident that all the bor-
rower time-varying characteristics have been partialled out in the analysis, hence
showing that at least a fraction of the effect is security specific. However, we can
still argue that CLOs might trade on ex-ante unobservable information which is
not captured by the previously used controls. There is indeed evidence that trades
in the secondary market for leveraged loans predict equity returns (Addoum and
Murfin, 2020), suggesting that active investors in this market have access to pri-
vate and valuable information; moreover Fabozzi et al. (2020) and Cordell et al.
(2020) show that CLO managers tend to profit by actively trading loans, further
suggesting that they might have access to information that is not available to other
investors in real time. In order to differentiate between the hypothesis suggested in
Section 1.5, i.e., that trades by distressed CLOs cause price pressure, and an alterna-
tive hypothesis where distressed CLOs simply have access to superior information
and forecast a drop in the price of the loans they sell, we need to look at whether
their trades are indeed able to predict outcomes that can be measured ex-post by
the econometrician. In particular, in the rest of this section, I show that trades by
distressed CLOs are not able to predict defaults or rating downgrades, therefore
suggesting that these trades are indeed purely caused by concerns related to their
OC tests.
The first test I conduct regards defaults. The results in Table A12 and Figure A5
suggest that the price impact of CLO trades lasts up to twelve months, therefore
I proceed by constructing a dummy variable that is equal to one whenever a loan
defaults in the following twelve months and check if loans sold by distressed CLOs
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are more likely to default compared to other loans held by CLOs. In order to control
for loan characteristics by employing fixed effects and avoid the incidental parameter
problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948), I will use the following linear probability model:
defaultj,t→t+12 = β1Shockedj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.9)
where defaultj,t→t+12 is a dummy variable equal to one when loan j defaults in the
period between t and t + 12, Shockedj,t is a dummy equal to one when the loan
has been sold by distressed CLOs and Xj,t is a matrix of fixed effects to control
for loan characteristics. The results are reported in Table A13. The baseline av-
erage probability of defaulting in the following twelve months for a loan that is
sold by a CLO is equal to 4.79%; column (1) shows that this probability is reduced
by 2.3% for the loans that are sold by distressed CLOs, confirming the hypothesis
that shocked CLOs tend to sell higher quality securities to meet their OC test con-
straints. The effect is large compared to the baseline and significant even when we
include time-to-maturity fixed effects at 0.9%. After the addition of rating fixed ef-
fects in columns (3)-(5) the coefficient becomes insignificant, suggesting that ratings
capture the difference in risk between treatment and control group. Overall, the ev-
idence in Table A13 is consistent with the hypothesis that sales by shocked CLOs
have no informational motives and are executed to meet OC constrains, adding to
the evidence that shocked CLOs are more aggressive in building par, they sell loans
with lower rating factors, and they cause price pressure on the loans they sell.
I can further develop this hypothesis by testing whether loans sold by distressed
CLOs are more or less likely to be downgraded or upgraded in the twelve months
following the sale. In order to do so, I run the following regression:
downgradej,t→t+12 = β1Shockedjt + Xjtδ + ε j,t (1.10)
where downgradej,t→t+12 is a dummy variable equal to one when loan j is down-
graded in the period between t and t + 12. Similarly I run a regression where the
outcome variable is upgradej,t→t+12, a dummy variable equal to one when a loan
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is upgraded in the period between t and t + 12. The results of the regressions are
reported in Table A14. The three leftmost columns show that loans sold by dis-
tressed CLOs after downgrades to Caa (CCC) of otherwise unrelated loans are not
more likely to be downgraded compared to loans in the control group after we
control for ex-ante observable loan characteristics: in none of the specifications the
coefficient is statistically different from zero. The same conclusion can be drawn
by looking at upgrades: none of the specifications makes us conclude that treated
loans are less likely to be upgraded in the following twelve months, compared to
their control group. Ex-ante observable characteristics predict ex-post observable
outcomes, suggesting that any regression including the former is unlikely to suffer
from selection issues between treatment and control groups.
Finally, one might wonder whether loans sold by distressed CLOs differ from
loans sold by other CLOs in terms of their liquidity. If loans sold by CLOs under
duress become less liquid after the sale, and if liquidity commands a premium, the
difference in discounts documented in Section 1.5 might be simply due to com-
pensation for this type risk. In order to test this hypothesis, I will employ two
commonly used proxies for liquidity in the literature on corporate bonds. First I
use Roll (1984)’s measure computed as the the negative of the autocovariance in
price changes, i.e. γ = −Cov(∆pt, ∆pt−1). Second I use the number of trades per
loan per month. The average value of γ is equal to 0.487, in line with measures for
the corporate bond market (Bao et al., 2011), while the average number of trades
per month is equal to 8.98, but heavily skewed towards few liquid loans, with the
median number equal to 5 and way lower than the average number of trades in the
corporate bond market. Table A15 reports the results of the following regression:
liquidityj,t = β1Shockedj,t + β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.11)
where liquidityj,t is either γ or log(Nr.Trades). In general we can conclude that
there is no clear difference in liquidity after a loan has been sold by a distressed
CLO. When we look at γ, the difference is significant in none of the specifications;
moreover, a higher value of γ signals higher illiquidity, implying that - if something
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- loans sold by shocked CLOs tend to be more liquid ex-post, even though this
is not statistically significant. When we look at the number of trades, we cannot
draw a firm conclusion: column (1) seems to suggest that loans sold by shocked
CLOs trade 3.9% more often after the sale, however the coefficient switches sign
and becomes insignificant in columns (2) and (3) once we add further controls,
suggesting that there is no statistical difference in liquidity.
We can conclude this section by summarizing its main findings. While we have
controlled for selection on ex-ante observables in Section 1.5, one might be worried
that treatment and control groups could select on unobservables. In this section we
have shown that, on the contrary, loans sold by shocked CLOs tend to be less likely
to default after the sale, there is no statistical difference in the likelihood of being
downgraded or in the liquidity of the loan ex-post. This confirms that selection on
unobservable characteristics is unlikely to explain the findings in Section 1.5.
1.5.2 Placebo Tests
In order to make sure the results in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 are not spurious I proceed
to conduct various placebo tests. The previous analysis is based on the premise that
shocks to the Caa (CCC) bucket have potentially a material effect on OC tests and
managers are forced to trade in order to make sure their tests are not violated. In
order to test whether these distortions are really caused by the downgrades to Caa
(CCC) I conduct the following placebo test: I construct a dummy variable that turns
on when a CLO receives a shock to the bucket of securities rated B3 (B-) by Moody’s
(Standard & Poor’s) and test whether these shocks have any effect on the trading
behaviour of CLOs. Given that the OC tests are unaffected by the downgrade, the
behaviour of management teams should not be distorted by these shocks. First I
study whether CLOs whose loans have been downgraded to B3 build par by re-
gressing the amount of par gained in each transaction on this dummy variable and
another indicator that is equal to one whenever the slack of the CLO is between
0% and 5%. The results are presented in Table A16, from which it is clear that, as
expected, CLOs hit by downgrades to B3 are neither more likely nor less likely to
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build par compared to CLOs in the control group: none of the coefficients is statis-
tically significant and their magnitudes tend to be puny. This is indeed consistent
with the idea that OC tests are insensitive to rating downgrades, as long as these
downgrades do not affect Caa (CCC) buckets, implying that treated CLOs do not
have any incentives to engage in par building more than they usually do. A similar
placebo test where I consider as shocked those CLOs whose loans have been down-
graded to a rating of B2 (B) according to Moody’s (Standard & Poor’s) is presented
in Table A35, displaying similar results.
I then proceed with the final placebo test which is constructed similarly and
tests whether sales performed by CLOs that have suffered a downgrade to B3 cause
price pressure. As shown in Table A16, the trading bahaviour of these CLOs is not
significantly different from the trading behaviour of CLOs in the control group,
hence there is no reason to expect their trades will happen at depressed prices.
Moreover, downgrades to B3 do not generate significant pressure across CLOs,
implying that there will likely be other CLOs with similar portfolios willing to buy
these loans. I construct a dummy variable, Shockedj,t, that is equal to one if a loan
has been sold by an above median number of distressed CLOs that have received
downgrades to B3 and a dummy variable Postj,t that is equal to one after the loan
has been sold by shocked CLOs. Table A17 reports the results of the following
regression:
discountj,t = β1Shockedj,t + β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.12)
where the variables are constructed as in previous sections. The results in Table
A17 confirm that loans sold by CLOs affected by downgrades to B3 do not trade at
a significant discount compared to loans in the control group. A similar result for
loans which have been sold by CLOs that suffered downgrades to B2 is reported in
Table A36, with similar findings.
1.6 Impact on Primary Markets
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Section 1.5 has documented that CLOs whose loans have been downgraded to Caa
(CCC), and whose OC constraints are binding, sell securities for non fundamental
reasons in order to restore the value of their tests. These sales depress the price
of loans for up to seven/nine months. Section 1.5.1 has shown that the trading
behaviour of distressed CLOs is not likely motivated by access to superior infor-
mation. Finally, Section 1.5.2 has provided evidence that these results are specific
to downgrades to Caa (CCC), hinting at the fact that these trades are indeed carried
out in order to gain slack on OC tests. Overall, these results can be interpreted as
evidence in favour of dislocations in the secondary market for loans unrelated to
issuing companies’ fundamentals and purely motivated by the mechanics of OC
tests. However distortions in the secondary market might simply result in zero-
sum transfers between distressed CLOs and unconstrained investors who are able
to purchase high quality securities at depressed prices and, hence, have limited
economic implications. That might not be the case whenever companies are forced
to access dislocated markets and accept worse terms of financing compared to what
they would have been able to do otherwise. Testing this hypothesis is particularly
challenging: firms can endogenously reduce their demand for funds or divert it
towards different markets, for instance, by trying to finance themselves using cor-
porate bonds, equities or even other types of leveraged loans that are not affected
by the previously documented shocks. In this section I will provide evidence in
favour of the hypothesis that companies whose loans have been sold for non funda-
mental reasons face worse terms of financing in the leverage loans primary market.
The demand for credit is an endogenous variable and if, as hinted above, compa-
nies whose loans have been sold by distressed CLOs are of higher quality, they
might demand less capital in response. I attempt to tackle the issue of endogenous
credit demand by adopting the following two strategies. First, I focus on compa-
nies whose previously issued loans are due to mature in the twelve months after
they have been sold by distressed CLOs. As in Almeida et al. (2011), the fact that a
firm is scheduled to refinance its debt in the following twelve months is the result
of previous financing decisions and is, therefore, plausibly exogenous with respect
to the downgrades to Caa (CCC) that have affected unrelated companies sharing
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the same CLO’s balance sheet. By focusing on this subset of firms for the treatment
and control group, I make sure that the two have roughly the same likelihood of
requiring funds. Second, and more importantly, I look at firms that do eventually
refinance themselves using leveraged loans and study the composition of newly
issued securities between institutional and non-institutional loans. This strategy is
reminiscent of the one used by papers analysing the substitution between corpo-
rate bonds and loans in periods of distress (Adrian et al., 2013; Becker and Ivashina,
2014) and by those on the substitution between institutional and bank tranches in
the syndicated loan market (Ivashina and Sun, 2011a; Fleckenstein et al., 2020). This
strategy guarantees that any variation in the terms of the loan cannot be explained
by company-specific factors, given that institutional and bank tranches are claims
on the same assets and usually have identical seniority18.
I document four facts: first, companies whose loans have been sold by dis-
tressed CLOs face a higher cost of capital; second, these companies are less likely
to issue institutional tranches which are usually held by CLOs; third, these com-
panies borrow less money through institutional tranches; fourth, conditional on
issuing an institutional tranche, these tend to be smaller. Figure A6 provides sug-
gestive evidence in these regards, which I discuss in greater detail in the following
paragraphs.
First, I study whether the price impact in the secondary market translates into
higher cost of funding in primary markets. Panel (1) of Figure A6 plots the yearly
average all-in spread drawn (AISD)19 for companies that have been affected by fire
sales from distressed CLOs (in red) against other companies (in blue); both groups
are in the CLO-i/SDC Platinum matched sample, guaranteeing that, at least once,
their loans have been held by CLOs. In each year in the sample the cost of capital
for firms whose loans have been sold in the secondary market by distressed CLOs
is higher by almost 100bps. This is not surprising given the evidence in Section 1.5:
leveraged loans are usually priced by looking at the price of comparables (Murfin
18These, however, are different along other dimensions such as their pricing and, mainly, their
amortization schedule.
19The all-in spread drawn is measured as the total annual spread including fees paid over the
reference rate (usually LIBOR) for each dollar drawn from the loan. It therefore includes any fee or
commission associated with the syndication process.
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and Pratt, 2018) and the price of leveraged loans of the same company traded in
the secondary market represents a clear benchmark for the cost of new issues (S&P
Global, 2020b). Once previously issued loans trade in the secondary market at a
discount, it is realistic to expect that new issued loans will likely be priced taking
this extra spread into account. This is even less surprising once we recall that most
of the discount suffered by these loans is due to a lack of convergence towards the
control group: after an initial negative shock, the discount on treated loans reduces
but in a slower fashion compared to their control group, making the mispricing
particularly hard to detect to an investor that is simply looking at the treated loans
in isolation. The results in Figure A6 do not control for firm characteristics, which
might drive the difference in AISD between the two groups. For this reason, I
investigate the effect on spreads by running the following regression whose results
are reported in Table A19:
AISDj,t = αt + αj + βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.13)
where AISDj,t is the all-in drawn spread for issuer j at time t and Shockedj,t is a
dummy variable that is equal to one when firm j has been sold by distressed CLOs
in the previous twelve months. Column (1) shows that the spread for shocked firms
is 55bps higher compared to the control group once we include time fixed effects
which help in partialling out any shared macroeconomic variation in loan spreads.
This guarantees that the results do not stem from the fact that downgrades to Caa
(CCC) are more likely to happen during bad periods, since we are focusing on the
cross-sectional differences in AISDs. Columns (2)-(4) show that the effect is robust
to the inclusion of time-to-maturity, industry, rating and issuer fixed effects even
though the magnitude of the coefficients is reduced. The effect ranges between
23.2 and 34.7 basis points when we consider time-to-maturity, industry and rating
fixed effects. When we add issuer fixed effects in column (5), the magnitude is re-
duced to 8bps, however it should be noted that the effect is now identified from
the subset of firms that have issued loans twelve months after being sold by CLOs
and have been at least once in the control and at least once in the treated group,
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representing a small subset of the whole sample. A significant fraction of the shock
documented in Section 1.5 is transmitted to the primary market of issuance, im-
plying that the ex-post cost of borrowing for treated firms is higher than for firms
in the control group. These firms are facing a shock to the supply of institutional
loans and might be forced to finance themselves with the next best source of cap-
ital. The rest of the section tests this hypothesis by looking at differences in the
composition of borrowed funds between the two groups of companies. Panel (2)
in Figure A6 compares the number of institutional tranches as a fraction of the to-
tal number of tranches issued by the two groups every year. With the exception of
2009 and 2010, the fraction of institutional tranches for shocked issuers has always
been lower compared to firms in the control group, corroborating the hypothesis
that companies indeed move away from institutional loans whenever they face a
supply shock in this market. Notice that by focusing only on firms that do eventu-
ally issue leveraged loans we are able to fix the demand for funds and make sure
that indeed the effect is driven by the supply of credit. Panel (3) provides simi-
lar evidence if we look at the total amount of funds borrowed using institutional
tranches as a fraction of the total amount borrowed: after 2010 shocked firms have
borrowed less capital compared to firms in the control group via institutional loans.
I then proceed to test whether the fraction of institutional tranches and the
amount of dollars borrowed are significantly lower for treated firms by running
the following regressions:
Fraction Inst.j,t = αt + αj + βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.14)
Fraction Inst. $j,t = αt + αj + βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t (1.15)
where Fraction Inst.j,t measures the number of institutional tranches as a fraction
of the total number of tranches issued by issuer j at time t and Fraction Inst. $j,t
measures the total amount of dollars borrowed using institutional tranches as a
fraction of the total amount borrowed by issuer j at time t. The results reported
in Table A20 and Table A21 show that shocked borrowers issue between 3.9% and
11.7% less institutional tranches, while the amount borrowed is between 5.5% and
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11.3% lower after we have controlled for firm characteristics, suggesting that af-
fected borrowers are substituting between institutional and traditional bank loans.
How can we interpret this evidence? If companies finance themselves with the
cheapest source of financing trying to arbitrage across different types of securities
(Ma, 2019), when the supply of institutional loans shifts they might move to the
next best source of funds, namely traditional (non institutional) bank loans. Once
forced to access the next source of capital we should expect the cost of capital to
increase, as documented in Table A19, and the quantities borrowed to decrease.
As a final test, Panel (4) in Figure A6 and Table A22 study intensive margin ef-
fects, by looking at the size of institutional tranches in terms of dollars borrowed:
even when they maintain access to institutional loans, treated companies draw less
funds through institutional loans sold to CLOs. The institutional tranches of com-
panies affected by dislocations in the secondary market are between 23.5% and
34.2% smaller compared to those in the control group. This is true even when we
include issuer fixed effect, which control for the average size of loans issued by that
specific borrower.
1.7 Conclusions
The paper studies the effect of non fundamental trades executed by CLOs in order
to gain slack in their constraints. After having analysed which loans are sold by
distressed CLOs in order to restore their constraints, I study the impact of their
trading actions. Securities sold by distressed CLOs trade at roughly 40bps dis-
count: I show that this effect is likely causal and cannot be explained by selection
on ex-ante or ex-post measurable loan characteristics. The effect is long lasting (up
to nine months) and mostly due to the failure of loans sold by distressed CLOs to
recover from depressed prices. I provide evidence that shocks in the secondary
market transmit to the primary market: companies that are due to refinance their
loans are less likely to employ institutional tranches when hit by the selling pres-
sure of CLOs in the secondary market. The substitution away from institutional to
bank tranches increases the cost of capital for affected firms.
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On top of documenting the relative price inelasticity of the market for leveraged
loans and the downstream effects on companies’ financing decisions, the results
in the paper might inform regulators when designing constraints for institutional
investors: constraints based on the par value of assets may prevent investors from
engaging in selling spirals where shocked assets are sold by distressed investors,
further exacerbating the initial shock. However, they might also lead to spillovers
where shocks are transmitted from troubled securities to otherwise unrelated ones
through the balance sheet of institutional investors. Finding the optimal balance
between the two concerns is crucial and should be the topic of further research.
2. Revealed Expectations and Learning
Biases: Evidence from the Mutual Fund
Industry
FRANCESCO NICOLAI AND SIMONA RISTESKA1
How do investors form their return expectations? Do they take all available infor-
mation into account? Does personal experience play a crucial role in the formation
of expectations? We attempt to answer these questions by looking at mutual fund
managers’ stock return expectations as revealed by their portfolio holdings. We
exploit the fact that, under a large class of models, the optimal portfolio rule has a
similar functional form; using a three dimensional panel consisting of the portfolio
holdings of mutual fund managers over a period of thirty-five years, we are able
to extract a measure of subjective expected returns for every manager in our panel
by exploiting the variation across stocks over time between and within managers.
To see this, consider a mean-variance investor for whom the vector of physical ex-
pected returns is given by the following formula:
Ei,t[rt+1 − r f1] = γi,tΣtw∗i,t (2.1)
where Ei,t[·] is the conditional expectation operator taken under investor i’s infor-
mation set at time t, rt+1 − r f1 is a vector of excess returns, γi,t is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion of manager i at time t, Σt is the conditional covariance ma-
trix of stock returns and w∗i,t is the time t vector of optimal portfolio weights of
investor i. The above expression for expected excess returns is obtained by invert-
1We benefited from helpful comments from Ulf Axelson, Nicholas Barberis, Pasquale Della
Corte, Daniel Ferreira, Boyan Jovanovic, Christian Julliard, Samuli Knupfer, Ralph Koijen, Avner
Langut, Dong Lou, Ian Martin, Igor Makarov, Cameron Peng, Asaf Razin, Andrew Redleaf, An-
drea Tamoni, Michela Verardo and the participants at the LSE seminar, the 2019 Yale Whitebox
Conference, the 2019 Belgrade Young Economists Conference. Any errors or omissions are the re-
sponsibility of the authors.
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ing the first-order condition of a mean-variance investor provided that we have a
good measure of conditional covariances Σt. In these regards we follow Merton
(1980) and argue that investors’ disagreement should mainly regard expected re-
turns and not variances and covariances. We show that empirically this is a good
approximation. In Section 2.2.1 we show that - as long as we correctly interpret
the manager-specific time-varying parameter γi,t - many optimal portfolio models
give rise to a subjective expected return similar to (2.1); whenever that is not the
case, we can saturate the model with fixed effects in order to split the total demand
into a mean-variance component and a hedging component; to isolate the effect of
risk aversion from the effect of subjective expected returns we resort to the very
general principle that, given the cross-section of assets the manager invests in, risk
aversion is a manager-specific quantity, while expected returns are at the same time
asset-specific. The information contained in the cross section of holdings, therefore,
greatly reduces the issue of separating the variation due to the manager’s prefer-
ences from the one due to beliefs.
We start by providing evidence in Section 2.3 that more than 50% of the varia-
tion in expected returns is explained by a common time-varying factor and we are
able to explain almost 90% of the variation with manager-time and stock-time com-
ponents. This suggests that a saturated regression will likely allow us to isolate the
idiosyncratic part of expected returns affected by manager-stock-time specific ef-
fects; we focus on this component to explore the extent to which managers’ beliefs
are affected by experience. In particular, we investigate whether fund managers
put more emphasis on past stock returns that they have personally experienced over
their investment career. To begin, we consider the effect of the simple average of
past observed returns on portfolio holdings decisions. Having experienced a one
standard deviation higher average return on a given stock causes the manager to
inflate his expected excess return by between 10.3 and 15.1 basis points (after par-
tialling out the effect of common stock and manager characteristics). This effect is
both statistically and economically significant and it is almost an order of magni-
tude larger than that of other commonly used predictors. Nonetheless, the effect
of average experienced returns masks important heterogeneity in the influence of
CHAPTER 2. REVEALED EXPECTATIONS AND LEARNING BIASES 52
past returns observed at different points in time: when we move on to examining
the particular shape of the learning curve we find evidence of a differential impact.
We start by providing non-parametric results that do not require taking a stance on
the precise functional form that investors use to weight past experienced returns.
Mutual fund managers in our sample are subject to the so-called serial-position
effect: the tendency to predominantly remember the initial and the last observa-
tions in a series. More precisely, managers’ investment decisions and beliefs are
particularly affected by the returns they have experienced early on during their
stock-specific experience and those they have experienced most recently. In other
words, professional investors seem to exhibit the primacy and recency bias.
As one would expect, the effect is stronger for single-managed funds and de-
cays fast as the number of managers in a team increases: the effect of recently
experienced returns on managers in a single managed fund is twice as large com-
pared to managers working with at least one other professional; the effect of early
returns is an order of magnitude larger.
We also show that the differential effect of taxes on capital gains and losses can-
not explain these findings since the effect of early career experience is still present
even when the manager switches to a different fund. At most, tax considerations
can explain 20% of the estimated influence of past returns on portfolio choices and
expected returns.
Armed with the reduced-form evidence, we provide a tentative parametric esti-
mation of the managers’ learning function. In particular, the results in the reduced-
form estimation seem to suggest a non-monotonic learning function. For this rea-
son we adopt a variation of the parametrisation of the learning function in Mal-
mendier and Nagel (2016) that allows for a variety of decreasing and increasing,
convex and concave, monotone and non-monotone learning weights. We find that
fund managers on average do indeed place a disproportionate weight on personal
past experience and that this biases the expected returns recovered from their stock
holdings, after having adjusted for risk and risk aversion. When we allow for time-
varying weights on past stock returns, we show that mutual fund managers tend
to place excessive weight on returns experienced at the beginning of their careers
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and in the most recent quarters compared to those in the middle period, suggesting
that both early-career and recent experience seem to be important determinants of
the investment behaviour of a large class of professional investors. For instance,
a manager with the median stock-specific experience of 9 quarters assigns around
1.84 times larger weight on the return experienced in the most recent quarter com-
pared to the benchmark of 1/9, while the weight on the first experienced return
is 3.13 times larger than the benchmark. We thus reconcile two conflicting strands
of the literature: similarly to Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Malmendier and
Nagel (2016), we confirm that investors do overweight their personal experience
and manifest a recency bias, but - at the same time - we show that professional in-
vestors also place a disproportionately large weight on returns that have been expe-
rienced in the early part of their investing career, similarly to the findings of Kaus-
tia and Knüpfer (2008) and Hirshleifer et al. (2021). When looking at co-managed
funds, we show that a large fraction of the effect of early experience washes out
while the effect of recently experienced returns persists; this might be due to the
fact that, while there is large heterogeneity in early experience, recently experi-
enced returns are mostly shared among managers within a team.
Finally, in the last part of the paper we focus on risk preferences. Notice from
equation (2.1) that, while risk aversion varies at the manager-time level, beliefs
vary at the manager-time-stock level. This lets us separate variation in adjusted
portfolio holdings that is due to the managers’ risk appetite from differences in
beliefs, but does not inform us regarding their level. Once we make some minimal
assumptions to pin down their level, we show that individual expected returns
tend to be quite biased and that preferences display significant heterogeneity across
individuals and time. Moreover, on average, mutual fund managers display an
Arrow (1965)-Pratt (1964) coefficient of relative risk aversion between 0.915 and
1.283.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2.1 provides an overview
of recent literature. We proceed by showing that most of the literature relies on evi-
dence from surveys obtained from non-professional investors or, when not affected
by these concerns, on a relatively limited amount of data. We argue that the present
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paper tries to solve the aforementioned issues. Section 2.2 describes how we can
separate the variation in expected returns from the variation in risk aversion or
other factors in a wide class of models. Section 2.3 gives details of the data used
in our empirical work and provides some summary statistics. Section 2.4 provides
the non-parametric results of our analysis, while Section 2.5 describes and show
the results of our parametric approach. In Section 2.6, we tackle the question of
the level of risk aversion of investment professionals. Finally, Section 2.7 provides
concluding remarks.
2.1 Previous Literature
The issue of whether economic agents learn with experience has been explored
to some extent by the existing literature. Evidence from the literature in psychol-
ogy and economics shows that personal experience exerts a larger influence on
behaviour compared to other shared sources of information2, especially very re-
cent and very early experience. These two phenomena are usually referred to as
the recency and the primacy effect and they generate what is known to researchers
in psychology as the U-shaped serial-position curve3.
Diving deeper into the field of finance there is growing evidence that personal
experience affects financial behaviour. Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008) and Chiang et
al. (2011) show that the likelihood of participating in subsequent IPOs is affected
by returns experienced in previous offerings. Choi et al. (2009) provide evidence
that investors with high return or low volatility on their 401(k) savings tend to in-
vest a larger fraction of their wealth. Using data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances from 1960 to 2007, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that individuals
2For early evidence on the concept of reinforcement learning, see the seminal study by
Thorndike (1898). A large body of theoretical and empirical literature studies the role of personal
experience in learning, see, for instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) for a discussion of the avail-
ability bias, Fazio et al. (1978) for experimental evidence on the differential processing of informa-
tion that results from direct versus indirect experience, Roth and Erev (1995) and Erev and Roth
(1998) for experimental data and theory regarding learning in sequential games, Camerer and Ho
(1999) for a combined model of reinforcement and belief-based learning, Simonsohn et al. (2008) for
experimental analysis of the effect of personal experience in a game theory context.
3The psychology literature on these topics goes beyond the scope of this paper. Among others,
see Nipher (1878), Ebbinghaus (1913) and Murdock (1962) for evidence on the serial-position effect;
for evidence on the primacy effect, see Asch (1946); the recency effect is explored by Deese and
Kaufman (1957). See Murdock (1974) for a survey.
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born before the 1920s who have experienced the lackluster stock market returns
during the Great Depression report higher risk aversion, lower expected returns
and are less likely to invest in the stock market. Those that happened to experi-
ence lower bond market returns tend to reduce their bond holdings. They also
find that returns experienced in the previous year contribute four to six times more
to future investment decisions than those experienced thirty years ago. In a sim-
ilar vein, Malmendier and Nagel (2016) analyse the effect of life-time experience
on inflation expectations using the Reuters/Michigan Survey of Consumers; they
show that the effect is stronger for younger respondents, and has a direct effect
on their borrowing and savings decisions. Malmendier et al. (2021) analyse the
effect of experienced inflation on members of the FOMC board and find similar
results. Greenwood and Nagel (2009) investigate the effect of experience on mu-
tual fund managers during the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s. The authors use
age as a proxy for experience and show that younger managers were investing
more in technology stocks compared to similar older managers and displayed a
more pronounced trend-chasing behavior. Chernenko et al. (2016) study the effect
of experience on a panel of mutual funds holdings of MBS during the 2003-2007
mortgage boom and show that less experienced managers had larger positions in
these securities, especially those backed by subprime mortgages; moreover they
show that personal experience outside of the fund had an effect on portfolio choice
behaviour. Andonov and Rauh (2020) analyse the effect of experienced returns
on a cross-section of U.S. Pension Fund managers, showing a significant effect of
past experience on the expected returns that these investors report in annual target
asset allocations; in particular, earlier experiences have a stronger effect on invest-
ment behaviour. Giglio et al. (2021) look at retail investors’ portfolio allocations
and match them to beliefs elicited from surveys. They find that stated beliefs have
a low explanatory power for the timing of trades, however, they are able to pre-
dict the direction and size of those trades that do occur. Finally, there is evidence
that experienced risk affects financial behaviour: Knüpfer et al. (2017) show that
experienced labour market distress affects portfolio choices, while Lochstoer and
Muir (forthcoming) find that individuals have extrapolative beliefs about market
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volatility.
While the contribution of the above papers is substantial, we argue that most
of them are affected by one or more of the following issues: reliance on evidence
obtained from surveys where agents report their subjective expected returns, focus
on non-professional investors who spend limited time investing and, usually, in-
vest relatively small amounts, and reliance on limited time-series or cross-sections
implying that it is harder to perform statistical inference.
Regarding the first issue, the task of recovering investors’ expectations is a par-
ticularly tricky one. It is well known at least since Harrison and Kreps (1979)
that asset prices reveal only risk-neutral expectations of market participants; a
way to circumvent this problem is, therefore, to focus attention on expectations
elicited from surveys. Most of these measures seem to display high correlations
as Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) point out. However Cochrane (2017) argues
that there is no guarantee that people report their ”true-measure unconditional
mean” in surveys. In these regards, Adam et al. (2021) provide evidence that sur-
veyed expected returns are inconsistent with risk-neutral expected returns, ambi-
guity averse/robust expected returns or any other risk-adjusted returns4. How-
ever, nothing guarantees that the reported expected returns are exactly representa-
tive of the mathematical physical expectation of investors. Consider for instance a
survey respondent that interprets the question as asking “what is the most likely
return“ instead of “what is the expected return“. In that case, the respondent will
provide a measure of the modal return rather than its average taken across states
of the world. Although the previous example may seem far-fetched, Martin (2017)
shows that - for a log investor who holds the market - the physical distribution of
returns is asymmetric and, for instance, at the height of the crisis, while the ex-
pected return on the S&P 500 was above 20% per year, the author recovers a prob-
ability of almost 20% of a 20% decline in the index. Large probability masses far
from the mean imply large discrepancies between modal, median and average re-
turns. Beliefs reflected in portfolio choices are more informative and represent the
primary object of interest, given that it is ultimately changes in demand and supply
4Appendix B.3 shows that our framework can also deal with this type of preferences.
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that determine the variation in prices. Malmendier and Nagel (2011), Andonov and
Rauh (2020) and Giglio et al. (2021) show that portfolio choices are consistent with
stated beliefs, but the explanatory power is only partial, while - by construction -
our beliefs are fully consistent with trading behaviour.
Regarding the second issue, we argue that there are reasons to believe that
sophisticated professional investors might behave differently compared to house-
holds and, for this reason, we focus our attention on mutual fund managers; they
also routinely follow the stock market and therefore there might be reasons to ex-
pect them to be less prone to biases or memory issues. While this seems to be true
in the case of IPO subscriptions (Chiang et al., 2011), we show that our investors
display large biases even though we cannot provide a direct comparison to house-
holds. It should also be noted that, to the extent that these financial intermediaries
represent a large fraction of total stock market activity, their beliefs will be an im-
portant driver of stock price movements.
Finally, concerning the third issue, many of the papers dealing with institutional
investors focus on specific events (e.g., Greenwood and Nagel (2009) or Chernenko
et al. (2016)) or rely on limited time series data (e.g., Andonov and Rauh (2020)).
The aim of the present paper is to be more general and explore whether the ef-
fect of experienced returns is common across periods and stocks and represents a
permanent trait of professional investors’ behaviour.
2.2 Methodology
In this section we provide a detailed description of our empirical strategy. We first
explain how we obtain a measure of expected returns given portfolio holdings. We
argue that in a wide set of models - including a mean-variance benchmark - we
are able to separate the effect of risk and risk aversion from the effect of return
beliefs by using the cross-section of manager holdings. We then describe the way
we deal with the issue of estimating covariance matrices and, finally, our plan for
identifying risk aversion.
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2.2.1 Recovering Subjective Expected Returns
Portfolio choices reveal information about future stock return expectations: this is
the main insight of Sharpe (1974)’s indirect approach to mean-variance optimisation
whereby beliefs about expected returns are inferred from portfolio holdings, rather
than the other way around5. Consider the problem of investor i who maximises





where Ji,t(.) is the value function of the investor evaluated at his current wealth








where r f is the instantaneous risk-free rate (or the instantaneous rate of return of
any other reference asset with respect to which excess returns are computed), µi,t is
an N × 1 vector of stock return drifts as perceived by investor i, wi,t is an N × 1
vector of stock portfolio weights, Σ
1
2
t is an N × N matrix of instantaneous loadings
on the Brownian motion processes Zt, ∆Ci,t is the (net) outflow of resources6, and
1 is an N × 1 vector of ones.
The investor chooses his optimal portfolio by selecting wi,t. Notice that we are
deliberately vague about other potential choice variables, i.e., our analysis follows
solely from the optimality conditions for the portfolio holdings and the fact that
current wealth is the only state variable. Standard dynamic optimisation argu-
5Black and Litterman (1992) start from the same insight to obtain portfolio holdings that com-
bine the manager’s views with average realised returns in a consistent way; Cohen et al. (2008)
and Shumway et al. (2011) use a similar approach to extract a measure of beliefs from portfolios
holdings. The former paper measures the best ideas of mutual funds as the investment positions for
which the authors can extract the largest expected returns, while the latter analyses the rationality
implications of extracted beliefs.




instantaneous flow of consumption Ci,t net of the income flow Yi,t, expressed as a fraction of wealth
Wi,t. In this setting ∆Ci,t can be loosely interpreted as the net outflow of money the mutual fund
manager is subject to in each period because of redemption/creation of new fund shares. Because
of Markovianity we have that ∆Ci,t = ∆C(Wi,t).
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Σ−1t (µi,t − r f1) (2.4)
where JWi,t and JWi,tWi,t are the first and second derivatives of the value function
with respect to current wealth and therefore −
Wi,t JWi,tWi,t
JWi,t
is the Arrow (1965)-Pratt
(1964) coefficient of instantaneous relative risk aversion measuring the curvature




Notice that equation (2.4) is a generalisation of the optimal demand employed by
Koijen and Yogo (2019)7. We can invert the optimality condition (2.4) in order to
get an expression for expected excess returns as a function of optimal holdings and
Σt. In particular, we have that:
µi,t − r f1 = γi,tΣtw∗i,t (2.5)
If we had information about the level of the investor’s risk aversion γi,t and the co-
variance matrix Σt, we could obtain an exact measure of his subjective expectations
of future one-period ahead excess returns µi,t − r f1. We follow Merton (1980) in
arguing that investors should share beliefs regarding Σt; we later provide evidence
in support of this assumption. To isolate the effect of γi,t, let us consider each el-
ement of the vector of excess returns µi,t − r f1. At each point in time t, for each
stock j, each manager i forms a measure of expected excess return which we can
denote by (µi,t − r f1)j8. By simply keeping track of the subscripts one can realise
that there is variation in expected returns across managers, stocks and time, i.e.,
along the three dimensions i, j, t. On the other hand, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion γi,t varies only at the i-t level, implying that the cross-section of holdings
for manager i at time t gives us enough information to isolate the variation in be-
liefs from the variation in risk aversion which acts as a level shifter on the demand




= 1, i.e., investors have logarithmic utility. It is easy to incorporate short sale
constraints in our setting as we show in Appendix B.3.
8(µi,t − r f1)j is the j−th element of the vector of expected excess returns for manager i, time t,
i.e., µi,t − r f1 = [(µi,t − r f1)1, ..., (µi,t − r f1)j, ..., (µi,t − r f1)N ]′.
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for risky assets9. When instantaneous returns are normally distributed and wealth
is the only state variable, any utility function (and therefore any value function
Ji,t(Wi,t)) gives rise to a demand as the one in (2.4). We can extend this approach to
a wide class of models where there is an L× 1 vector of Markovian state variables
Xt with the following law of motion:
dXt = φ(Xt)dt + Γ(Xt)dZt (2.6)






















measures the semi-elasticity of the marginal utility of




represents the vector of instantaneous covariances between returns and the state




many settings in which we can still disentangle variation in beliefs from variation
in hedging demands10. First, we might consider the possibility that the mutual
fund is facing borrowing constraints. We show in the Appendix that in this case
the expected return can be recovered from:




j + Hi,t (2.8)
Similarly, suppose mutual funds managers are ranked according to a common
summary statistic (e.g. alpha over a benchmark). The expected excess return can
then be approximated by:




j + Hj,t (2.9)
9For the reader who is familiar with the textbook mean-variance optimisation, this is analogous
to the fact that the selection of the tangency portfolio does not depend on the investor’s risk aversion
which merely influences the relative proportion of wealth invested in the risk-free and risky assets.
10For more details, see Appendix B.3 where we analyse the case of borrowing and short selling
constraints, concerns about model misspecification and the issue of benchmarking.
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The previous examples show that, by saturating the regressions with the proper
fixed effects, we are able to use the cross-section of assets of a particular investor
to separate the effect of changes in beliefs (which vary at the i, j, t level) from the
effect of changes in risk aversion (varying at the i, t level) and hedging demand (as
long as this varies at a coarser level).
As a caveat, notice that the only situation where we would be unable to separate
changes in the hedging demand from changes in beliefs is if the hedging demand
varied at the stock-manager-time level (i.e., if we had Hi,j,t). This would under-
mine any attempt to recover variation in beliefs from variation in portfolio hold-
ings; however, the results in the paper would not lose their relevance. First of all,
as shown by Moreira and Muir (2019) in the case of time-varying expected returns
and volatilities, optimal portfolios can be closely approximated by an affine trans-
formation of the standard mean-variance portfolio. Second, even if expected excess
returns cannot be separated from hedging demands, it is not easy to conceive of a
mechanism where past experience has a large impact on hedging demands. Third,
even if this were the case, we could still interpret all the results in terms of scaled
demands (Σtw∗i,t) as opposed to beliefs. Asset prices are ultimately determined by
investors’ holdings and the variation thereof; it would be nice to know whether the
effect on investors’ demands goes through expected returns (µi,t − r f1), risk aver-
sion (γi,t) or hedging demands (H), but ultimately what matters is the fact that
part of the variation in the cross-section and the time-series of assets holdings is
due to the returns that the agent has experienced. Having said that, in what fol-
lows, we impose the previously discussed restrictions in order to disentangle the
different mechanisms. We, therefore, assume that the issue of hedging demands
can be solved by saturating the regression with the appropriate levels of fixed ef-
fects. In the following two sections, we tackle the two remaining problems, namely,
the estimation of the conditional covariance matrix and level of risk aversion.
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2.2.2 Estimating the Covariance Matrix
As can be seen in the previous section, in order to construct a measure of one-
period ahead expected excess returns, we need to have a measure of the conditional
covariance matrices. In this paper we rely on an argument set forth by Merton
(1980), which states that, in principle, all investors should agree on Σt since it can
be very precisely estimated by using increasingly more granular data. In practice
it is unavoidable to take a stance on how to estimate the conditional covariance
matrix. To make sure that our results do not depend on the chosen estimator for
Σt, we decide to take three different approaches for this exercise:
1. As a first measure, we compute the sample covariance matrix of stock returns:
Σ̂d,1t =
1
t− 1(Rt − r̄t1
′)(Rt − r̄t1′)′
where Rt = [r1,t, ..., rj,t, ..., rN,t]′ is an N × t matrix that contains past re-
alised returns as rows, r̄t is an N × 1 vector that collects sample average
returns computed at time t, and 1 is a t × 1 vector of ones. We estimate
Σ̂d,1t from a one-year rolling window of daily returns
11 and we scale it by
K = nb. obs.nb. quarters = 63.07 days to obtain our first estimator as Σ̂
1
t = K × Σ̂
d,1
t .
It is well known that it is extremely hard to estimate correlations between
stocks and correlations close to unity in absolute value tend to give extreme
long-short portfolios. For this reason we resort to the next two measures of
the sample covariance matrix;
2. Our second estimate makes use of a Bayesian Stein Shrinkage estimator. We
follow Touloumis (2015) and compute the daily covariance matrix Σ̂d,2t as a
weighted-average of the sample covariance matrix Σ̂d,1t and a target matrix
11The reader might be worried about the fact that we estimate expected returns employing co-
variance matrices that rely on past return data, to subsequently regress on past realised returns.
However, notice that the same covariance estimates are shared in the cross-section of managers,
which is not true for past experienced returns. Furthermore, our estimates of covariance matrices
employ only one year of data while the average manager has more than three years of experience
with a given stock.
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Σtargett which imposes zero correlations across stocks:
Σ̂d,2t = λΣ̂
d,1
t + (1− λ)Σ
target
t
where Σtargett is a diagonal matrix where the elements on the diagonal are the
sample estimated variances, namely Σtargett = Σ̂
d,1
t ∗ IN where ∗ denotes the
Hadamard product and IN is a N× N identity matrix where N is the number
of stocks. The estimator of quarterly covariances is then: Σ̂2t = K× Σ̂
d,2
t ;




t + (1− λ)Σ̃
target
t
Following Ledoit and Wolf (2004), Σ̃targett is a diagonal matrix with the con-
stant average daily sample variance on the diagonal, namely Σ̃targett =
tr(Σ̂d,1t )
N IN,
where tr(Σ̂d,1t ) is the trace of the covariance matrix, and IN is a N×N identity
matrix where N is the number of stocks. The estimator is then: Σ̂3t = K× Σ̂
d,3
t .
More details on the construction of Σ̂2t and Σ̂
3
t and the optimal choice of λ are pro-
vided in Appendix B.4. We show in the rest of the paper that the way we compute
the covariance matrices is not very relevant for our results. This should be expected
given that, as long as managers’ estimates of covariances are very similar in the
cross-section, up to the first order, the covariance matrix behaves like a stock-time
fixed effect and therefore will be absorbed by those in the saturated regressions.
2.2.3 Recovering Risk Aversion
Having discussed the identification of hedging demands and the way we estimate
covariance matrices, we now turn to the issue of risk aversion. Let us first disregard
any hedging demand for simplicity. The portfolio choice in this case takes the form
of (2.4). Note that while we can separate changes in beliefs from changes in γi,t,
the investor’s risk aversion, we are unable to determine their levels. As a simple
example, notice that γ̃i,t = 2× γi,t and µ̃i,t − r f1 = 2× (µi,t − r f1) would yield
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the exact same portfolio choice as that implied by γi,t and µi,t − r f1. In Section 2.6,
we impose a plausible restriction on the level of subjective expected returns and
risk aversion, namely, that fund managers expectations are formed in such a way
to minimise the difference with ex-post realised returns12. Start from the following
identities:
rt+1 − r f1 = Et[rt+1 − r f1] + εt+1 (2.10)




(µi,t − r f1) + εi,t+1 (2.12)
= γi,t(Σtw∗i,t) + εi,t+1 (2.13)
The first line of the above expression is a definition for εt+1: realised returns have
to be equal to expected returns plus an orthogonal prediction error. In the second
line, we assume that the subjective expectation (µi,t − r f1) and the error εi,t+1
made by the investor are orthogonal. This can be interpreted as a requirement
that the expected return is consistent with the law of iterated expectations 13. The
third line multiplies and divides this expectation by the investor’s risk aversion
γi,t. In the empirical counterpart, this will require that the instantaneous relative
risk aversion is known to the manager at time t. Finally, we use equation (2.5)
to rewrite (2.12) as (2.13). We can, therefore, pin down the level of risk aversion
γi,t by running multiple regressions across managers and/or time of stock realised
returns on scaled portfolio weights. For instance, if we think that risk aversion is a
12Conditional expectations are the best predictor in a mean square sense, i.e., given the infor-
mation set Ft and the random variable yt+1, the conditional expectation E[yt+1|Ft] minimises
E[(yt+1 − ft)2] over all the Ft-measurable functions ft.
13To see this remember that, according to our notation, the expected excess return of manager i
using his information set at time t is Ei,t[rt+1− r f1] = µi,t − r f1. We can therefore rewrite (2.11) as
rt+1 − r f1 = Ei,t[rt+1 − r f1] + (rt+1 − r f1−Ei,t[rt+1 − r f1]). If the law of iterated expectations
applies under manager i’s expectation, i.e., if Ei[Ei,t[rt+1 − r f1]] = Ei[rt+1 − r f1], it is easy to
show that:
– Ei[(rt+1 − r f1−Ei,t[rt+1 − r f1])] = 0, i.e., there is no unconditional bias,
– Ei[Ei,t[rt+1 − r f1](rt+1 − r f1−Ei,t[rt+1 − r f1])′] = 0N×N , i.e., the perceived expected re-
turn and the error are uncorrelated.
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manager-specific quantity we can run the following regression:
rj,t+1 − r f = αi + βi(Σtw∗i,t)j + εi,j,t+1 (2.14)
where rj,t+1 − r f is the realised excess return of stock j from time t to t + 1, and
(Σtw∗i,t)j is the demand for stock j for manager i, at time t scaled by the conditional
covariance matrix Σt. The estimate for αi will then be a measure of the bias or resid-
ual hedging demand. If αi = 0, i.e., the bias or hedging demand is not statistically
different from zero, we would be able to interpret the estimate for βi as the average
coefficient of relative risk aversion of manager i, that is βi = γi. It is important
to notice that, while it might be interesting to pin down the levels of risk aversion
and beliefs of each manager, the identification of the learning parameters comes
from differential changes in beliefs in the cross-section of stocks held, hence it is not
affected by our choice of the risk aversion parameter.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section we describe the data that we use in the empirical analysis. Data on
mutual funds and mutual fund managers’ information are obtained from the Cen-
ter for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund database14. Given that we
aim to conduct our analysis at the fund manager level, as opposed to the fund level,
we need to construct a dataset of managers’ careers. To do this, we first obtain a list
of the managers that at any point in time are managing at least one equity fund. We
then split each occurrence of multiple managers managing a fund at the same time
into separate observations. We also disregard all the cases in which no manager
name is available and all the observations where we have words such as ”team”,
”group”, ”partners” or others that do not allow us to infer who was managing the
fund. The most challenging part, however, is to account for cases in which a typo in
the fund manager’s name causes CRSP to treat the same manager as two different
individuals. As an illustration, an individual named John Smith could, for exam-
14University of Chicago. Center for Research in Security Prices, I. (1960).
CHAPTER 2. REVEALED EXPECTATIONS AND LEARNING BIASES 66
ple, appear as ”John Smith”, ”J. Smith”, ”J Smith” or just ”Smith”. In order to tackle
this issue, we first match names into pairs using a string matching algorithm. We
match similar names using three different string distances: the cosine, Jaccard and
Jaro-Wrinkler metrics, and we apply rather large distance-specific thresholds that
allow us to keep the names which are sufficiently close. We subsequently proceed
by manually checking the matched results which amount to more than 15,000 pairs
of matched names. Out of these pairs, our manual exercise leaves us with roughly
20% of real matches which suggests that we are quite flexible with the distance
thresholds. It is important to stress that, although our manual check might contain
some errors, i.e., false positive matches and/or false match rejections, so long as
these mistakes are random they only introduce noise in our estimates and cause no
bias. More details on the process are provided in Appendix B.4. After matching the
names we assign a unique index to each manager in order to build their careers.
This exercise leaves us with 3,214 unique managers in our sample. We next match
the above managerial data with CRSP mutual fund data based on the first and last
date when a manager has been managing a given fund. We remove index funds,
fixed-income funds and funds which mainly own foreign equities following Evans
(2010), Benos et al. (2010) and Kacperczyk et al. (2006)15. We then match the fund
information with mutual fund holdings data from the Thomson-Reuters Institu-
tional Holdings database, using Russ Wermer’s MFLinks tables. We finally merge
the above data with CRSP data on stock returns and risk-free rates and Compustat-
Capital IQ data on firm fundamentals16. Since we have monthly mutual fund and
return data while holdings data are only available on a quarterly basis, we com-
pute quarterly stock returns from the CRSP monthly data and proceed by merging
with Compustat quarterly data. The final dataset comprises of over 13 millions
observations for 3,214 distinct managers in the period 1980-201517. Table B1 pro-
vides descriptive statistics. The first panel reports summary statistics regarding
average and median past returns experienced by managers. As one should ex-
15Details on the removed funds can be found in Appendix B.4.
16Standard & Poor’s Compustat Services, I. (1962).
17The number of observations includes a sizeble fraction of holdings that have zero weights but
are included because they are part of the manager investment universe. The investment universe is
constructed similarly to Koijen and Yogo (2019).
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pect, past experienced returns tend to be right skewed with mean average returns
that are larger than mean median returns (2.4% and 1.4%, respectively). While the
standard deviation of average experienced returns is similar to the one of median
experienced returns (10% and 11% respectively), counterintuitively, the latter seem
to be more dispersed, implying that negative experienced returns tend to be right
skewed (so that the median is smaller than the average) and positive experienced
returns tend to be left skewed (so that the median is larger than the average).
The second panel of Table B1 regards expected returns, which are computed as
explained in Section 2.2.1. In the rest of the paper we provide six measures of ex-
pected excess returns which we denote (1)-(6). The first issue regards the inclusion
of zero weights18. Measures (1)-(3) include only positive weights, while measures
(4)-(6) do include the zero weights19. Measures (1) and (4) use sample covariance
matrices Σ̂1t , measures (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂
2
t and
measures (3) and (6) use Ledoit and Wolf (2004) covariance matrices Σ̂3t . It is clear
from the table that the measures are quite similar in terms of summary statistics.
All the measures have an average expected excess return of about 1% per quar-
ter and a median expected excess return of about 0.6%. It should also be noted
that, while we have about 12.7 million data points if we consider the zero weights,
the number of observations drops to about 5.4 million once we remove the zeros.
Figure B1 sheds light on the sources of variation in beliefs. We provide a decom-
position of the variation in expected excess returns according to measure (1) by
regressing it against various fixed effects. Manager and stock fixed effects explain
a small fraction of excess returns (11.63% and 14.20%, respectively), while time
fixed effects explain more than half (55.73%) of the variation. This suggests that
manager and stock immutable characteristics are relatively less important than ag-
gregate time-varying factors in the formation of expectations. When we separately
include manager, stock and time fixed effects the explanatory power rises to al-
18Similarly to the present paper, Koijen and Yogo (2019) discuss how the analysis might be af-
fected by including or excluding zero weights.
19It might be important to know whether zero weights arise by choice or because the manager
cannot short sell stocks that would otherwise appear with negative weights. Appendix B.3 shows
how the optimal choice of a manager is affected by short selling constraints and how to deal with
them when trying to recover beliefs.
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most seventy percent (68.21%). If we allow for interactions between fixed effects,
we can explain up to almost ninety percent (89.43%) of the variation in expected
excess returns when we include manager-time and stock-time fixed effects. From
this decomposition we learn that the largest part of the changes in expected re-
turns is due to time-varying factors, then stock-specific characteristics and, finally,
factors related to the manager. The addition of manager-time and stock-time fixed
effects will remove the greatest majority of the variation in expected excess returns
and will, thus, ensure that the results are driven by idiosyncratic variation in ex-
pected returns unexplained by systematic factors. This gives more credibility to
our identification strategy.
Finally, we consider the data related to the managers’ careers which can be anal-
ysed with the help of the last panel of Table B1 and Figures B2 and B3. The upper
panel of Figure B2 provides information regarding the experience of the managers
in the sample. We plot the number of managers by the first time they appear in
the sample, which we call the starting date of the fund manager and denote it by
ti,0. The sample extends from 1980 to 2015 and covers a period of 35 years. Notice,
however, that there are fewer managers who start their career in the first ten years
compared to the rest of the sample. This can be attributed to low data coverage
during the 1980s. Most of the managers in our sample begin their career in the late
1990s. We can observe, however, a wide range of manager starting dates up until
the last sample year. We then proceed to construct a tenure variable which mea-
sures how many quarters have passed since the start of the manager’s career, i.e.,
for a given manager i and date t, tenurei,t = t− ti,020. The lower panel of Figure
B2 displays the number of managers with a given level of accumulated tenure over
the sample period, i.e., the empirical distribution of (t− ti,0) for all i, t. Most of the
managers in our sample are relatively young and inexperienced, but again, there is
quite a large variation in tenure as well, ranging from less than a year up to some
managers that are present in the whole sample (i.e., for a period of 35 years). Note
that, by construction, the number of observations with a given level of accumu-
20Notice that for each manager we disregard the first quarter of experience, i.e., ti,0, when com-
puting the statistic.
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lated tenure should be decreasing as, for example, a manager who has 5 quarters
of accumulated tenure must also have accumulated 4 quarters of experience pre-
viously. In practice, this could be violated for two reasons: the first reason is that
mutual funds were required to report holdings at a semi-annual level up until 2003
and only later regulators enforced quarterly reporting, as a result, some funds used
to report holdings on a quarterly basis while others did so only on a semi-annual
basis prior to 2003; second, there might be some missing data in our sample which
means that we might be able to observe a given manager’s career and holdings
in a particular quarter but not in the previous one. The bottom panel of Table B1
shows that the average tenure is of 26.9 quarters (almost 7 years), but because of
the positive skewness manifested in Figure B2, the median tenure is of only 22
quarters (5.5 years). We then proceed to the main object of interest of the paper,
which is the relationship between each manager and stock. Figure B3 describes
the relationship between fund managers and individual stock holdings. The first
panel displays the date when a given stock-manager pair has first appeared in our
sample which we call the starting date. For each manager i and stock j we can
denote the starting date as ti,j,0. Unsurprisingly, the largest number of such initi-
ations have occurred in the late nineties and early 2000s, i.e., when the number of
managers in our sample significantly increases. There is, however, large variation
in the stock-manager starting dates which we exploit as part of our identification
strategy. To see this, the second histogram depicts the length of the personal expe-
rience of a given manager with a given stock, i.e., for each manager i, stock j and
date t, experiencei,j,t = t− ti,j,0. It is clear from the histogram that there is a large
variation in experience. The third panel of Table B1 shows that it ranges from 1 to
139 quarters, with a standard deviation of about 12.9 quarters. The standard devia-
tion is of similar magnitude compared to the average (about 13.2 quarters) and the
median experience (9 quarters). The main hypothesis of the paper is that this vari-
ation in stock-specific experience is associated with a variation in expected returns
across managers. Finally, we can look at the maximal experience achieved for each
stock-manager pair, in the bottom panel of Figure B3 and Table B121. While the
21For each manager i and stock j, the maximal experience is defined as max. experiencei,j =
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average maximal experience and its standard deviation are similar to the above
(13.9 and 12 quarters respectively), the median maximal experience is larger (11
quarters, compared to 9 quarters of experience).
In the next section, we present the reduced-form results of our empirical analy-
sis.
2.4 Reduced-form Results
The main hypothesis of the paper is that past experienced returns affect expected
future returns. Moreover, if that is the case, we would like to further explore
whether certain periods carry more relevance than others. In what follows, we
show that differential stock-specific experience across managers indeed matters in
the formation of expectations and, in particular, differences in the first and the most
recent few quarters of experience play the most crucial role.
The empirical specification in this section relies on the following argument: we
conjecture that the manager will try to estimate future returns by looking at the
returns he has experienced over his career. A manager i with Ti,j,t quarters of ex-
perience with a given stock j at time t might use the average experienced return
as a sufficient statistic when forming expectations, i.e., his expected return for that
stock can be represented as:








where r̄i,j,t denotes the equal-weighted average of stock j returns observed over the
investor’s experience horizon. Notice that the variation in the length of past expe-
rience Ti,j,t allows us to exploit the cross-section of managers holding a given stock
j as our source of differential treatment22. The coefficient β captures the average
effect that past observed returns have on expectations formation, while the im-
plicit constant weight ωk = ω = 1Ti,j,t means that all past observations are equally-
maxt{experiencei,j,t}.
22On the other hand, the variation in the length of past experience Ti,j,t for a given manager i at
time t across different stocks is what helps us in disentangling preferences from expected returns.
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weighted. This choice implies that investors attach equal importance to all obser-
vations, however, as the length of experience grows every observation receives a
progressively lower weight. Note that this approach does not restrict managers
from incorporating other sources of information in their estimation. This can be
easily taken into account by saturating the regression with the proper controls. To
reiterate, fixed effects, for instance, would account for the information or charac-
teristics that all managers, or all stocks in the portfolio of a given manager, have in
common; the coefficient on the average experienced return would thus provide a
measure of the incremental effect of experience23. We, therefore, show in Table B2
the results of the following regression:
µi,j,t − r f = βr̄i,j,t + Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t (2.16)
where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period ahead return of manager i
for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t is the previously defined equal-weighted average expe-
rienced return24, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed
effect. To better disentangle the effect of experience we focus on the subsample
of single-managed funds25. The results in the table confirm our main hypothe-
sis: having experienced an increase of one standard deviation in average quarterly
return leads to an increase in the expected excess return of between 0.103% and
0.151%; the results are both economically and statistically large and display very
minor variation across specifications. This validates our intuition that the estima-
tion method for the covariance matrix is not very consequential. Similarly, the
inclusion of the zero weights has no effect on our main findings, even though the
drop in R-squared shows that the zeros are indeed informative and cannot be fully
explained by the fixed effects alone. The within R-squared shows that the average
experienced returns explain between 0.6% and 0.9% of the variation in expected
23Notice that this implies that managers could very well use all past realised returns when they
form expectations and this would be absorbed by the stock-time fixed effects. In particular, β would
then measure the relative over-weighting of experienced returns.
24All the regressions in the paper use standardised explanatory variables for ease of interpreta-
tion.
25Section 2.4.1 analyses the case of co-managed funds, showing indeed that most of the effect
washes out when we aggregate across managers.
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returns. While this might seem low, it is in fact in line with the findings of Koijen
and Yogo (2019) that observable characteristics explain a small part of the variation
in investors’ demands which is mostly explained by latent factors. Table B11 in Ap-
pendix B.6 reports the results of a similar regression with manager-time and stock
fixed effects, and a number of time-varying stock characteristics, namely, profitabil-
ity, investment, book-to-market ratio, market equity, and dividend-price ratio. The
findings are similar in magnitude and statistically significant, and show that the ef-
fect of experienced returns is almost an order of magnitude larger than that of other
known characteristics, confirming again the findings of Koijen and Yogo (2019) that
standard predictors have a hard time explaining portfolio choices26.
So far, we have assumed that the effect of experience is homogeneous. Alter-
natively, we could allow for more flexible weights in order to investigate whether




, such that 1Ti,j,t ∑
Ti,j,t
k=1 δk = 1. Namely, the manager estimates future returns



















The weighting term δk is a number centred around one measuring the relative over-
or under-weighting of a given past observation. If δk < 1, then returns observed
k-periods ago are under-weighted, while if δk > 1 they are over-weighted relative
to the previous benchmark. The last equality in equation (2.17) shows that if we
rewrite β̃k = βδk and r̃j,t+1−k =
rj,t+1−k
Ti,j,t
, then we can run a regression on experience-











that is, the average effect of past experience can be obtained as the average of the
k coefficients β̃k, while the relative weight assigned to the k-periods ago return is
given as the ratio of the coefficient on the k-th term and the equal-weighted average
26We do not report results for median experienced returns which are virtually identical.
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of all coefficients.
In practice, this approach breaks down if we have to deal with varying expe-
rience lengths Ti,j,t, as the number of regressors would change together with Ti,j,t.
For this reason, we group past returns into buckets as a means of fixing the number
of regressors. In our first such specification we divide the stock-specific experience
of the manager into five non-overlapping buckets of equal length, |∆Tqi,j,t|, with
q = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}27. Table B3 reports the results of the following regression:





+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t (2.19)
for Q = 5 and where r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
, q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, is the average return in the q-
th bucket. Table B4 reports the results for ten non-overlapping buckets of equal
length, i.e., the specification in equation (2.19) for Q = 10. In both cases we focus
on the subsample of single-managed funds. To better visualise the results, the esti-
mated coefficients of a regression with five buckets are reported in the upper panel
of Figure B4, while the bottom panel reports the results for ten buckets. The picture
immediately reveals that the effect of past experienced returns is clearly neither
constant nor monotone. Consider, for instance, our first model of expected returns
with Q = 5 for which we show results in column (1) of Table B3: a one standard de-
viation increase in experienced average quarterly return in the most recent or in the
earliest period of holding the stock increases the expected return by roughly 0.25%
(β1 = 0.276 and β5 = 0.238); on the other hand, the effect of an increase of one
standard deviation midway through the manager’s experience has an effect lower
by almost an order of magnitude (β3 = 0.041). Figure B4 confirms that the effect
of experienced returns is “U-shaped” regardless of whether we include the zero
weights and independently from the estimator for the covariance matrix used. The
lower panel of the figure reports the results for Q = 10, painting almost an iden-
27To cast this specification in terms of the previously discussed model, let us denote each bucket
by ∆Tqi,j,t and its length by |∆T
q
i,j,t|. We then have that δk = βq
Ti,j,t
|∆Tqi,j,t |
, where for each time index k in








≈ 5, where the approximation derives from the fact that we have to split ties
when the experience length is not a multiple of five.
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tical picture. The coefficients for ten buckets are similar in magnitude to those for
the regression with five buckets and follow the same “U-shaped” pattern. We re-
port in Appendix B.6 the results for various other specifications: Tables B12 and
B13 report the results of the previous models with stock fixed effects and the previ-
ously mentioned controls, while Tables B14 and B15 describe the results for a model
with three non-overlapping equal-sized buckets; finally Tables B16, B17 and B18,
B19 report the results for three non-overlapping buckets of unequal length (with
stock-time fixed effects or stock fixed effects and varying controls), where the first
and last buckets consist of four and eight quarters, respectively. All these specifica-
tions confirm the previously discussed results: experienced returns are important
in determining expected returns and most of the impact comes from most recent
and earliest stock-specific observations. This is evidence in favour of the so-called
serial-position effect, concept well studied among researchers in psychology (Mur-
dock, 1974). Moreover, our findings reconcile two apparently distinct phenomena
observed in previous research: on the one hand, Malmendier and Nagel (2011)
show that economic agents are principally affected by recent experience, while on
the other hand Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2021) and Hoffmann
et al. (2017) report evidence in favour of the primacy effect or first impression bias. We
show that both effects are present in mutual fund managers and that they need to
be separately considered.
2.4.1 Co-managed Funds
So far we have focused our attention on single-managed funds, but one might be
interested to know whether the above findings are, in fact, weaker when managers
work in teams. In this section we check the impact of the number of managers
within a team on the effect of experience. Our hypothesis is that personal stock-
specific experiences should partly offset each other within a team, so long as the
managers that form part of the team have followed different career paths. To ex-
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plore this hypothesis, we run the following regression:





+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t (2.20)
We split managers into subsamples based on the number of co-managers they work
with, i.e., ni,t ∈{1, 2, 3, 4 or more} signifies that the manager works in a team of one,
two, three or four or more people. We thus obtain a different set of coefficients βq,n
for each combination of buckets and size of the management team. We report in
Table B5 the results of this exercise for Q = 5 buckets; the results for the specifica-
tion with 10 buckets are reported in Table B20 in Appendix B.6. To better visualise
the results, Figure B5 displays the coefficients βq,n. The two plots on the left-hand-
side of the figure show the results for measure (1) while the right-hand-side plots
display the coefficients for measure (4). The first row reports the results for Q = 5
and the bottom row for Q = 10 buckets. As one can see in Table B5, the coefficient
on the most recently experienced returns for single-managed funds is more than
twice as large as the same for funds managed by two managers; the difference in
coefficients is even larger for the earliest bucket of returns, more specifically, the
effect of returns observed at the beginning of a stock-specific experience is more
than ten times greater for single-managed funds compared to funds managed by
at least two people. The effect on managers working in teams of three or more
is orders of magnitude lower, while still statistically significant for recent experi-
enced returns. On the other hand, the effect of early returns loses significance. The
above is visually confirmed by the plots in Figure B5 showing a rather steep de-
crease in the coefficients on the earliest bucket of returns across teams of different
sizes, especially when going from a single-managed fund to a fund managed by
two professionals. The findings are equally pronounced for the specification with
ten buckets.
The results seem to suggest that a considerable part of personal experience
washes out in the cross-section of managers working in the same team, and more so
the further we go in the past since managers are more likely to change teams over
a longer period of time. On the other hand, recent returns affect all co-managers
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in a similar way as they have presumably gone through the same recent experi-
ence, having been working for the same fund. This could justify the difference in
spreads observed between buckets at different horizons, especially if we compare
single-managed funds with those managed by two individuals.
2.4.2 Taxes
In what follows, we investigate the impact of taxes on managers’ investment de-
cisions and the potential explanation the tax regime might have thereof. More
specifically, we examine whether tax considerations can absorb the effect that past
experience has on portfolio weights and expectations formation. The differential
treatment of short-term and long-term capital gains in terms of their taxation, to-
gether with the possibility to offset capital gains with capital losses, suggests that
mutual funds will try to defer the realisation of gains and accelerate the realisation
of losses. This implies that it is optimal from the point of view of minimising the
tax bill for mutual funds to hold on to assets that performed well in the past and
sell assets that had subpar performances28.
This, in turn, means that the previous results could be simply driven by tax
considerations. One way to solve the problem is to model the optimal selling deci-
sion in the spirit of Barclay et al. (1998) or Sialm and Zhang (2020) and check if the
effect of experienced returns survives after we have taken tax considerations into
account. However, in what follows we take a reduced-form approach and make
use of the large amount of data on managers who have managed different funds
in their career. In particular, we focus on the subsample of manager-stock pairs
where the manager had positive holdings of the stock in the past while managing
a different mutual fund compared to the one that he is currently working for. In
this setting, tax considerations should be muted given that capital gain overhangs
cannot be transferred from one fund to another.
Table B6 reports the results of a regression of expected returns on five buckets of
28Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) show that inflows to mutual funds, and therefore managers’
compensation, are affected by the amount of unrealised capital gains, implying that there might
be a tension between postponing capital gains indefinitely to provide better after-tax returns for
current investors and attracting new investors. Barclay et al. (1998) explicitly tackle this question,
showing that indeed managers tend to realise gains early to attract new investors.
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past experience for only those managers that have changed funds, while Table B7
reports the results when we split the previous experience in ten buckets. The results
are then summarised in Figure B6 where the upper panel reports the results for five
buckets and the lower panel for ten buckets. While the number of observations is
greatly reduced (from about 800,000 to slightly more than 110,000 observations if
we do not include zero weights, and from about 2 million to approximately 225,000
if we do), the economic and statistical significance of the coefficients is virtually
unchanged confirming the previous findings: experienced returns have a sizeable
influence on expected excess returns, with the majority of the effect coming from
the extreme buckets. If, for instance, we consider measure (1) we notice that the
coefficient on the most recent bucket goes from 0.276 to 0.224, while on the earliest
one from 0.238 to 0.199. We infer, therefore, that no more than 20% of the effect
might be due to tax considerations and we confirm both the recency and the first
impression bias.
Having presented the reduced-form results of our analysis, we now develop a
simple three-parameters model of learning and proceed with its estimation.
2.5 Parametric Estimation
The reduced-form evidence of the previous section teaches us that: experience mat-
ters, i.e., average experienced returns are an important determinant of expected re-
turns and; the effect of experience is neither constant nor monotone, in particular,
earliest and most recent experience matter the most. However, as shown in Section
2.4, estimating the shape of the weighting function requires us to drop a sizeable
amount of observations and potentially lose significant information. For this rea-
son we now posit a functional form for the learning weights and try to estimate its
parameters. As Figures B4, B5 and B6 show, we need to allow for non-monotone
weights if we want to accurately fit the data. Similarly to Section 2.4, we assume
that the manager uses a weighted average of experienced returns in order to pre-
dict future returns. Recall the model in equation (2.17) where the weights
δi,j,t,k
Ti,j,t
capture the differential effect of returns experienced at different points in time. In
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The functional form in equation (2.21) is similar to the one used by Malmendier
and Nagel (2011) and Malmendier and Nagel (2016)29. The weighting function
used in these papers depends only on Ti,j,t − k and, as such, it confounds two sep-
arate effects: the first impression bias and the recency bias. On the other hand, our
weighting function has the advantage of disentangling between these effects: the
term Ti,j,t − k measures the distance between the return observed at time t + 1− k
and the beginning of a stock-specific experience, hence capturing the first impres-
sion bias, while k measures the distance from the current date t, thus capturing
the recency bias. Figure B7 shows how flexible the parsimonious parametrisation
introduced in equation (2.21) is. We plot in blue the weighting function for a man-
ager with Tij,t = 50 quarters of experience for all the combinations of {λ1, λ2} ∈
{−0.1, 0, 0.1} × {−0.1, 0, 0.1}30 and compare it to the black dashed line represent-
ing the benchmark 1Ti,j,t where the manager equally weights each observation that
forms part of his experience. The first parameter, λ1, governs the strength of the
first impression bias: when it is negative, the manager is overweighting early ex-
periences relative to the benchmark scenario. The second parameter, λ2, controls
the strength of the recency bias: when the sign of λ2 is negative the manager over-
weights recent observations relative to the benchmark, and vice versa. As one
can see from the examples in Figure B7, using only two parameters we are able
to capture a variety of shapes including linear, convex or concave, increasing or
decreasing, monotone or non-monotone weighting schemes arising from the inter-
play of the recency and first impression bias. Given the evidence from the reduced-
form regressions we expect λ1 and λ2 to be negative, implying that the managers
are subject to both effects. Similarly to the model in equation (2.19) we include
manager-time and stock-time fixed effects to get rid of potentially time-varying
unobservable characteristics shared across stocks and managers, respectively. Ta-
29Our weighting scheme collapses to the one used by Malmendier and Nagel (2011) when λ2 = 0.
30Figure B12 in Appendix B.6 plots the weighting function for {λ1, λ2} ∈ {−2, 0, 2} × {−2, 0, 2}.
CHAPTER 2. REVEALED EXPECTATIONS AND LEARNING BIASES 79
ble B8 reports the NLS estimates of the following regression31:










Consistent with the reduced-form evidence, both λ1 and λ2 are negative and sta-
tistically significant across all specifications. The magnitude of the effects is illus-
trated in Figure B8 where we plot the weighting functions at median and average
experience of Ti,j,t = 9, 13 quarters, respectively, using the empirically estimated
values for λ1 and λ2 under model (1). It is evident that the weighting function is
always convex and non-monotone, implying that managers overweight the most
recent and the earliest returns observed; for instance, a manager with an experience
of nine quarters will assign a weight of 0.204 (0.347) to the most recent (earliest) ob-
servation, which is 1.84 (3.13) times the benchmark of 1/9. On the contrary, he will
only assign a weight of 0.043 to the middle observation which is 0.39 times the
benchmark weight. The results display a slight asymmetry with λ1 being always
larger in magnitude than λ2 implying that the recency bias is marginally weaker
compared to the first impression bias. This is, however, not a robust feature of the
data: Table B21 in Appendix B.6 shows that λ1 and λ2 are almost identical once we
include only manager-time and stock fixed effects, indicating that a large fraction
of the recency bias might be captured by stock-time fixed effects as we should ex-
pect. Pinning down the actual magnitude of the two biases is extremely difficult
given that we have to get rid of a large fraction of the variation in expected returns
to achieve identification. Finally, the parameter β in Table B8 measures the average
impact of past experience on expected excess returns: the estimates range between
0.139 and 0.207. This is about 4 basis points larger than the baseline results in Table
B2 where we do not allow for varying weights32. We therefore confirm that once
31Appendix B.5 provides more details on the estimation procedure.
32Note that all the results presented refer to standardised variables. In the case of the results in







This is to avoid directly scaling the weighted average which would affect the computation of the
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we take into account the possibility that recent and early returns might have a dif-
ferential impact, we find an incremental effect of experience on expected returns.
2.6 Risk Aversion
As explained in Section 2.2.3, our methodology allows us to examine in more de-
tail the preferences of investors. Recall equations (2.10)-(2.13); if we assume that
subjective expected returns obey the law of iterated expectations, we are able to
extract the risk aversion of managers by exploiting the cross-section of individual
stock holdings. Running regressions of realised excess returns on scaled demands,
as shown in equation (2.14), we can obtain an estimate for the risk aversion param-
eter γ and the bias (or residual hedging demand). We start this section by provid-
ing evidence from pooled regressions and then proceed to show results pertaining
to the distribution of γi obtained from multiple regressions. Table B9 reports the
results of the following pooled regression:
rj,t+1 − r f = α + γ(Σtw∗i,t)j + εi,j,t+1 (2.23)
where rj,t+1 − r f is the realised excess return of stock j from time t to t + 1, and
(Σtw∗i,t)j is the scaled demand for stock j of manager i, at time t. If we assume
that preferences are constant across managers and time, we obtain a risk aversion
coefficient close to unity (between 0.915 and 1.283 across specifications) for our rep-
resentative investor. While the estimate is low compared to other measures obtained
from equity returns (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Kocherlakota, 1996), it is consis-
tent with measures derived from labour choices (Chetty, 2006) and option prices
(Martin, 2017). Our representative investor displays a quite large and statistically
significant bias (or residual hedging demand) of about 1% per quarter.
The pooled results in Table B9 mask a sizeable amount of variability across man-
agers. For this reason, we proceed by estimating separate regressions, one for each
gradient of the right hand side of equation (2.22) needed to obtain standard errors.
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manager in the sample:
rj,t+1 − r f = αi + γi(Σtw∗i,t)j + εi,j,t+1 (2.24)
Given that there seems to be limited difference resulting from the choice of the co-
variance matrix Σt, we report the results using the sample covariance Σ̂1t . Table
B10 reports summary statistics for elicited risk aversion and bias referring to mea-
sure (1)33. We obtain a median (average) relative risk aversion of 1.117 (1.236), in
line with the pooled results; however, there is a wide dispersion in the estimates
with a standard deviation of 5.850. The estimates display positive skewness and
are leptokurtic. When we allow for variation in preferences across managers, the
bias is reduced on average: the mean bias is only 0.7% and the median bias is 1%
per quarter. Figure B9 displays histograms of the distribution of αi and γi after we
have removed outliers. Unfortunately our methodology does not prevent us from
obtaining negative values for γi whenever the cross-section of revealed beliefs is
negatively correlated with realised returns. Most of the mass, however, seems to
fall in the positive value region.
We then proceed to exploit the variation of preferences across managers and
analyse whether tenure affects risk aversion and bias. Figure B10 displays the bias
and the risk aversion as a function of tenure for measures (1) and (4). It is hard
to detect a specific pattern in either of the measures; longer tenures seem to be
dominated by noise, given that they make use of fewer estimations by construction.
Finally, Figure B11 reports the results by date: also in this case it is hard to detect
any conclusive evidence. Unfortunately, our measures of risk aversion cannot be
used to predict or explain future returns given that they have been obtained from
them: by construction they represent the best linear predictor of rj,t+1 − r f given
the information contained in (Σtw∗i,t)j.
33The results for measure (4) can be found in Appendix B.6.
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2.7 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of personal experience on
learning and expected returns by analysing a large sample of more than 3,000
professional investors (mutual fund managers) that have been tracked throughout
their careers in the 35 years period between 1980 and 2015. Section 2.2.1 shows that
in a variety of cases it is possible to invert the portfolio demands of our investors
to obtain their subjective expected returns by using the identifying assumption
that, while beliefs vary at the stock-investor-time level, risk aversion varies at the
investor-time level, i.e., risk aversion is constant in the cross-section of stock hold-
ings of a given manager. Similarly, we are able to account for many cases in which
demands display a hedging component by saturating the regressions with fixed
effects. Indeed, as we show in Section 2.3, almost ninety percent of recovered ex-
pected returns can be explained by manager-time and stock-time fixed effects. We
then provide reduced-form evidence that professional investors overweight expe-
rienced returns compared to other information shared across stocks and individ-
uals: having experienced a one standard deviation increase in quarterly returns
on average leads to an increased expected return of about 10-15 basis points per
quarter. Various reduced-form specifications in Section 2.4 and the parametric es-
timation in Section 2.5 confirm that the effect of experienced returns is neither con-
stant nor monotone. We show that investors exhibit recency and first impression bias:
an investor with a stock-specific experience of nine quarters overweights the most
recently observed quarterly returns by 1.84 times and the earliest experienced re-
turns by 3.13 times relative to the constant weight benchmark. These results are
most apparent for managers working alone, as opposed to in a team of two or
more, suggesting that a significant fraction, though not the entirety, of the effect
of personal experience cancels out once aggregated. By looking at managers who
have switched funds, we eliminate the possibility that these findings are purely
driven by tax considerations: more than 80% of the effect remains unexplained by
tax concerns. We finally turn to the issue of estimating risk aversion and find that
a representative investor displays a coefficient of relative risk aversion around unity.
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The paper also finds that individual investors exhibit biases when forming expec-
tations. Finally, when we look at more disaggregated measures, we find that there
is a large heterogeneity in biases and risk aversion across time and investors. The
results in the paper can inform theorists willing to model the preferences and the
learning behaviour of professional investors in a way that is consistent with the ev-
idence obtained from portfolio holdings. Consistent with theory, more than half of
the variation in expected excess returns can be explained by a common time vary-
ing component. However, an incremental forty percent is due to investor-specific
and stock-specific time-varying effects, hinting at the possibility of time variation in
preferences and stock-specific factors shared across investors. Finally, if interested
in modelling the idiosyncratic part of expected returns, one should pay particu-
lar attention to behavioural factors which play a prominent role as shown by the
evidence provided in this paper.
3. Living on the Edge: the Salience of
Property Taxes in the UK Housing Market
FRANCESCO NICOLAI, MARCO PELOSI AND SIMONA RISTESKA1
A standard tenet of economic theory is that the statutory incidence of taxes is ir-
relevant for their economic incidence2. It should also be the case that whether a
tax is paid at the moment of transaction or later is irrelevant for its incidence, as
long as we take into account the time value of money and the riskiness of the cash
flows. By looking at the UK residential property market, this paper shows that this
is not the case and that deferred taxes have a markedly lower incidence compared
to taxes paid at the time of decision-making.
Together with France, the United Kingdom is one of the few countries receiv-
ing a sizeable fraction of revenues from property taxes, amounting to about 4.3%
of GDP or more than £84 billion in 2016 (European Commission (2018)). The two
main taxes levied on domestic properties are the Stamp Duty Land Tax and the
council tax. The former is a tax levied on the transaction value of land and any
buildings and structures thereon. The fact that its statutory incidence falls on the
buyer, who is required to pay the tax liability to the HM Revenue and Customs
within very few weeks from the completion of the transaction, and the fact that the
tax represents a lump sum ranging between 1% and 7% of the property value are
features that make the stamp duty tax particularly salient at the moment of pur-
chase. The latter, which is the focus of the present paper, is a tax levied by the local
government on a yearly basis. The council tax is levied on the resident, as opposed
1We are grateful to Vicente Cuñat, Daniel Ferreira, Dirk Jenter, Christian Julliard, Daniel Par-
avisini, Andrea Tamoni, Michela Verardo and the participants at the LSE PhD seminar for the useful
comments on the paper. We thank Vittorio Raoul Tavolaro for invaluable research assistance. The
paper contains HM Land Registry data c© Crown copyright and database right 2019. The data is
licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. 1. We thank the University of Glasgow - Urban
Big Data Centre for providing Zoopla property data. Zoopla Limited, c© 2019. Zoopla Limited.
Economic and Social Research Council. Zoopla Property Data, 2019 [data collection]. University of
Glasgow - Urban Big Data Centre.
2Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) provide a detailed review of classical theory on tax incidence.
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to the house owner, and is based on the property value in 1991. While the coun-
cil tax is extremely salient at the moment when it needs to be paid, we show that
this is not the case at the moment when properties are purchased even though, in
present value terms, it is similar to or even larger than the stamp duty tax. By us-
ing the geographical discontinuity at the border of different local authorities in the
London area, we are able to estimate the incidence of the council tax on property
prices and contrast it with the incidence of the stamp duty tax estimated, among
others, by Best and Kleven (2018). The London area is particularly suitable for the
estimation because of the sharp nature of the council borders and the large disper-
sion in council tax rates across Boroughs. For instance, Figure C1 depicts a road
that is at the border of the Borough of Westminster and the Borough of Kensington
and Chelsea. As can be seen from the picture, the houses on both sides of the street
are otherwise identical except for the fact that they pay quite different council tax
amounts: the ones on the left pay £2, 279 per year in council tax while those on the
right pay £1, 421 per year. If we discount the future payments as a perpetuity at a
rate of 4%, similar to the mortgage rates observed in sample, we obtain that the dif-
ference between the two present values amounts to £21, 450 (about $28, 000). The
tax differentials become even more significant once we consider the fact that many
London Boroughs share services, such as waste management, and that many other
amenities, such as access to parks, schooling and religious facilities, are not strictly
limited to residents of a given Borough. In Section 3.3 we show that the price of
similar properties on opposite sides of a border does not adjust for differentials in
council tax amounts. By employing a variety of estimators, we establish that the
council tax incidence is never statistically negative. We then proceed in Section 3.4
to set up a model where downpayment-constrained households purchase a house
and pay two sets of taxes: a lump sum stamp duty tax levied at the moment of
purchase and a periodic council tax. We move on to perform a Bayesian analysis
in Section 3.4.1 where we provide a posterior range for council tax incidence us-
ing priors that are economically motivated. In all these estimates, the incidence
of council tax on property prices is too low relative to existing estimates of the
incidence of other property taxes, even after accounting for time value of money
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and the fact that discount rates might be larger because of borrowing constraints.
These findings can be rationalised in a model where agents neglect taxes that are
levied in the future. We show in Section 3.4.2 that then a trade-off between the two
types of taxes arises: the stamp duty tax is distortionary because agents are liquid-
ity constrained; on the other hand, the council tax leads agents to over-consume
the housing good and, therefore, distorts their consumption choices by reducing
available income. As a result, we demonstrate that the Government can optimally
tune the two taxes to minimise distortions for a given level of revenue.
The present paper adds on to the burgeoning literature on behavioural public
finance and the salience of taxes (or the lack thereof). Chetty et al. (2009) is the first
paper to empirically estimate how differences in salience can alter the behaviour of
economic agents. They intervene in a grocery store in order to modify the salience
of sales taxes and show that the incidence on buyers is largely reduced when taxes
are made fully salient. In a second experiment they compare the effect of excises
taxes, which are included in posted prices, and sales taxes, which are not explicitly
included, on alcohol demand and again show that tax salience plays an important
role in consumer behaviour. The setting in the present paper is quite similar to the
second experiment in Chetty et al. (2009), given that the stamp duty tax is paid
upfront while the council tax is deferred and thus less salient. For policy reasons,
however, the question of property taxes is of greater importance because of the
large amounts of money involved and the fact that it is very difficult for agents to
learn since buying a new property is typically a once-in-a-lifetime event. Following
Chetty et al. (2009), other papers have also explored the question of tax salience, for
instance, Feldman and Ruffle (2015) and Feldman et al. (2018) have replicated the
findings in laboratory experiments, while Finkelstein (2009) similarly shows that
the introduction of electronic toll payments raises toll expenditures. Taubinsky and
Rees-Jones (2018) further explore the topic by showing that there is large variation
in the way agents react to tax salience and investigate policy implications. The
present paper is also akin to Allcott (2011) who demonstrates that a similar bias is
present in the automobile market, namely, car buyers fail to correctly price in the
future energy cost at the time of purchase. As in Allcott (2011), our conclusions also
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rely on the choice of an appropriate discount factor. We show in Section 3.4.1 that
the bias persists even after allowing for large discount rates. In a similar vein, using
Norwegian data, Agarwal and Karapetyan (2016) explore the effect of non-salient
debt features on households’ purchasing decisions and show that they do not fully
factor in the added cost. The authors show that the mispricing was eliminated
once these features became fully salient. Finally, the paper extends the literature
on property taxes; among others, we use the results of Besley et al. (2014) and,
in particular, Best and Kleven (2018) to compare our estimates of the council tax
incidence with their stamp duty incidence estimates in order to highlight the lack
of salience of the former.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 3.1 describes the data and
the institutional setting; Section 3.2 gives evidence of the geographical distribution
of council taxes and points out that this can significantly bias our estimates if not
appropriately taken care of, before proceeding with the details of our identification
strategies; Section 3.3 presents the empirical estimates of the council tax incidence;
Section 3.4 develops a stylised model to help interpret the findings and shows that
the estimated incidence is too low to be consistent with fully-salient taxes, before
exploring some policy implications; and finally, Section 3.5 summarises and con-
cludes the paper.
3.1 Data
To estimate the incidence of council taxes we need access to data on property char-
acteristics and house prices, as well as council taxes paid. Price paid data on house
transactions are readily available from the HM Land Registry website. This dataset
contains information about all residential properties transacted in England and
Wales from 1995 that have been sold for full market value3. The dataset com-
prises of the price paid, the transaction date and, most importantly, the address
of the house which allows us to pinpoint the exact location of every property. Ad-
3Data excluded from the dataset include commercial transactions, property transactions that
have not been lodged in with HM Land Registry and transactions made below market value. For
more details on the property sales not included in the dataset the reader can visit the HM Land
Registry website: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/about-the-price-paid-data.
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ditionally, the data provide us with information on the property type, which can
be one of five possible categories (a detached, semi-detached, or terraced house, a
flat/maisonette and other), the age of the property (classified into old or new to
distinguish between newly built properties and already established buildings) and
the duration of tenure, i.e., whether the property is under a freehold or leasehold4.
Since we would ideally like to compare properties that are as similar to each
other as possible, we need more information on property characteristics. For this
purpose we make use of two additional datasets: the Zoopla Property data and
Domestic Energy Performance Certificates. The Zoopla Property data5 has been
collected by Zoopla, one of the UK’s leading providers of property data for con-
sumers and property professionals, giving free access to information on 27,000,000
property records, up to 1,000,000 property listings and 15 years of sold prices data.
The dataset covers the period between 1st January 2010 and 31st March 2019 for
properties located in Great Britain (England, Wales, Scotland). The dataset con-
tains details on characteristics such as property location, property type6, whether
the property has been categorised as residential or commercial7, number of bed-
rooms, number of floors, number of bathrooms, number of receptions and whether
the property is listed for sale or for rent8. In addition, we also have access to the ask-
ing price for both rents and sales, however, we use the more accurate transaction
price from the HM Land Registry dataset. The second source of house character-
istics comes from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.
On their website, one can access the Energy Performance Certificates (EPC) for
domestic and non-domestic buildings. For domestic properties, before 2008 cer-
4Note that leases of seven years or less are not recorded in the dataset.
5The access to the dataset has been kindly provided by the University of Glasgow - Urban Big
Data Centre. Access to the dataset for research purposes can be obtained directly through the Urban
Big Data Centre. The data has been collected by Zoopla. Zoopla Limited, c© 2019. Zoopla Limited.
Economic and Social Research Council. Zoopla Property Data, 2019 [data collection]. University of
Glasgow - Urban Big Data Centre.
6Property types include: barn conversion, block of flats, bungalow, business park, chalet,
château, cottage, country house, detached bungalow, detached house, end terrace house, eques-
trian property, farm, farm house, finca, flat, hotel/guest house, houseboat, industrial, land,
leisure/hospitality, light industrial, link-detached house, lodge, longère, maisonette, mews house,
mobile/park home, office, parking/garage, pub/bar, restaurant/cafe, retail premises, riad, semi-
detached bungalow, semi-detached house, studio, terraced bungalow, terraced house, town house,
unknown, villa and warehouse.
7We keep only properties categorised as residential.
8For the time being we only keep properties listed for sale.
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tificates could be lodged on a voluntary basis. From 2008 onwards, however, it
has become mandatory for accredited energy assessors to lodge the energy certifi-
cates. Consequently, the data coverage drastically improves around that time, as
does our ability to match these data with the price paid data. More specifically, the
matching rate jumps from about 50 percent to over 90 percent around 2008. The
dataset contains information on the location, property type, total floor area, num-
ber of storeys, number of rooms, floor level and height, along with many indicators
of energy efficiency and quality of glazed surfaces. The final piece of data needed
to conduct our analysis is related to council tax data; in the following section we
describe in more detail the functioning of this property tax and the relevant data.
3.1.1 Council Tax
The taxation of properties in the United Kingdom is peculiar compared to other
OECD countries, representing a rather large source of both central Government
and local authorities’ revenues. The three main taxes levied on properties are the
council tax, business rates and stamp duty taxes. Council taxes are levied on each
occupier, rather than on the owner, of domestic properties. The tax is one of the
few levies in Great Britain being both set and collected by local authorities (Bor-
oughs in the case of London) and it represents one of their major sources of revenue
(around one-third of total revenue), the other sources being commercial property
taxes (business rates) and transfers from the central Government. The tax is based
on a classification in eight bands (A-H) based on the value of the property as es-
tablished by the Valuation Office in 1991; newly built properties are assigned to
a band, after having their current value converted into the value of an equivalent
property in 1991. Each London Borough is responsible for setting the annual tax
amount to be paid by a property in band D every year; the amount to be paid by
other bands is automatically set as a ratio to the amount for band D9. Bands C and
D represent the largest fraction of dwellings (about 50 percent of the total), but
there is variation across Boroughs with central properties being skewed towards
9The ratios are constant across Boroughs and are as follows: band A 6/9, band B 7/9, band C
8/9, band D 1, band E 10/9, band F 13/9, band G 15/9, band H 2.
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higher valued bands compared to properties in outer Boroughs. Figure C2 shows
the time series of the council tax payable per band per Borough. Each panel in
the figure depicts the amount payable by different bands showing that, by con-
struction, the tax moves in locksteps across bands. More interestingly, it should be
noted that there is a wide dispersion in amounts payable across Boroughs, even
though the ranking across different local authorities remains almost constant with
the only exception being the Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham where taxes
have been slashed starting from the late 2000s. After a marked increase in council
tax rates in the early 2000s, the freeze mandated by the central Goverment after the
2008 financial crisis is visible in the time series; since 2011, taxes can be raised only
by a centrally set amount unless a local referendum allows the authority to do so.
We show in Section 3.2.1 that the geographical distribution of council tax rates is
not random and could severely bias any estimate of incidence, given that central
(and pricier) Boroughs tend to set lower council tax rates. This is mainly because
central Boroughs tend to have larger fraction of properties in higher bands; for in-
stance, the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea raises more than fifty percent of its
revenues from bands G and H, while Barking and Dagenham raise less than five
percent from these bands.
We obtain information on council tax band assignment from the website of the
Valuation Office Agency, which provides data on the full address and the council
tax band for each property in Great Britain. The average amount to be paid in
each London Borough by each band in the period 1999-2018 is obtained from the
London Datastore managed by the Greater London Authority.
In the following section, we provide some descriptive statistics of the data we
have mentioned so far.
3.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure C3 shows the distribution of transaction prices for domestic properties in
London, truncated to exclude extremely high property prices which are, however,
included in the analysis. The data consists of 889,925 observations in the period
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between 1999 and 2018 for which property characteristics and council tax infor-
mation is available. We confirm that the distribution is highly skewed with the
average and median property values being £366, 528 and £250, 000, respectively. It
is immediately obvious that there is a large degree of bunching in prices, as noted
for instance in Best and Kleven (2018). The bunching mainly happens just before
stamp duty notches, which allows Best and Kleven (2018) to estimate the local inci-
dence of this tax. Figure C4, for instance, shows the large extent of bunching at the
threshold of £250, 000 (upper panel) and £500, 000 (lower panel) where the stamp
duty tax jumps from 1% to 3% and from 3% to 4%, respectively. Best and Kleven
(2018) estimate a rather large incidence of stamp duty tax on property prices and
argue in favour of evidence of rather strict borrowing constraints; we use their es-
timates to inform our analysis of the incidence of the council tax, allowing us to
disentangle how much of the incidence is due to borrowing constraints (or the lack
thereof) and how much is attributable to pure time discount. Figure C5 shows the
distribution of house prices per band. The vertical red lines depict the median price
within each band. As one should expect, higher bands tend to have houses with
higher average prices although there is a large dispersion within bands. This is
because prices have increased a lot over the past twenty years, especially for more
central and higher-banded properties. This makes it essential that we compare
only transactions occurring in close periods. Moreover, one should notice that the
number of properties belonging to bands C and D dominates the rest, as previously
mentioned. In Figures C6, C7, C8, C9 and C10 we show that there is a wide dis-
persion of transaction prices based on house characteristics such as property type,
number of rooms, property age and duration. There is a disproportionate amount
of flats in our sample, which we see as an advantage in our estimation, as flats are
much more likely to be similar to each other relative to other property types. De-
tached houses are most expensive, with a median price of £525, 000, followed by
semi-detached houses (£319, 950) and terraced houses (£270, 000), and finally, flats
are the cheapest category (£195, 000). Naturally, the house price is increasing in
the number of rooms with the median value of each additional room being about
£40, 000 in the full sample. Newly-built properties represent a minority in our sam-
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ple and trade at a small discount relative to established buildings. This is due to
the geographic distribution of the housing stock in London where older properties
tend to be in the more sought-after central areas. However, there is some hetero-
geneity when we look at the year of construction: properties built before 1949 sold
at a median of £287, 000 close to those built after 2003 (£275, 000), while proper-
ties built in the period 1950-1982 and 1983-2002 sold at lower prices (£215, 000 and
£200, 000, respectively). This pattern can be explained both by differences in type
and location across groups. Finally, it can be noted that properties under a freehold
ownership have a higher median price (£305, 000) compared to leasehold proper-
ties (£195, 000).
After having described the data, we proceed to the discussion of our empirical
strategy in the next section.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Evidence of Selection
The main issue that arises when estimating the incidence of council taxes is the
fact that the cross-sectional distribution of council tax amounts across Boroughs is
very strongly correlated with other characteristics that affect house prices. To see
this, Figure C11 shows a map of the distribution of Band D council tax amounts
payable for each London Borough along with the respective distribution of house
prices. Panel C11a shows the distribution of council taxes in 2000, where taxes
increase moving from yellow to red; Panel C11b the distribution of house prices in
the same year, where prices increase moving from light blue to brown. Panel C11c
shows the distribution of council taxes in 2018, while panel C11d the distribution of
house prices in the same year. It is visually striking that councils with lower taxes
tend to have higher house prices. For instance, the City of Westminster had the
lowest Band D council tax in 2000 (£375.17) and the second highest average house
price (£357, 925), after the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (£726, 908) which
had the fourth lowest council tax (£623.38). In 2018 the same holds true, with the
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City of Westminster having the lowest council tax (£710.50) and the second highest
average price (£1, 612, 231), after Kensington and Chelsea (£3, 040, 547) which had
the fifth lowest council tax (£1, 139.41). In general, it is clear from the map that
Boroughs that lie further from the centre tend to have higher council taxes and
lower prices, while the more central Boroughs tend to exhibit the opposite pattern.
To confirm the intuition obtained from Figure C11, we can run a naı̈ve regression of
house prices on house characteristics and council tax payable without controlling
for the geographical location of the property, i.e.:
pidbt = βτdbt + δbt + ζ ′xidbt + εidbt (3.1)
where pidbt is the price of house i in Borough d, band b at time t; τdbt is the coun-
cil tax amount for a house in Borough d, band b at time t; δbt are year-band fixed
effects; and xidbt are controls which include the property size measured in squared
meters, number of rooms, property type, age, duration and month which controls
for seasonality in the housing market (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2014). Table C1 reports
the results of regression (3.1); the first column provides the baseline result where
month and year-band fixed effects are included in order to remove the mechani-
cal correlation between increasing property prices and taxes over time and the fact
that moving from band A to band H goes hand in hand with higher house prices.
If we took this evidence at face value, we would conclude that the incidence of
council tax is extremely large and statistically significant with a point estimate of
−231.2. To give intuition, using a discount rate of r = 4% (similar to the risk-
free rate observed in sample) this would roughly imply that an extra £1 in present
value of taxes would lead to a drop in prices of r × β = 4%× 231.2 = £9.25. It
is obvious that this figure is only the artefact of the negative correlation between
the value of properties and the average tax within councils as observed in Fig-
ure C11. Extremely negative coefficients are obtained in columns (2), (3) and (4)
where we control for the property size, number of rooms, property type, whether
the property is newly-built and whether it is a leasehold. The smallest of these
coefficients in absolute value, i.e., −228.7 in column (3), would imply an incidence
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of r × β = 4%× 228.7 = £9.15 which is still unreasonably high. Table C2 shows
similar estimates when we include all the variables available as controls. To further
corroborate the negative correlation between property prices and council taxes due
to geographical selection, we provide the results of the following two-step estima-
tion. First, we regress house prices on characteristics to obtain hedonic residuals:
pidbt = ζ ′xidbt + εidbt (3.2)
For each Borough, band, year, we compute the median residual price εmeddbt and pro-
ceed to regress it on council tax amount payable including year-band fixed effects:
εmeddbt = βτdbt + δbt + ηdbt (3.3)
The results are reported in Table C3. The vector of predictors xidbt in the first-stage
hedonic regression includes: month fixed effects in column (1); month, property
size, number of rooms in column (2); month, property size, number of rooms and
property type in column (3); and month, property size, number of rooms, prop-
erty type and indicators for whether the property is newly-built and a leashold in
column (4). Similarly, Table C4 reports results when the dependent variable in the
second stage is the average hedonic residual ε̄dbt per Borough, band, year, i.e.:
ε̄dbt = βτdbt + δbt + ηdbt (3.4)
Both tables confirm the previous finding that Boroughs with higher house values
tend to impose lower council tax bills: the coefficients are negative and statistically
significant, ranging from −183.6 to −368.4.
The results provided so far imply that special care needs to be taken before
using the geographical variation in council taxes to estimate their incidence on
house prices. For this reason in our identification strategy we compare only houses
that lie extremely close, i.e., no more than 500 meters and mainly closer than 200
meters, to the border between two adjacent Boroughs in order to disentangle the
actual incidence of the tax from the geographical distribution of taxes across Bor-
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oughs. Throughout the rest of the paper, the reader should bear in mind that the
geographical distribution of council taxes entails that any estimated incidence is, at
most, an upper bound for the true incidence. This is because, if buyers value certain
characteristics upon purchasing a house, these should be capitalised in the house
price which, in this case, acts almost like a sufficient statistic for their value; the
results of Figure C11 and Tables C1-C4 signal that houses with more highly valued
characteristics (and higher prices) tend to be located in Boroughs with lower taxes,
thus inflating any estimate of tax incidence. A second and more subtle reason why
we can only estimate an upper bound for the incidence has to do with our iden-
tification strategy. By comparing similar dwellings on opposite sides of a border,
we implicitly assume that the buyer always has an outside option during the price
bargaining process. As a result, the buyer would be much more elastic than an
otherwise identical buyer involved in the purchase of a house located in the heart
of a Borough where there is no outside option in terms of council tax. We show
in Section 3.4 that the seller bears the full incidence of the tax at the border, while
that is not necessarily the case at an interior point. In general, even in the absence
of perfect substitutes across council borders, it is reasonable to conjecture that the
incidence is still much larger at the border compared to the council centre, where
the agent would have to move long distance in order to pay a different council tax
rate.
In the next section we describe the identification strategies that allow us to es-
timate the incidence of council taxes as precisely as possible given the present set-
ting, bearing in mind that any attempt is likely to result in an over-estimation of
the true incidence.
3.2.2 Identification Strategies
We use two different identification strategies to measure an upper bound of the
incidence of council tax on property prices: regressions grids and a matching algo-
rithm.
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Regression Grids
The first strategy compares houses that lie in close proximity by dividing the area
of London in a grid and assigning a fixed effect to each square in the grid. By do-
ing so, we are de-facto comparing two houses that are otherwise identical but lie
on opposite sides of a given border between two Boroughs. Figure C12 graphi-
cally depicts our first approach. Panel C12a shows a grid of squares with equal
sizes superposed on a map of London. Panel C12b shows a more detailed picture
of the Boroughs in the centre10. We then proceed to select the squares that have
two houses that: are sold in the same year, are in the same council tax band and
lie on opposite sides of the border; Panel C12b displays in blue examples of such
squares. It can be noticed that we discard observations for which the border is lo-
cated on the Thames River bank. To avoid relying on an arbitrary division, we use
three different grids, namely one grid divides the area in 50× 50 squares, another
divides it in 100× 100 squares and, finally, the last grid is a 150× 150 one. These
squares have an approximate size of 800 meters, 400 meters and 250 meters, re-
spectively. While the maximal possible distance between houses can be inferred as
√
2× square side length, we choose to remove observations that are more than 500
meters far from the border. Figure C13 shows the distribution of distances to the
border for our different specifications. As mentioned, no house lies more than 500
meters away from the border, and most of the observations are about 200 meters
away from the closest border. As we proceed to refine our grids by subdividing
into a larger number of squares, we can see that we lose observations in the 200
meters-500 meters range; this reduces our power significantly, but ensures that we
compare houses that are indeed in very close proximity.
Our strategy consists of running within square regressions whereby we com-
pare houses that are sold in the same year and in the same council tax band, specif-
ically:
pibgdt = βτbdt + δbgt + ζ ′xibgdt + εibgdt (3.5)
10The three main Boroughs depicted in the picture are, starting from left, Hammersmith and
Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea and the City of Westminster.
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where pibgdt is the price of house i, in council tax band b, grid square g, Borough
d, and year t; τbdt is the council tax amount for band b, Borough d in year t; and
xibgdt are house-specific controls. The presence of the band-grid square-year fixed
effects δbgt guarantees that the regression compares houses that are in the same
square, same council tax band and are sold in the same year, implying that our
identification assumption is that they systematically differ only due to the amount
of council tax paid, after partialling out the effect of house characteristics that we
add to increase our precision. It should be noticed that, as mentioned above, better
Boroughs, i.e., Boroughs with higher average prices, tend to have lower council
taxes, implying that - if we leave some hidden characteristic out of our regression
- the estimate of β is most likely going to overstate the true incidence. To give an
example, while highly unlikely given the sharp nature of the borders, one could
argue that there is a name tag value of living in certain Boroughs over others, for
instance, a house in Westminster commands a premium over a similar house on
the other side of the border in Brent. The fact that Westminster has a lower tax
compared to Brent implies that we would overestimate the incidence of the tax
because of the name tag value of living in Westminster. In general, to reverse this
bias and claim that the true incidence might be higher than the one we estimate,
the reader should think of some hidden characteristic that systematically causes
people to prefer living in a Borough with worse amenities compared to a Borough
with better ones.
The following section presents our second identification strategy which relies
on a matching estimator rather than grid squares fixed effects.
Matching Estimator
Our second identification approach consists of pairwise matching of houses on
opposite sides of a given border. To find the closest match, we need to define a
distance: in what follows, we rely on a Euclidean distance and a distance based on
a linear model. Under the first one, we restrict the possible matches to be: no more
than 500 meters away from each other, sold in the same year, in the same council
tax band, and to both be either old or newly-built and freehold or leasehold prop-
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erties. For each property we then choose the closest match as the one minimising
the Euclidean distance d(i, j) =
√
∑Kk=1(xik − xjk)2, where i is the original property,
j indexes the possible matches on the other side of the border, xik are house i char-
acteristics and xjk are house j characteristics. We then run within-pair regressions:
pibdt = βτbdt + δij + ζ ′xibdt + εibdt (3.6)
where δij are ij-pair dummies and xibdt are house i-specific features. The second
choice of distance is based on a linear pricing model:
pit = α + β′xit + εit (3.7)
where xit similarly contains house-specific characteristics as above. We then com-
pute the model-predicted price p̂it = α̂ + β̂′xit. As before, we restrict the pairing
to houses sold in the same year, band, old/new and leasehold/freehold categories
and no further than 500 meters from each other. For each property i we pick the
closest match j as the one that minimises the following distance: d(i, j) = | p̂it− p̂jt|.
To estimate the incidence, we run within pair-regressions as in equation (3.6) where
the δij dummies are determined according to the new matching algorithm. As in
Section 3.2.2 the identification is valid as long as the only systematic difference
within pairs is the amount of council tax. As previously explained, any other omit-
ted variable would most likely lead us to estimate an upper bound for the inci-
dence, given the geographical distribution of council taxes.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Grid Estimator
Table C5 presents the results of the grid regressions described in Section 3.2.2 where
we use a 50× 50 grid and include band-grid square ID-year fixed effects to compare
the effect of council taxes on properties in the same band, sold in the same year, lo-
cated in the same grid square but on opposite sides of a border as in equation (3.5).
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The controls we include are as follows: column (1) uses month fixed effects to con-
trol for housing market seasonality; column (2) adds number of rooms fixed effects
and controls for property size; column (3) also adds property type fixed effects,
and; column (4) includes an indicator for newly-built and leasehold properties.
These are our default specifications throughout the rest of the paper. In all columns
the coefficient on council taxes is statistically indistinguishable from zero and al-
ways with the wrong sign. The lack of significance cannot be attributed to lack
of statistical power in the regressions given that other control variables are always
strongly statistically significant. For instance, the effect of one additional squared
metre ranges between £4, 537 and £4, 627, newly-built properties command a pre-
mium of about £33, 400 and freehold properties sell for £76, 000 more relative to
leaseholds. The same conclusion can be drawn from Table C6 where we expand
the regressions to include all available house price predictors, showing that even
relatively minor characteristics such as the number of lighting outlets or the pres-
ence of fireplaces in the property have a significant effect on prices.
Table C7 displays the grid regression results for grids of different sizes: column
(1) uses a grid that divides the London area into 50× 50 squares, column (2) 100×
100, and column (3) 150 × 150. This might help to alleviate concerns that grids
made of large squares might be comparing houses that are rather distant from each
other. The specification is otherwise same as the one in column (4) of Table C5. The
coefficient on council tax remains statistically insignificant and the point estimate
varies from positive to negative across columns: this is precisely what we should
expect when a regressor has no effect on the outcome variable and simply reacts to
the noise in the sample. The fact that the R-squared is very high (between 77% and
83%) and that all other coefficients are precisely estimated confirms our previous
finding that the incidence of the council tax is indistinguishable from zero. In Table
C8 we augment the regressions by adding all additional house characteristics: the
coefficient on council tax ranges from -11.8 to 75.4 and is never statistically lower
than zero.
To make sure that the confounding effect of the stamp duty notches does not
play a role in our estimation results, Table C9 presents the results of the grid regres-
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sions when we remove the two main stamp duty notches at £250, 000 and £500, 000.
Column (1) excludes only the first notch, column (2) the second, and column (3) re-
moves both. The results are virtually unchanged, with the incidence still being
statistically insignificant, small in magnitude, and always displaying the wrong
sign. As previously mentioned, the large R-squared and the fact that the remain-
ing coefficients are precisely estimated guarantees that this is not due to lack of
power.
Finally, Tables C10 and C11 provide estimates of council tax incidence using a
similar two-step approach as in Tables C3 and C4, i.e., by first obtaining residual
hedonic prices as follows:
pibdgt = ζ ′xibdgt + εibdgt (3.8)
and subsequently regressing the median or average hedonic residuals for each Bor-
ough, band, grid square and year on council tax amounts:
εmedbdgt = βτbdt + δbgt + ηbdgt (3.9)
ε̄bdgt = βτbdt + δbgt + ηbdgt (3.10)
where δbgt are band-grid square-year fixed effects included to ensure that we com-
pare values of houses in the same council tax band, sold in the same year and
located in the same square of the grid. As usual, we restrict the analysis to grid
squares with at least two houses located on different sides of a border and present
the four standard specifications. The results confirm the previous finding: both the
median and average hedonic residuals are not decreasing in the council tax amount
paid, suggesting that the incidence of this tax on house prices is not different from
zero.
In the following section we supplement the evidence by presenting results us-
ing our second identification strategy.
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3.3.2 Matching Estimator
Tables C12, C13 and C14 show the results of our second estimation approach where
we explicitly match similar dwellings on opposite sides of a border as described in
Section 3.2.2. As previously mentioned, all the results are obtained using hous-
ing pairs on opposite sides of a border no more than 500 metres apart, sold in
the same year, in the same council tax band and which are both either old or
newly-built and leasehold or freehold properties. Table C12 displays the results
where closest pairs have been determined by minimising the Euclidean distance
d(i, j) =
√
∑Kk=1(xik − xjk)2, where the vectors xi and xj consist of property size
and number of rooms in columns (1) and (2), and also energy cost in columns (3)
and (4). All the variables are standardised to be comparable. This procedure leads
to 57,612 and 57,323 observations of property pairs with 71,578 and 71,656 unique
transactions in columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), respectively11. After having obtained
the pairs, we run the regression specified in equation (3.6). The presence of δij
pair fixed effects amounts to regressing the difference in prices of matched houses
on the difference in council tax paid, controlling for other property characteristics
along which the matched properties may differ. Consistent with the results ob-
tained with the grid estimator, none of the coefficients on council tax is statistically
significantly negative. As pointed out before, this result is not attributable to lack
of statistical power: for instance, the coefficient on size is highly statistically sig-
nificant and has the same order of magnitude as the ones obtained with the earlier
estimator12. Table C13 confirms these findings under the linear matching algorithm
where pairs are chosen by minimising the distance d(i, j) = | p̂it − p̂jt|, where the
predicted prices p̂it and p̂jt are obtained from a linear model as in equation (3.7). As
before, columns (1) and (2) match properties based on size and number of rooms,
while columns (3) and (4) add energy cost. Finally, Table C14 presents the last set
of results for the linear model where we allow each property to be paired with
11Notice that any given transaction can be the closest match for more than one property. In order
to take care of this redundancy we cluster standard errors at the transaction ID level.
12Notice that, compared to the default specifications used in Tables C1, C5, C7 and C9, the indi-
cators for newly-built and leasehold properties have been dropped given that properties are con-
strained to be identical along these dimensions.
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more than one similar property on the other side of the border, as long as the ab-
solute difference in predicted prices is less than 30% of the largest predicted price,
namely: | p̂it − p̂jt| < 0.3×max{ p̂it, p̂jt}. While the point estimates range between
-5.24 and -8.19, none of the coefficients is statistically different from zero as in all
previous specifications. We shed more light on the interpretation of these and the
previous results in Section 3.4.1.
The empirical findings above demonstrate that council tax differences never
significantly explain house price differences. Moreover, while absence of evidence,
namely the fact that agents seem to be insensitive to taxes that are postponed to the
future, does not directly imply evidence of absence, many point estimates are pos-
itive and hence with the wrong sign. Bearing these estimates in mind, in the next
section we develop a simple model that allows us to propose a plausible explana-
tion for the above results. We subsequently calibrate the model using a Bayesian
approach informed by all of the above estimates and briefly discuss policy impli-
cations.
3.4 Model
In what follows, we present a simple multi-period model of housing-consumption
choice in order to calibrate the above results. We begin with the optimisation prob-
lem of an agent who chooses at time t = 0 an infinite stream of consumption {ct}∞t=0
and a composite housing good h:
max
{{ct,dt}∞t=0,h,1{A},1{B}}









s.t. c0 + h(pA01{A} + pB01{B} + τS) ≤ w0 + d0 (3.12)
ct + h(τAt1{A} + τBt1{B}) + dt−1(1 + r) ≤ wt + dt t = 1, 2, 3, ... (3.13)
dt ≤ αh(pAt1{A} + pBt1{B}) t = 0, 1, 2... (3.14)
For simplicity, the utility of the agent is chosen to be time-separable and separa-
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ble in consumption and housing. The utility function is quasi-linear in c0 in order
to get rid of income effects, as is standard practice in the public finance literature.
For tractability and to separate the effects of stamp duty and council tax, the agent
purchases the housing good only once at t = 0. There are two Boroughs, A and
B, with exogenously chosen and potentially different council tax rates. We assume
that there is equal supply of housing in both Boroughs13. Equation (3.12) is the
first-period budget constraint: the agent spends his initial endowment w0 on con-
sumption c0 and the after-tax cost of his housing demand h. When he buys a house,
the agent pays the pre-tax price pi0, i = A, B, and, in addition, he also needs to pay
the stamp duty tax τS hereby assumed to be proportional to the quality-adjusted
level of housing demand. If his total demand exceeds his initial endowment, the
agent can borrow additional funds d0 for one period at the risk-free rate. The bud-
get constraints for all subsequent periods are identical and given by equation (3.13):
from time t = 1 onwards, the agent spends his endowment wt on his optimal con-
sumption choice ct and to pay the council tax τit, i = A, B, that corresponds to the
Borough where he has chosen to locate at time t = 0. He also needs to repay his
short-term debt from the previous period inclusive of interest dt−1(1+ r), and is al-
lowed to borrow again at the same terms in order to balance his budget constraint.
Finally, the last constraint in equation (3.14) is the financing constraint: the agent
cannot borrow more than a fraction α of the pre-tax cost of his housing demand.
This can potentially generate very large incidence for the stamp duty tax since the
lump sum nature of this tax tightens the leverage constraint. The Lagrangian for
the above problem can be written as:






















13This assumption is crucial and de-facto eliminates the potential for a differential elasticity of
supply with respect to council taxes at the border. We consider this assumption quite reasonable
given that the greatest majority of the housing stock in London has been constructed well before
the introduction of this tax in the early 90s as shown in Figures C8 and C9.
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where we use the fact that 1{B} = 1− 1{A}. Notice that the Lagrangian is mono-
tone in the choice of Borough 1{A}, therefore, the choice of where to locate can be
separated from the consumption and housing-quality choices. The agent chooses
to live in Borough A if:












(pAt − pBt) (3.16)
i.e., if the price differential between the same-quality house in Boroughs A and B
more than compensates for the present value of the difference in future council
tax payments and the collateral value of the house. In equilibrium, markets clear
if equation (3.16) holds with equality which, from now onwards, we assume to
be the case. Assuming that the agent is indifferent between living in Boroughs A
and B, we proceed by suppressing the Borough subscripts and denote the price of
the house as pt and the council tax as τt. The first-order conditions for an interior
solution are:
1 = λ0 (3.17)
βtu′(ct) = λt ∀t = 1, 2, 3, ... (3.18)
−λt + λt+1(1 + r) + µt = 0 ∀t = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.19)
h−1
(1− β) = λ0(p0 − α
µ0
λ0












Combining the first-order conditions for consumption and for the optimal debt








1 + r + µtλt+1
(3.21)
The above Euler equation implies that the agent’s discount factor is equal to the
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inverse of the risk-free rate and a liquidity premium µtλt+1 , arising from the fact
that the house has some collateral value. In order to simplify the exposition, we
assume that in equilibrium the liquidity premium is constant and equal to µtλt+1 = k,
that house prices grow at a constant rate g, i.e., pit = pi0(1 + g)t, and council tax
amounts grow at a constant rate g̃, i.e., τit = τi1(1 + g̃)t−1. Re-arranging equations





r + k− g
)
= −(τA1 − τB1)
1
r + k− g̃ (3.22)
h−1
(1− β) = p0
(
1− αk




r + k− g̃ (3.23)
The first equation is the equilibrium condition of how house prices should behave
across Boroughs: the house price differential, after having taken into account the
collateral value αkr+k−g , needs to match (the negative of) the present value of the
council tax differential. The second equation states that the agent’s marginal utility
of housing is equal to the house price inclusive of (the present value of) all taxes
and collateral value. It is important to note that the no-arbitrage condition (3.22)
in general gives a different incidence compared to the one obtained from the hous-
ing demand (3.23). This is because the former holds only at the border between
two Boroughs where the outside option, i.e., the option to buy an otherwise iden-
tical house on the other side of the border, implies that the supply bears the whole




r + k− g̃ ×
r + k− g
r + (1− α)k− g (3.24)
On the other hand, for both houses on the border as well as houses in the mid-
dle of a given Borough we can define the optimal demand from equation (3.23) as
D(p0, τ1, τS) = h∗(p0, τ1, τS). Equating with the optimal supply, S(p0) = D(p0, τ1, τS),
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is a slightly modi-
fied version of the supply elasticity ηS that takes into account the price inclusive of




≤ r + k− g
r + (1− α)k− g (3.26)
implying that the incidence at the border between Boroughs is an upper bound for
the true council tax incidence as long as the modified elasticity of supply is non-
negative, i.e., η̃S ≥ 0. Notice that the modified elasticity of supply η̃S is positive as
long as the true elasticity of supply ηS is positive.
3.4.1 Calibration
The model in the previous section allows us to better interpret the empirical results







r + k− g̃ (3.27)
i.e., the incidence of the council tax can be interpreted as the present value of the
sum of the incidence of the stamp duty tax discounted at the liquidity-adjusted cost
of capital r + k with growth rate g̃. In what follows we use the results in Tables C5 -
C14 and provide further direction on how to interpret them. We treat each estimate
as a separate model m. Conditional on the model being true and given a common
prior distribution p(βτ|m) = p(βτ) about the true incidence of council tax and the
likelihood function of the data p(y|βτ, m) we can use Bayes’ rule to express the
14This assumes that η̃S = 0, i.e., that the supply of housing is fixed in the short term.
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The computational burden of equation (3.29) is significant, therefore, we proceed
with the simplifying assumptions described in Appendix C.4. We always start from
a normally-distributed prior βτ ∼ N (bτ, σ2τ) and likelihood function which leads to
a normal posterior. As detailed in Appendix C.4 the mean of the prior is chosen by
calibrating the parameters g, g̃, r and α based on historical data and matching the
stamp duty incidence to results in Best and Kleven (2018). For robustness we also
vary the precision of the prior and provide results for five different specifications:
p(βτ) = N (−150, 502), N (−100, 502), N (−50, 502), N (−150, 752), N (−50, 252).
Figure C15 plots the model-averaged density of the posterior distribution for
the council tax incidence. Panel (a) displays the posterior density for a constant
standard deviation of the prior of 50, while (b) for a standard deviation equal to
half the prior mean. It can be noted that the shape of the posterior is similar across
specifications and that it displays a significant shift of mass toward zero. Table C15
provides the quantiles, the mode and the mean of the posterior distribution of the
incidence. The median posterior incidence ranges between -22.87 and -2.17, well
below the median implied by the model calibration which has informed the prior.
The last column reports the ratio between the two, giving the implied attenuation
bias displayed by agents. Given the model parameters the price reaction to council
taxes is between 4% and 37% of what the price reaction to the stamp duty tax would
imply from agents who fully perceive the tax.
The results above become striking once coupled with the extent to which house
buyers react to stamp duty taxes. When buyers are liquidity-constrained, their
effective discount rates become large and, therefore, one might be tempted to at-
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tribute the previous evidence solely to extreme discounting of future cash flows. If
we are willing to take this view, we would have to assume discount rates ranging
between 23.4% and 231.9% in order to fit the posterior estimates of the council tax
incidence. Moreover, it should be noted that every estimate of the council tax inci-
dence is conditioned on an estimate of the stamp duty incidence, i.e., the discount
rate is not a free parameter in the calibration. To put it differently, changing the
discount rate to match a reasonable incidence for the council tax would lead to an
incidence of the stamp duty tax that is inconsistent with current estimates in the
literature. The fact that the incidence of the stamp duty is large but not extreme
implies that the liquidity premium cannot be the only source of the low council tax
incidence. Third, in our estimation we use relatively concentrated priors around
the model-informed incidence; had we allowed the likelihood to dominate by as-
signing diffuse priors, we would have obtained much lower estimates compared to
the conservative ones provided so far. One way to explain these findings is by hy-
pothesising that, when buying their properties, agents discount tax payments that
happen in the future disproportionately compared to those that occur concurrently
with the purchase. It is difficult to argue that this might be due to uncertainty as-
sociated with council tax payments given that differences in council tax amounts
across Boroughs are very smooth and predictable as shown in Figure C2. This
leaves us with another plausible alternative explanation: agents fail to fully inter-
nalise the difference in council tax payments across Boroughs upon purchasing a
property, either because this is much less salient compared to the stamp duty tax15,
or because they fail to appreciate the magnitude of its present value16. Notice also
that the results so far suggest that there is somebody who does not take the council
tax differentials into account in a fully-rational way, but this does not need to be the
house buyer: our previous analysis goes through even if the buyer is fully aware
15It is also possible that the tax is fully salient to agents but, due to mental accounting, they fail
to integrate its present value into the house price they are willing to pay. Other explanations could
be related to search costs and cognitive costs.
16For a property in band D worth, say, £300, 000, the stamp duty tax in 2018 would amount to
£9, 000. If the buyer could choose whether to buy the property in the Borough of Camden or the
Borough of Westminster, the difference in council tax would amount to about £778 in 2018 which,
in present value using a discount rate of 4%, would be equal to £19, 450, more than twice the value
of the stamp duty tax.
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of the tax and hopes to shift its incidence onto the subsequent buyer, or the renter
in the case of buy-to-let property transactions17.
Motivated by these findings, we explore some policy implications in the follow-
ing section.
3.4.2 Implications for Tax Policy
Given the results in the previous section, it seems reasonable to argue that agents
fail to fully perceive deferred taxes. As a result, we propose a modified version of
the model above that allows for non-fully salient taxes. We extend our analysis to
properties that are potentially far from the border and, therefore, allow the elastic-
ity of supply ηS to be non-zero. Recall that the incidence estimates coming from
the border in Section 3.3 are an upper bound for the incidence in the middle of Bor-
oughs. For simplicity, let us assume we are in an equilibrium where the leverage
constraint (3.14) is binding, i.e., dt = αhpt. If we multiply each of the constraints
(3.12) and (3.13) by 1




(1 + r + k)
+
c2
(1 + r + k)2
+ ... + p̃h = w0 +
w1
(1 + r + k)
+ ... = I (3.30)






r+k−g̃ is the tax-inclusive house price. For sim-




and τ = τ1r+k−g̃ , so that we can
rewrite p̃ = p + τS + τ. Following Chetty et al. (2009), Farhi and Gabaix (2020) and
Goldin (2015), we assume that the agent misperceives taxes with attenuation factor
γ, i.e., he solves the following maximisation problem:
max
{{ct}∞t=0,h}




βt (u(ct) + log(h)) (3.31)
17Note that we largely interpret the results as evidence of overpricing. Another possibility is that
the properties on the low council tax side of borders are relatively underpriced and it is, therefore,
sellers who fail to incorporate the tax discount into their ask price.




(1 + r + k)
+
c2
(1 + r + k)2
+ ... + p̃γh = w0 +
w1
(1 + r + k)
+ ... = I (3.32)
where the perceived house price is:
p̃γ = p + τS + γτ, γ ∈ [0, 1] (3.33)
Recall from the previous section that the attenuation factor for the council tax im-
plied by the data ranges between 0.04 and 0.37. Notice that while the agent per-
ceives the above budget constraint, he has to satisfy the actual budget constraint
(3.30) given by the rational model. As pointed out in Reck (2016), it is crucial to de-
cide what choice variable bears the burden of adjustment. Given our assumption
about the quasi-linear utility function in first-period consumption c0, it is natural
to let c0 be the shock absorber. This choice amounts to assuming the following train
of events: 1) the agent misperceives the council tax he will have to pay going for-
ward and, as a result, buys ”too much” quality-adjusted housing; 2) following this,
he realises that the actual amount of taxes he will have to pay is beyond his bud-
get; 3) consequently, the agent adjusts his consumption in the first period keeping
everything else constant. Denoting the observed demands as ĉ0, ĉt, ĥ, and the opti-
mal demands absent any behavioural frictions as c∗0 , c
∗
t , h





(β(1 + r + k))t
)
= c∗t (3.34)
ĥ = [(1− β) p̃γ]−1 6= [(1− β) p̃]−1 = h∗ (3.35)





(1 + r + k)t
− ĥ p̃ 6= c∗0 (3.36)
As previously mentioned, the optimality condition for future consumption remains
as before. However, equation (3.35) shows that the agent demands ”too much”
housing due to the fact that the perceived price p̃γ is lower than the true price p̃,
as long as γ < 1. As a result, because of quasi-linearity in the utility function,
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ĉ0 adjusts to absorb the reduction in available income. The previous discussion
highlights the fact that misperception of the house price affects both consumption
and housing demand, albeit in opposite directions. This implies that a benevolent
social planner needs to carefully balance the two distortions when setting the opti-
mal tax policy. To see this more formally, let us adopt the approach of Goldin (2015)
and assume that the Government chooses the optimal (property) tax combination
in order to raise a fixed amount of revenue and maximise the utility of the buyer18.
For convenience, define the present value of council tax revenue from the Govern-
ment’s point of view, discounted at the risk-free rate, as τ̃ = τ1r−g̃ . The total revenue
raised from a given buyer is:
R = (τS + τ̃)h =
(
τS + τ




The second equality of the above equation shows that the Government discounts
the revenue raised through council taxes at a lower rate than agents due to the
presence of borrowing constraints. The Government can twick the two taxes to














r + k− g̃
r− g̃ h +
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τS + τ








This implies that the change in stamp duty per unit change in council tax needed




















































tell us how responsive the demand is with respect
to taxes relative to pre-tax prices. From equations (3.33) and (3.35) we infer that
θτS = 1 and θτ = γ in our model. The indirect utility function for an inattentive
18In what follows, we abstract from analysing the effect on the utility of the seller.
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agent is:





(1 + r + k)t












and ĥ = ĥ(p, τS, τ) = [(1− β)(p + τS + γτ)]−1



































∂τ is the total incidence of the council tax after having taken
into account the shift in stamp duty to guarantee revenue neutrality. As in Goldin








measures the direct welfare effect of a tax shift due to
the alleviation of the borrowing constraint; the second part, i.e.,
[
∂U
∂h − (p + τS + τ)
]
is the behavioural wedge and it represents the difference between perceived and







is equal to the change in
prices as perceived by the agent; and the fourth component, i.e., ∂ĥ∂p is the impact
of a change in prices on demand for housing. With no bias, i.e., when γ = 1 the
perceived price is equal to the actual price and the envelope theorem ensures that
the second component above is equal to zero. As a consequence, the optimal tax
policy depends on the sign of the first term19. If this is positive, it is optimal for
the government to set τS = 0, if negative, τS = R. It is easy to show that when
γ = 1 this term is unambiguously positive as long as ηS > 0. The Government
should then choose a zero stamp duty tax in order to alleviate the agent’s liquidity
constraint. In the presence of biases, however, there is a trade-off between the two
inefficiencies: 1) the liquidity constraint and differences in salience make increas-
ing the stamp duty tax less efficient than raising the council tax; 2) on the other
19Notice that ∂τS∂τ < −1 because r + k − g̃ > r − g̃, θτ < θτS and
∂h
∂p < 0. The above assumes















> 0, i.e., the Government is on the




∂τ is usually positive since agents react
less to a decrease in council tax relative to a revenue-neutral increase in the stamp duty.
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hand, raising the council tax causes a shift in demand away from c0 which in our
example is the shock absorber. In the extreme case when there are no liquidity con-
straints, it is optimal to impose no council tax. Otherwise, the problem of the social
planner amounts to choosing the optimal combination of stamp duty and council











Figure C16 reports the optimal mix of taxes computed for a house worth £430, 000
which is the median value of properties in band D in 2017. The property pays a
stamp duty of £11, 500 and we assume that it pays a yearly council tax of £1, 419.73,
the in-sample median amount in the corresponding band and year. The upper
panel shows how the optimal combination varies as a function of the discount rate
r + k, while the bottom panel varies the attenuation parameter γ. The figures con-
firm the above intuition. From Figure C16a we can see that when the liquidity
premium is zero, the optimal policy is to levy only the stamp duty tax. For a
small liquidity premium there is an optimal mix that includes positive amounts
of both taxes, however, the borrowing constraints become dominant fairly quickly
and make it optimal to set a stamp duty of zero. Figure C16b, on the other hand,
focuses on the effect of salience. Even when the council tax is entirely non-salient,
i.e., γ = 0, it is still optimal to raise a little over 20% of revenue through it. As
the tax becomes more salient, its distortionary effect on c0 decreases, therefore, its
proportion should increase, up to the point where it becomes the only form of tax-
ation for γ greater than 0.25. It should be noted, however, that this assumes that
tax policy changes do not affect any of the parameters. In practice, changing the
tax mix can change the inattention parameter γ.
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3.5 Conclusions
This paper studies the incidence of property taxes in the UK housing market. By us-
ing a geographical discontinuity approach, exploiting the considerable difference
in council tax rates across London Boroughs, we show that agents significantly
underreact to council taxes. Our empirical estimates of council tax incidence on
house prices is never significantly negative and this lack of significance cannot be
attributed to lack of power. This is in sharp contrast to the large stamp duty in-
cidence estimated by Best and Kleven (2018) and suggests that agents do not pay
sufficient attention to taxes deferred to the future, or possibly points to evidence of
very large search frictions or other cognitive costs. In Section 3.4.2, we touch upon
the policy implications of our findings, however, one should be aware of issues
arising when manipulating tax rates given that there is no guarantee that changes
in policies are not followed by changes in tax salience and therefore behaviour. The
analysis in this paper relies on data from the residential property market, however,
it can also be extended to other domains of tax policy. One general take-away from
the present work is that transaction taxes, such as the stamp duty tax, have a large
incidence on transaction prices while deferred taxes, such as the council tax, have a
lower effect on prices but potentially higher impact on consumption choices. This
implies that the optimal mix of taxes may be some combination of the two. The
analysis can be extended, for instance, to financial securities where the fact that a
transaction tax might be very distortionary does not imply that it is optimal to raise
revenues only through capital gains20 or dividend taxes.
The findings in the paper keep open the question of the nature of the channels
through which inattentive households correct their mistakes and adjust their con-
sumption policies, once neglected taxes materialise. Access to disaggregated ex-
penditure data could help shed light on this matter: this can be done by analysing
differences in consumption responses at the border between Boroughs, which we
should expect to arise whenever agents fail to optimally account for tax differ-
20While the capital gains tax is a transaction tax, the fact that it is borne by the seller of the asset
suggests that agents could still underreact to it as it is a deferred tax and, therefore less salient
compared to a tax charged at the moment of purchase like the stamp duty tax.
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ences and are forced to adjust their expenditures ex-post to meet their budget con-
straints.
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A. Appendix to Contagion in the Market for
Leveraged Loans
A.1 Tables
Table A1: Summary Statistics - Holdings
The table contains summary statistics for the sample of CLOs in the CLO-i dataset between January
2009 and December 2019. Panel A reports summary statistics at the level of each CLO report, while
Panel B aggregates at the level of Management Team - Month. Total Assets refers to the sum of the
current balance of securities held measured in $Mlns; Nr. Issuers refers to the distinct number of
issuers held; Nr. Securities to the distinct number of securities; % of Assets to the fraction of assets
represented by each security in the portfolio; Interest rate to the interest rate of the loan; % CCC to
the ratio between the sum of the current balance of securities rated at or below Caa (CCC) and total
assets; % Default to the ratio between the sum of the current balance of securities in default and
total assets; Age to the difference between the first time a certain deal or management team appears
in sample and the current reporting date; WARF to the weighted-average rating factor computed
using Moody’s rating factors.
Panel A: CLO Deals
Nr.Obs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev
Total Assets 89,111 0.00 18336.84 408.86 434.73 283.96
Nr. Issuers 89,111 1.00 748.00 157.00 168.20 101.33
Nr. Securities 89,111 1.00 907.00 203.00 213.82 115.27
% of Assets 88,517 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Interest Rate 88,334 0.00 16.47 4.77 4.87 1.11
% CCC 88,905 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.09 0.12
% Default 88,905 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.05 0.11
Age 89,111 0.00 10.90 2.00 2.57 2.16
WARF 88,421 4.33 10000.00 2737 2923.48 806.63
Panel B: Management Teams
Nr.Obs Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev
Deals Managed 15,470 1.00 53.00 3.00 5.57 6.50
Total Assets 15,470 0.00 28504.00 1239.46 2504.18 3328.16
Nr. Issuers 15,470 1.00 1209.00 217.00 257.45 183.73
Nr. Securities 15,470 1.00 4935.00 337.00 565.32 606.29
% of Assets 15,100 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
Interest Rate 15,298 0.00 12.28 4.72 4.88 1.10
% CCC 15,451 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.09 0.10
% Default 15,451 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.05 0.09
Age 15,470 0.00 11.00 4.21 4.70 3.23
WARF 15,080 160.75 10000.00 2753.89 2944.44 818.51
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Table A2: Summary Statistics - Transactions
The table contains summary statistics for the sample of CLOs’ transactions in the CLO-i dataset
between January 2009 and December 2019. Tot. Transactions refers to the number of transactions
completed by a deal between two reporting dates; Purchase Price to the average price at which a
loan has been purchased; Nr. Purchases to the total number of securities bought; Amt. Purchased
to the amount of securities purchased, measured in $ Mlns; Sale Price to the average price at which
a loan has been sold; Nr. Sales to the total number of securities sold; Amt. Sold to the amount of
securities sold, measured in $ Mlns. Prices have been capped between $10 and $150. Nr. Obs counts
the number of non-zero observations, while Nr. Zeros counts the number of observations equal to
zero. Min, Max, Median, Mean and Std. Dev are the minimum, maximum, median, average and
standard deviation of the non-zero observations.
CLO Deals
Nr. Obs Nr. Zeros Min Max Median Mean Std.Dev
Tot. Transactions 72,515 16,596 0.00 853.00 19.00 29.73 36.97
Purchase Price 64,919 0 10.00 150.00 98.99 95.31 13.39
Nr. Purchases 65,458 23,653 0.00 736.00 13.00 19.25 26.20
Amt. Purchased 65,458 23,653 0.00 2372.24 15.29 22.44 43.94
Sale Price 64,755 0 10.00 150.00 98.20 91.73 17.53
Nr. Sales 65,239 23,872 0.00 475.00 8.00 13.69 17.55
Amt. Sold 65,239 23,872 0.00 1006.72 6.65 10.84 19.67
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Table A3: The Mechanical Effect of Downgrades to Caa (CCC) on OC Tests
The table studies the mechanical effect of downgrades to Caa (CCC) on the slack of OC tests.
Columns (1)-(4) report the results of the following regression: slackki,t = α + β1Shockedi,t + Xi,tδ +







i,t is the realization of the OC test for tranche k and CLO i and Oki
is the test threshold; Shockedi,t is an indicator variable that turns on whenever the loans of CLO
i have been downgraded to Caa (CCC). Column (5) reports the result of the following regression:
slackki,t = α + β1Shockedi,t + β2Above 7.5%i,t + β3Shockedi,t × Above 7.5%i,t + Xi,tδ + εi,t, where
Above 7.5%i,t is a dummy variable that turns on whenever the fraction of Caa (CCC) securities for
CLO i is greater than 7.5% at time t. Standard errors are reported in parantheses and are double
clustered at the Year ×Month & CLO Deal level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) 0.072∗∗∗
(0.008)
Shocked -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Above 7.5% 0.140
(0.135)
Shocked × Above 7.5% -0.124
(0.128)
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal No No Yes Yes Yes
Senior/Junior OC No No No Yes Yes
Observations 80,321 80,321 80,321 80,321 80,321
R2 0.000 0.001 0.052 0.053 0.053
Within R2 – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Two-way (Year×Month & Deal) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A4: Holdings vs. Market Prices
The table compares the discount of loans as they are reported by CLOs with the closest market price
in the following year by running the following regression: discountj,t = αi + αt + β1Transactionj,t +
Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where discountj,t = 100× log(100/Pj,t) is the discount at which a loan is recorded or
traded compared to par, Transactionj,t is an indicator variable equal to one whenever the price
comes from an actual sale transaction and zero otherwise, αi and αt are issuer and time fixed effects,
while Xj,t includes a set of fixed effects for rating, industry and interest rate of the loan. Panel A
consider the universe of loans that have at least one price reported on the balance sheet of CLOs
and one market price in the following twelve months, while Panel B focuses on the subset of loans
rated Caa (CCC). Standard errors clustered at the Year ×Month and Issuer level are reported in
parentheses.
Panel A: All Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transaction 0.871∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170)
Fit statistics
Obs. 2,211,675 2,200,337 2,200,337 2,200,337 2,211,675
R2 0.578 0.609 0.610 0.610 0.726
Within R2 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
Panel B: Caa (CCC) Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transaction 3.990∗∗∗ 4.000∗∗∗ 4.000∗∗∗ 4.000∗∗∗ 4.030∗∗∗
(0.801) (0.801) (0.801) (0.801) (0.803)
Fit statistics
Obs. 195,073 195,073 195,073 195,073 195,073
R2 0.622 0.644 0.646 0.646 0.728
Within R2 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.018
Fixed-Effects
Year ×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Issuer Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Rating No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
Interest No No No Yes Yes
Year ×Month×Issuer No No No No Yes
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A5: Discontinuity Test
The table reports the result of a discontinuity test where I compare the density of the fraction of Caa
(CCC) or lower rated securities before and after the 7.5% threshold. Number of Obs. reports the
total number of observations on the left and right of the 7.5% threshold; Eff. Number of Obs. reports
the number of observations used for the test which employs Cattaneo et al. (2020) local polynomial
approximation.
Cutoff 0.075 Left Right
Number of Obs. 45318 1620
Eff. Number of Obs. 961 744
Order 2 2
Order Bias 3 3
Bandwith 0.008 0.011
T Pr > |T|
Statistic -0.2725 0.7852
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Table A6: Par Building
Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the following regressions: gaini,j,t =
α + β1Constrainedi,t + β2Shockedi,t + β3Constrainedi,t × Shockedi,t + εi,t, where













for sales; Constrainedi,t is a dummy variable equal
to one whenever the Junior (column (1)) or Senior (column(2)) slack of CLO i is between 0%
and and 5% in period t; Shockedi,t is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the loans of
CLO i have been downgraded. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the following regres-











other variables are defined as above. Constrainedi,t refers to Junior tests in column (3) and to Senior
tests in column (4). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and they are double clustered at
the Year×Month & CLO Deal level.
Individual Transactions Multiple Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Intercept) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002)
Constrained 0.004∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.015)
Shocked 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.003)
Constrained × Shocked 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004 0.069∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.022)
Fit statistics
Observations 309,028 303,160 30,156 29,034
R2 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.005
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.005
OC Test Junior Senior Junior Senior
Two-way (Year×Month & CLO Deal) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A7: Rating Factor
The table shows how to convert Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s ratings into Moody’s Rating Fac-
tors. Rating Factors convert the ordinal rating into a cardinal variable.
Moody’s S&P Rating Factor Moody’s S&P Rating Factor
Aaa AAA 1 Ba1 BB+ 940
Aa1 AA+ 10 Ba2 BB 1350
Aa2 AA 20 Ba3 BB- 1766
Aa3 AA- 40 B1 B+ 2220
A1 A+ 70 B2 B 2720
A2 A 120 B3 B- 3490
A3 A- 180 Caa1 CCC+ 4770
Baa1 BBB+ 260 Caa2 CCC 6500
Baa2 BBB 360 Caa3 CCC- 8070
Baa3 BBB- 610 Ca-C CC-C 10000
Table A8: WARF Deterioration
The table compares the average rating factor for loans sold, in column (1), and purchased, col-
umn (2), by CLOs whose loans have been downgraded to Caa (CCC) and whose Junior OC tests
are binding, by reporting the coefficients of the following regression: RFi,j,t = α + β1Shockedi,t +
β2Constrainedi,t + β3Shockedi,t×Constrainedi,t + εi,t; where RFi,j,t is the rating factor of loan j, sold
by CLO i at time t; Shockedi,t is dummy variable equal to one when the loans of CLO i have been
downgraded to Caa (CCC); Constrainedi,t is a dummy variable equal to one when the slack of the
Junior OC test is between 0% and 5%. Column (3) aggregates the results by reporting the coefficients
of the following regression: ∆WARFi,t = α + β1Shockedi,t + β2Constrainedi,t + β3Shockedi,t ×
Constrainedi,t + εi,t, where ∆WARFi,t = ∑j RFi,j,t ×
Amt. Purchasedi,j,t
∑j Amt. Purchasedi,j,t




Standard errors clustered by CLO Deal & Year×Month are reported in parentheses.
Individual Transactions Multiple Transactions
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 3025.0∗∗∗ 2641.4∗∗∗ -441.3∗∗∗
(29.5) (12.3) (39.6)
Shocked -151.6∗∗∗ 67.5∗∗∗ 316.2∗∗∗
(26.9) (18.3) (35.5)
Constrained 73.9∗∗ -6.9 374.5∗∗∗
(34.2) (14) (43.3)
Shocked × Constrained -514.2∗∗∗ 105.8∗∗∗ 79.1∗
(40.2) (23.4) (41.2)
Fit statistics
Observations 155,079 162,629 21,043
R2 0.00847 0.00434 0.04243
Adjusted R2 0.00845 0.00432 0.0423
Two-way (CLO Deal & Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A9: Price Pressure
The table reports the results of the following regression: discountj,t = β1Shockedj,t +
β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where discountj,k,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,k,t), Pj,k,t is the price
of loan j issued by firm k at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j
selling volume by shocked CLOs is above median, Postj,t is a dummy equal to one after loan j
has received an above median selling volume by shocked CLOs, Xj,t is a matrix containing var-
ious fixed effects and controls. Column (1) includes year×month fixed effects; column (2) adds
year×month×time-to-maturity fixed effects; column (3) adds year×month×rating fixed effects;
column (4) adds year×month×industry fixed effects; column (5) adds year×month×interest rate
fixed effects. Interest and time-to-maturity fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the contin-
uous variable in ten groups. All the regressions include the lagged average discount on the issuer




s=1 discountj,k,s, where Jk is the number of loans
by issuer k actively traded. Two-way clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level
are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked×Post 0.718∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.104) (0.088) (0.083) (0.086)
Shocked -0.395∗∗∗ -0.093 -0.009 -0.027 -0.011
(0.116) (0.094) (0.068) (0.063) (0.067)
Avg. discountt−1 0.802∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 738,354 738,354 738,354 738,354 738,354
R2 0.421 0.432 0.533 0.564 0.540
Within R2 0.324 0.312 0.224 0.218 0.223
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A10: Price Pressure Within Issuers
The table reports the results of the following regression: discountj,k,t = αk,t + β1Shockedj,t +
β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,k,t, where discountj,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,t), Pj,t is the price of
loan j at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j selling volume by shocked
CLOs is above median, Postj,t is a dummy equal to one after loan j has received an above median
selling volume by shocked CLOs, Xj,t is a matrix containing the fixed effects reported in the table.
Column (1) includes all the loans that have been traded by CLOs; column (2) restricts the sample
to those issuers with at least two actively traded loans; column (3) to those issuers with at least five
actively traded loans; column (4) to those issuers with at least 10 actively traded loans. Two-way
clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in parentheses. Two-way
clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shocked -0.032 -0.034 -0.053∗ -0.042
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.040)
Shocked×Post 0.120∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.051) (0.071)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month×Issuer Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×TTM Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 746,956 629,507 402,252 170,122
R2 0.914 0.884 0.853 0.821
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nr. Traded Loans ≥ 1 ≥ 2 ≥ 5 ≥ 10
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A11: Price Pressure - Purchases
The table reports the results of the following regression: discountj,t = β1Shockedj,t +
β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where discountj,k,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,k,t), Pj,k,t is the price
of loan j issued by firm k at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j pur-
chasing volume by shocked CLOs is above median, Postj,t is a dummy equal to one after loan j
has received an above median purchasing volume by shocked CLOs, Xj,t is a matrix containing
various fixed effects and controls. Column (1) includes year×month fixed effects; column (2) adds
year×month×time-to-maturity fixed effects; column (3) adds year×month×rating fixed effects;
column (4) adds year×month×industry fixed effects; column (5) adds year×month×interest rate
fixed effects. Interest and time-to-maturity fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the contin-
uous variable in ten groups. All the regressions include the lagged average discount on the issuer




s=1 discountj,k,s, where Jk is the number of loans
by issuer k actively traded. Two-way clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level
are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked -1.16∗∗∗ -0.923∗∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗ -0.634∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.109) (0.084) (0.086) (0.084)
Shocked×Post -0.108 -0.281∗∗ 0.014 0.004 -0.054
(0.149) (0.142) (0.139) (0.135) (0.133)
Avg. discountt−1 0.795∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 738,354 738,354 597,976 597,976 596,807
R2 0.42337 0.42419 0.48533 0.4922 0.4915
Within R2 0.32595 0.31629 0.19398 0.18928 0.18685
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A12: The Dynamics of the Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked×1(t− 6) -0.241∗ -0.241∗ 0.187 0.151 0.162
(0.136) (0.136) (0.124) (0.111) (0.109)
Shocked×1(t− 5) -0.076 -0.076 0.145 0.156∗ 0.161∗
(0.124) (0.124) (0.096) (0.090) (0.092)
Shocked×1(t− 4) -0.237∗∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.046 -0.028 -0.016
(0.109) (0.109) (0.074) (0.066) (0.065)
Shocked×1(t− 3) -0.216∗ -0.216∗ -0.088 -0.073 -0.047
(0.126) (0.126) (0.094) (0.090) (0.084)
Shocked×1(t− 2) -0.081 -0.081 -0.070 -0.028 0.012
(0.098) (0.098) (0.082) (0.074) (0.073)
Shocked×1(t− 1) -0.183∗∗ -0.183∗∗ -0.112∗ -0.073 -0.052
(0.081) (0.081) (0.060) (0.057) (0.055)
Shocked×1(t) 0.259∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.085) (0.068) (0.068)
Shocked×1(t + 1) 0.205∗ 0.205∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.122∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.078) (0.065) (0.063)
Shocked×1(t + 2) 0.489∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.147) (0.117) (0.102) (0.100)
Shocked×1(t + 3) 0.540∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.115) (0.100) (0.096)
Shocked×1(t + 4) 0.752∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.147) (0.132) (0.112) (0.111)
Shocked×1(t + 5) 0.929∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.185) (0.144) (0.131) (0.129)
Shocked×1(t + 6) 1.03∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.209) (0.149) (0.135) (0.124)
Continued on next page
APPENDIX A. CONTAGION IN THE MARKET FOR LEVERAGED LOANS 141
Table A12 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked×1(t + 7) 0.872∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.196) (0.171) (0.139) (0.130)
Shocked×1(t + 8) 0.760∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.266 0.260∗ 0.250∗
(0.200) (0.200) (0.172) (0.152) (0.144)
Shocked×1(t + 9) 0.467∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.037 0.158 0.126
(0.166) (0.166) (0.139) (0.123) (0.119)
Shocked×1(t + 10) 0.683∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.273∗ 0.309∗∗ 0.239∗
(0.176) (0.176) (0.150) (0.144) (0.132)
Shocked×1(t + 11) -0.130 -0.130 -0.033 0.030 0.034
(0.149) (0.149) (0.132) (0.122) (0.120)
Shocked×1(t + 12) -0.294∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ 0.068 0.080 0.088
(0.111) (0.111) (0.095) (0.089) (0.087)
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×IndustryNo No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 746,956 746,956 746,956 746,956 746,956
R2 0.48414 0.48414 0.58706 0.61761 0.62407
Within R2 0.00153 0.00153 0.00107 0.00091 0.00072
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A13: Defaults
The table reports the results of the following regression: defaultj,t→t+12 = βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ +
ε j,t, where defaultj,t→t+12 is a dummy variable equal to one when loan j defaults in the period
between t and t + 12, Shockedj,t is a dummy equal to one when the loan has been sold by distressed
CLOs and Xj,t is a matrix of fixed effects to control for loan characteristics. Column (1) includes
year×month fixed effects; column (2) includes year×month×time-to-maturity fixed effects; column
(3) adds year×month×rating fixed effects; column (4) adds year×month×industry fixed effects;
column (5) adds year×month×interest fixed effects. Interest and time-to-maturity fixed effects are
constructed after bucketing the continuous variable in ten groups. Two-way clustered standard
errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked -0.023∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 141,564 141,564 141,564 141,564 141,564
R2 0.052 0.129 0.408 0.471 0.483
Within R2 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
APPENDIX A. CONTAGION IN THE MARKET FOR LEVERAGED LOANS 143
Table A14: Rating Changes
The table reports the results of the following regression: y = βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where the
outcome variable is either y = downgradej,t→t+12 or y = upgradej,t→t+12. downgradej,t→t+12 is a
dummy variable equal to one if loan j is downgraded between time t and t + 12; upgradej,t→t+12
is a dummy variable equal to one if loan j is upgraded between time t and t + 12. Shockedj,t is a
dummy equal to one when the loan has been sold by shocked CLOs and Xj,t is a matrix of fixed
effects to control for loan characteristics. Column (1) includes year×month fixed effects; column
(2) adds year×month×time-to-maturity and year×month×rating fixed effects; column (3) adds
year×month×industry and year×month×interest rate fixed effects. Interest and time-to-maturity
fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the continuous variable in ten groups. Two-way clus-
tered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in parentheses.
downgradej,t→t+12 upgradej,t→t+12
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Shocked 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No Yes No No Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No Yes No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 75,489 75,484 75,405 75,489 75,484 75,405
R2 0.222 0.270 0.278 0.171 0.262 0.268
Within R2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A15: Liquidity
The table reports the results of the following regression: y = β1Shockedj,t + β2Shockedj,t ×
Postj,tXj,tδ + ε j,t, where the outcome variable is either y = γj,t or y = log(Nr.Trades). γj,t measures
the liquidity of loans by using the covariance in price changes (Roll, 1984), while log(Nr.Trades) is
the natural logarithm of the number of times a given loan has been traded by CLOs. Shockedj,t is a
dummy equal to one when the loan has been sold by distressed CLOs and Postj,t is a dummy that is
equal to one after a loan has been sold by a shocked CLO. Xj,t is a matrix of fixed effects to control
for loan characteristics.
γ log(Nr.Trades)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Shocked 0.561 0.446 0.387 -0.048∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.399) (0.349) (0.333) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Shocked× Post -0.293 -0.301 -0.290 0.039∗∗∗ -0.015 -0.015
(0.328) (0.362) (0.363) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No Yes No No Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No Yes No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 137,866 123,273 123,165 137,866 123,273 123,165
R2 0.121 0.155 0.156 0.154 0.198 0.200
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A16: Par Building - Placebo Test: Downgrades to B3
The table reports the difference in par built between CLOs that have received a shock to the
bucket of securities rated B3. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the following re-
gressions: gaini,j,t = α + β1Constrainedi,t + β2Shockedi,t + β3Constrainedi,t × Shockedi,t + εi,t,











for sales; Constrainedi,t is a dummy variable equal to one
whenever the Junior (column (1)) or Senior (column(2)) slack of CLO i is between 0% and and
5% in period t; Shockedi,t is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the loans of CLO i
have been downgraded to B3. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the following regres-











other variables are defined as above. Constrainedi,t refers to Junior tests in column (3) and to Senior
tests in column (4). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and they are double clustered at the
Year×Month & CLO Deal level.
Individual Transactions Multiple Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Intercept) -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.006) (0.003)
Shocked 0.0005 0.0003∗ 0.005 0.004
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.009) (0.003)
Constrained 0.002∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.024)
Shocked × Constrained -0.0003 0.002 -0.003 0.026
(0.0005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.028)
Fit statistics
Observations 309,028 303,160 30,156 29,034
R2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
OC Test Junior Senior Junior Senior
Two-way (Year×Month & CLO Deal) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A17: Price Pressure - Placebo Test: Downgrades to B3
The table reports the results of the following regression: discountj,k,t = β1Shockedj,t +
β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where discountj,k,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,k,t), Pj,k,t is the price
of loan j issued by firm k at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j sell-
ing volume by CLOs that experienced downgrades to B3 is above median and their slack is be-
tween 0% and 5%, Postj,t is a dummy equal to one after loan j has received an above median
selling volume by CLOs with downgrades to B3, Xj,t is a matrix containing various fixed effects
and controls. Column (1) includes year×month fixed effects; column (2) adds year×month×time-
to-maturity fixed effects; column (3) adds year×month×rating fixed effects; column (4) adds
year×month×industry fixed effects; column (5) adds year×month×interest rate fixed effects. In-
terest and time-to-maturity fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the continuous variable in
ten groups. All the regressions include the lagged average discount on the issuer computed as Avg.




s=1 discountj,k,s, where Jk is the number of loans by issuer k actively
traded. Two-way clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in
parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked 0.738∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.151) (0.122) (0.111) (0.107)
Shocked×Post -0.204 -0.001 0.059 0.066 0.075
(0.147) (0.132) (0.111) (0.104) (0.103)
Avg. Discountt−1 0.853∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 332,118 332,118 332,118 332,118 332,118
R2 0.489 0.504 0.597 0.636 0.644
Within R2 0.406 0.388 0.290 0.276 0.274
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A18: Probability of Subscribing a Loan
The table provides the results of the following regression in column (1): Subscribedi,j,t = α +
βPreviously Heldi,j,t + εi,j,t, where Subscribedi,j,t is dummy variable equal to one when a CLO deal
i subscribed a loan issued by borrower j at time t and Previously Heldi,j,t is a dummy variable
equal to one when the CLO i has held a different loan from borrower j before time t. Column (2)
reports the results of the following model: Subscribedi,j,t = αt + βPreviously Heldi,j,t + εi,j,t where
αt are Year×Month fixed effects. Column(3) adds the age of a CLO Deal and the logarithm of to-
tal assets under management as controls: Subscribedi,j,t = αt + βPreviously Heldi,j,t + γ1Agei,t +
γ2Total Assetsi,t + εi,j,t. Column (4) adds CLO deals fixed effect interacted with the issuer’s indus-
try fixed effect αj,s: Subscribedi,j,t = αt + αj,s + βPreviously Heldi,j,t + γ1Agei,t + γ2Total Assetsi,t +
εi,j,t. Standard errors clustered at the Year×Month level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Intercept) 0.033∗∗∗
(0.001)
Previous Held 0.098∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Age -0.006∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.046)
Total Assets 0.023∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Fixed-effects
Yesr×Month No Yes Yes Yes
CLO Deal×Industry No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 9,626,651 9,626,651 6,439,971 6,439,971
R2 0.021 0.026 0.050 0.091
Within R2 – 0.021 0.041 0.014
One-way (Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A19: All-in Spread Drawn
The table reports the results of the following regression: AISDj,t = αt + αj + βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ +
ε j,t, AISDj,t is the all-in drawn spread for issuer j at time t, Shockedj,t is a dummy variable that is
equal to one when firm j has been sold by shocked CLOs in the previous twelve months. Column
(1) includes Year×Month fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed effects constructed
by grouping the variable in ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects; column (4) adds
rating fixed effects; column (5) adds issuer fixed effects. Rating is constructed from the closest
rating available for the firm. Standard errors are reported in paretheses and double clustered by
Year×Month and Issuer.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked 0.550∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039)
Fixed-effects
Year ×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No No Yes Yes
Issuer No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 13,468 13,365 13,365 13,365 13,365
R2 0.04806 0.06598 0.09166 0.09166 0.60933
Within R2 0.00304 0.00121 0.00055 0.00055 7e-05
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A20: Fraction of Institutional Loans
The table reports the results of the following regression: Fraction Inst.j,t = αt + αj + βShockedj,t +
Xj,tδ + ε j,t, Fraction Inst.j,t measures the number of institutional tranches as a fraction of the total
number of tranches issued by issuer j at time t, Shockedj,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one
when firm j has been sold by distressed CLOs in the previous twelve months. Column (1) includes
Year×Month fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed effects constructed by grouping
the variable in ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects; column (4) adds rating fixed
effects; column (5) adds issuer fixed effects. Rating is constructed from the closest rating available
for the firm. Standard errors are reported in paretheses and double clustered by Year×Month and
Issuer.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked -0.117∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.039∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No No Yes Yes
Issuer No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 13,468 13,365 13,365 13,365 13,365
R2 0.11799 0.20027 0.20301 0.23609 0.34322
Within R2 0.00183 0.001 0.00095 0.00047 2e-04
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A21: Fraction of Dollars Borrowed
The table reports the results of the following regression: Fraction Inst. $j,t = αt + αj + βShockedj,t +
Xj,tδ + ε j,t, Fraction Inst. $j,t measures the total amount of dollars borrowed using institutional
tranches as a fraction of the total amount borrowed by issuer j at time t, Shockedj,t is a dummy
variable that is equal to one when firm j has been sold by shocked CLOs in the previous twelve
months. Column (1) includes Year×Month fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed
effects constructed by grouping the variable in ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects;
column (4) adds rating fixed effects; column (5) adds issuer fixed effects. Rating is constructed
from the closest rating available for the firm. Standard errors are reported in paretheses and double
clustered by Year×Month and Issuer.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked -0.113∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.055∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No No Yes Yes
Issuer No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 8,969 8,667 8,667 8,667 8,667
R2 0.2085 0.23172 0.24261 0.31183 0.54704
Within R2 0.00245 0.00195 0.00169 0.00077 0.00073
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
APPENDIX A. CONTAGION IN THE MARKET FOR LEVERAGED LOANS 151
Table A22: Institutional Tranches Size
The table reports the results of the following regression: log(Inst. Tranche Size)j,t = αt + αj +
βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where log(Inst. Tranche Size)j,t is the logarithm of the tranche size for in-
stitutional loans measured in dollars, Shockedj,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one when firm
j has been sold by shocked CLOs in the previous twelve months. Column (1) includes Year×Month
fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed effects constructed by grouping the variable
in ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects; column (4) adds rating fixed effects; column
(5) adds issuer fixed effects. Rating is constructed from the closest rating available for the firm.
Standard errors are reported in paretheses and double clustered by Year×Month and Issuer.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked -0.342∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.109) (0.106) (0.096) (0.077)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No No Yes Yes
Issuer No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 5,723 5,623 5,623 5,623 5,623
R2 0.08508 0.12548 0.15397 0.24187 0.59158
Within R2 0.0033 0.00318 0.00341 0.00247 0.00204
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A23: All-in Spread Drawn Within Lead Agent
The table reports the results of the following regression: AISDj,t = βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ+ ε j,t, AISDj,t
is the all-in drawn spread for issuer j at time t, Shockedj,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one
when firm j has been sold by shocked CLOs in the previous twelve months. Column (1) includes
Year×Month×Lead Agent fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed effects constructed
by grouping the variable in ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects; column (4) adds
rating fixed effects. Rating is constructed from the closest rating available for the firm. Standard
errors are reported in paretheses and clustered by Year×Month.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shocked 0.519∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.094) (0.094) (0.090)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month×Lead Agent Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No Yes Yes
Industry No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 13,252 12,826 12,826 12,826
R2 0.63895 0.63905 0.63905 0.64029
Within R2 0.00064 0.00051 0.00051 0.00043
One-way (Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A24: Fraction of Institutional Loans Within Lead Agent
The table reports the results of the following regression: Fraction Inst.j,t = βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ+ ε j,t,
Fraction Inst.j,t measures the number of institutional tranches as a fraction of the total number of
tranches issued by issuer j at time t, Shockedj,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one when
firm j has been sold by distressed CLOs in the previous twelve months. Column (1) includes
Year×Month×Lead Agent fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed effects constructed
by grouping the variable in ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects; column (4) adds
rating fixed effects. Rating is constructed from the closest rating available for the firm. Standard
errors are reported in paretheses and clustered by Year×Month.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shocked -0.227∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.078) (0.076) (0.079)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month×Lead Agent Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No Yes Yes
Industry No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 13,252 12,826 12,826 12,826
R2 0.60046 0.64498 0.64604 0.65359
Within R2 0.00068 0.00069 0.00064 0.00067
One-way (Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A25: Fraction of Dollars Borrowed Within Lead Agent
The table reports the results of the following regression: Fraction Inst. $j,t = βShockedj,t + Xj,tδ +
ε j,t, Fraction Inst. $j,t measures the total amount of dollars borrowed using institutional tranches as
a fraction of the total amount borrowed by issuer j at time t, Shockedj,t is a dummy variable that is
equal to one when firm j has been sold by shocked CLOs in the previous twelve months. Column
(1) includes Year×Month×Lead Agent fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed effects
constructed by grouping the variable in ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects; column
(4) adds rating fixed effects. Rating is constructed from the closest rating available for the firm.
Standard errors are reported in paretheses and clustered by Year×Month.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shocked -0.169∗ -0.183∗∗ -0.182∗∗ -0.180∗∗
(0.090) (0.093) (0.085) (0.089)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month×Lead Agent Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No Yes Yes
Industry No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 8,794 8,457 8,457 8,457
R2 0.95913 0.96312 0.9645 0.96552
Within R2 0.00533 0.00685 0.00693 0.00681
One-way (Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A26: Institutional Tranches Size Within Lead Agent
The table reports the results of the following regression: log(Inst. Tranche Size)j,t = βShockedj,t +
Xj,tδ+ ε j,t, where log(Inst. Tranche Size)j,t is the logarithm of the tranche size for institutional loans
measured in dollars, Shockedj,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one when firm j has been sold
by shocked CLOs in the previous twelve months. Column (1) includes Year×Month×Lead Agent
fixed effects; column (2) adds time-to-maturity fixed effects constructed by grouping the variable in
ten buckets; column (3) adds industry fixed effects; column (4) adds rating fixed effects. Rating is
constructed from the closest rating available for the firm. Standard errors are reported in paretheses
and clustered by Year×Month.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shocked -0.156 -0.181 -0.155 -0.189
(0.203) (0.192) (0.223) (0.237)
Fixed-effects
Year×Month×Lead Agent Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTM No Yes Yes Yes
Rating No No Yes Yes
Industry No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 5,727 5,622 5,622 5,622
R2 0.82295 0.82543 0.82998 0.85369
Within R2 0.00015 2e-04 0.00014 0.00024
One-way (Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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A.2 Figures
Figure A1: Fraction of Caa (CCC) securities
The upper panel reports a histogram of the fraction of Caa (CCC) rated securities, while the lower
panel superposes a local polynomial approximation of the density with the relative confidence in-
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Figure A2: Par Building and OC Tests Slack
The figure depicts the gain in par as a function of the slack of the over-collateralization test by
plotting the estimated coefficients of the following regression: gaini,t = ∑Ss=1 βs1s + εi,t, where









; 1s is a
dummy variable equal to one whenever the Junior (left panel) or Senior (right panel) slack belongs
to bucket s of the following S = 7 buckets: [-1.00,-0.05), [-0.05,0), [0,0.05), [0.05,0.10), [0.10,0.15),
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Figure A3: Fraction of Above-Par Securities Sold in the Month of a Downgrade to
Caa (CCC)
The plots report the amount of securities sold above par as a fraction of total sales as a function of
the slack in Junior OC tests. Observations are binned following Cattaneo et al. (2019). Each panel
fits a separate polynomial of order p = 1, 2, 3, 4 to observation with positive and negative slack,
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Figure A4: Fraction of Caa (CCC) rated Securities Sold in the Month of a Down-
grade to Caa (CCC)
The plots report the amount of securities rated at Caa (CCC) or below sold as a fraction of total
sales as a function of the slack in Junior OC tests. Observations are binned following Cattaneo et al.
(2019). Each panel fits a separate polynomial of order p = 1, 2, 3, 4 to observation with positive and
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Figure A5: Price Pressure
The figure plots the results of the following regression: discountj,t = γShockedj,t +
∑12s=−6 βsShockedj,t × 1(t + s) + Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where discountj,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,t), Pj,t is the
price of loan j at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j selling vol-
ume by shocked CLOs is above median, 1(t + s) is a set of dummies that are equal to one
s = −6,−5, ..., 11, 12 months around the event of the sale at time t, Xj,t is a matrix containing the fol-
lowing fixed effects: year×yonth×time-to-maturity, year×month×rating, year×month×industry.
Time-to-maturity fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the continuous variable in ten groups.
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Figure A6: The Outcome in the Primary Market
The figure is composed of fours panels. (1) reports the yearly average all-in spread drawn in basis
points; (2) reports the fraction of institutional loans per year as the total number of institutional
tranches as a fraction of the total number of tranches; (3) reports the total amount of funds raised
via institutional tranches as a fraction of total amount of funds raised; (4) reports the yearly average
tranche size for institutional loans. All the panels reports the statistics for shocked firms in red and
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A.3 Data Matching
This section describes the matching process to link loans in the CLO-i dataset with
loans in the SDC Platinum dataset. Matching datasets on the U.S. syndicated loan
market is a challenging task and no agreed upon procedure exists (Cohen et al.,
2018). The task is even more challenging for the CLO-i dataset: due to the fact that
information on loan holdings and transactions are obtained from CLOs’ reports,
there is no guarantee of consistency across time and deals. This implies that, in or-
der to guarantee the integrity of the data, most of the matching procedure requires
human discretion. In what follows I describe the steps I undertaken to match CLO-
i with SDC Platinum, which - to the best of my knowledge - is the first attempt in
these regards.
The procedure starts from the CLO holdings in the CLO-i dataset from which
I keep only the following types: “Term Loan B”, “Term Loan C”, “Term Loan D”,
“Term Loan (Other)” and “Other”. These types represent the greatest majority
of CLO holdings as Figure A11 shows. For each of these securities I proceed to
compute the first and last date they appear in sample together with the maturity
date provided on the report; Figure A12 shows their distribution. I then proceed
by recoding the maturity date as the maximum between the last time a security
appears in sample and the reported maturity date, given that a security cannot
appear on a balance sheet past its maturity and the resulting maturity date likely
stems from a reporting mistake. I then proceed to compare the information at the
security level across different CLO reports. Whenever a security presents different
maturity dates I keep the modal date across reports.
Unfortunately, for the greatest part of the sampe, CLO-i does not provide a
unique identifier for each security1. In order to make sure that the same security
does not appear twice or more because of spelling mistakes I use the following
convention: two securities are considered the same if the agree on the name of the
borrower, type and maturity date. This implies that the analysis in the paper is
carried out at the level of the loan issue-tranche type. In order to guarantee the
1CLO-i provides a unique loan identifier only after 2019.
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integrity of the match, issuer and security names have been removed of irrelevant
information: special characters have been removed, all the names have been con-
verted into lower cased letters, commonly used abbreviations (e.g., “corp”, “grp”,
etc...) have been fixed, similarly to Cohen et al. (2018). Once a security has been
uniquely identified on CLO-i, I keep information regarding the first time it appears
in sample, the maturity date, the first rating and the first interest rate, whenever
they are available.
I then proceed to apply the same procedure to the universe of loans in SDC
Platinum, which - however - does not require to be fixed for duplicates. First,
I obtain the distinct observations by borrower, announcement date, facility and
tranche. Then the borrower names are adjusted as previously described.
I then match the refined samples of loans in CLO-i and SDC Platinum using
the following criteria: first, the announcement date in SDC Platinum needs to be
no more than one year away from the first time the loan appears in CLO-i, second
the maturity date in SDC Platinum is no more than one year away from the ma-
turity date in the CLO-i, third at least one word in the borrower name reported in
SDC Platinum needs to appear in either the issuer or the security name in CLO-
i2. This leaves me with approximately 300,000 matches. These matches have been
manually inspected in order to avoid false positives. When a security in CLO-i is
matched with more than one security in SDC Platinum I keep the closest security
according to the following criteria: first, I give priority to the securities sharing the
same maturity date and loan type; second, I keep securities whose types are con-
sistent3; third, if more than one tranche is matched, I keep the closest loan in terms
of maturity and interest rate.
The final matching rate by year is displayed in Figure A25 for the securities in
2Applying fuzzy string matching routines provides a reduced matching rate compared to this
procedure.
3CLO-i provides information on the loan type which I augment with information from the secu-
rity name whenever possible. I adopt the following matching rules. “Term Loan B” is matched
with the following SDC Platinum types: “1stLienTermLoan”, “Other”, “”RevCred/Term Ln”,
“RevCred/TLB”, “Term Loan”, and“Term Loan B”. “Term Loan C” is matched with the follow-
ing SDC Platinum types: “1stLienTermLoan”, “Other”, “”RevCred/Term Ln”, “RevCred/TLC”,
“Term Loan”,“Term Loan C”, and “Term Loan/LC”. “Term Loan D” is matched with the follow-
ing SDC Platinum types: “1stLienTermLoan”, “Other”, “”RevCred/Term Ln”, “RevCred/TLD”,
“Term Loan”,“Term Loan D”. “Term Loan (Other)” and “Other” are matched with all the previous.
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the CLO-i dataset, and in Figure A26 for the securities in SDC Platinum.
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A.4 Additional Tables
Table A27: Largest Deals and Management Teams
The table reports the twenty largest CLO managers, in Panel A, and CLO deal, in Panel B,
based on the average total assets in sample. For managers, total assets are the sum of the
current balance of holdings managed in a given month, while for CLO deals the sum of the
current balance of holdings held in a given report. Assets are measured in $Mlns.
Panel A: Managers
Name Mean Median Min. Max.
GSO Capital Partners 15536.34 15075.26 5813.30 27456.15
Carlyle Group 11932.33 10541.84 1620.47 24850.72
KKR Financial Advisors 11376.15 11419.91 9645.77 13058.09
Och Ziff 11136.66 11622.85 8459.28 13089.39
Credit Suisse Asset Management 11093.56 8881.74 2718.49 28504.00
Ares Management 7819.85 7326.49 1999.78 19644.97
Barings 7701.79 7383.15 3856.02 17866.87
PGIM 7606.96 5128.54 1653.70 24309.48
Alcentra 7457.40 7629.65 2525.83 13718.95
CIFC Asset Management 7011.29 6284.61 493.14 18429.52
KKR 6994.95 6402.08 2700.69 18720.42
Apollo Global Management 6918.01 6946.41 1303.09 14200.04
CBAM 6581.15 7750.09 1231.18 10223.07
CVC Credit Partners 6205.31 5197.08 2134.08 13792.22
Barclays Capital 6151.88 5772.62 4755.84 9752.23
MJX Asset Management 5584.94 4169.99 852.10 17248.10
Investcorp Credit Management 5510.20 5238.23 2053.56 11178.54
Sculptor 5082.09 5269.00 588.07 14447.15
Octagon Credit Investors 4859.36 2993.79 670.60 18102.80
Onex Credit Partners 4848.65 3993.32 501.63 10095.17
Panel B: CLO Deals
Name Mean Median Min. Max.
Heta Funding 5331.63 4938.22 4721.55 7897.35
GoldenTree Credit Opportunities Financing I 3652.07 3652.07 3652.07 3652.07
Fortress Credit Opportunities I 3441.43 3454.84 1251.67 18336.84
KKR Financial CLO 2007-1 2817.67 3196.07 56.26 3424.96
GSO Domestic Capital Funding 2101.24 2101.24 170.94 4031.53
Antares CLO 2017-1 2100.21 2111.52 2016.51 2171.98
Prospect Funding I 1817.85 1431.03 1189.79 3750.56
CBAM 2017-2 1552.42 1554.13 1532.76 1572.30
RR 3 1479.54 1489.09 1306.71 1523.67
Ares XXXI-R 1362.82 1266.47 1243.70 2546.44
Genesis CLO 2007-2 1324.87 1313.84 1275.03 1371.04
Fortress Credit Opportunities IX 1318.64 1407.09 1108.52 1491.66
CBAM 2017-3 1288.33 1286.42 1262.60 1309.47
Tennenbaum Opportunities Partners V 1246.03 1331.87 623.67 3839.90
CBAM 2017-1 1239.99 1240.39 1225.05 1257.22
Ares XXXI 1213.49 1228.08 1075.40 1266.95
Antares CLO 2017-2 1208.99 1215.78 1164.59 1241.41
Churchill Financial Cayman 1198.26 1176.02 192.14 5162.72
Woodmont 2017-2 Trust 1171.74 1171.65 1103.75 1210.65
Zohar II 2005-1 1137.45 1153.06 919.02 1202.65
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Table A28: Holding vs. Market Prices - All Transactions
The table compares the discount of loans as they are reported by CLOs with the closest market price
in the following year by running the following regression: discountj,t = αj + αt + β1Transactionj,t +
Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where discountj,t = 100× log(100/Pj,t) is the discount at which a loan is recorded or
traded compared to par, Transactionj,t is an indicator variable equal to one whenever the price
comes from an actual transaction (sale or purchase) and zero otherwise, αj and αt are issuer and
time fixed effects, while Xj,t includes a set of fixed effects for rating, industry and interest rate of
the loan. Panel A consider the universe of matched loans, while Panel B focuses on loans rated Caa
(CCC).
Panel A: All Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transaction 0.700∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Fit statistics
Observations 2,598,448 2,580,708 2,580,708 2,580,708 2,598,448
R2 0.570 0.602 0.603 0.603 0.729
Within R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
Panel B: Caa (CCC) Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transaction 2.96∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗
(0.669) (0.669) (0.669) (0.669) (0.670)
Fit statistics
Observations 228,440 228,440 228,440 228,440 228,440
R2 0.628 0.648 0.650 0.650 0.739
Within R2 0.0083 0.00884 0.0089 0.0089 0.01218
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Issuer Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Rating No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
Interest No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Issuer No No No No Yes
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A29: Par Building and OC Test Slack
Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the following regressions: gaini,j,t = ∑Ss=1 1s + εi,t,
where gaini,j,t = (100− Pj,t−1) ×
Nr. loans boughti,j,t
Principal Balancei,t
for purchases and gaini,j,t = −(100− Pj,t−1) ×
Nr. loans soldi,j,t
Principal Balancei,t
for sales; 1s is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the Junior (column (1)) or
Senior (column(2)) slack belongs to bucket s of the following S = 7 buckets: [-1.00,-0.05), [-0.05,0),
[0,0.05), [0.05,0.10), [0.10,0.15), [0.15,0.20), [0.20,1.00). Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the







; 1s is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the Junior (col-
umn (3)) or Senior (column(4)) slack belongs to bucket s.
Individual Transactions Multiple Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[−1.00,−0.05) -0.037∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.067
(0.012) (0.012) (0.043) (0.091)
1[−0.05, 0.00) 0.012 0.0004 0.030 0.030
(0.012) (0.014) (0.048) (0.098)
1[0.00, 0.05) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.004 0.249∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.043) (0.093)
1[0.05, 0.10) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.009 0.143∗∗∗ 0.068
(0.012) (0.012) (0.043) (0.091)
1[0.10, 0.15) 0.014 0.009 0.0007 0.066
(0.012) (0.012) (0.050) (0.092)
1[0.15, 0.20) 0.001 0.006 -0.082 0.043
(0.014) (0.012) (0.069) (0.093)
1[0.20, 1.00) 0.013 -0.006 -0.075 -0.038
(0.014) (0.012) (0.068) (0.093)
Fit statistics
Observations 301,770 301,669 18,539 17,676
R2 0.01193 0.00368 0.04887 0.01655
Adjusted R2 0.01191 0.00366 0.04856 0.01621
OC Test Junior Senior Junior Senior
Two-way (CLO Deal & Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A30: Rating Factor and OC Test Slack
The table presents the average rating factor for loans sold, in column (1), and purchased, column
(2), by CLOs as a function of the slack of their Junior OC tests, by reporting the coefficients of the
following regression: RFi,j,t = ∑Ss=1 βs1s + εi,j,t; where RFi,j,t is the rating factor of loan j, sold by
CLO i at time t; 1s is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the Junior slack belongs to bucket
s of the following S = 7 buckets: [-1.00,-0.05), [-0.05,0), [0,0.05), [0.05,0.10), [0.10,0.15), [0.15,0.20),
[0.20,1.00). Column (3) aggregates the results by reporting the coefficients of the following regres-
sion: ∆WARFi,t = ∑Ss=1 βs1s + εi,t, where ∆WARFi,t = ∑j RFi,j,t ×
Amt. Purchasedi,j,t
∑j Amt. Purchasedi,j,t
− ∑j RFi,j,t ×
Amt. Soldi,j,t
∑j Amt. Soldi,j,t
. Standard errors clustered by CLO Deal & Year×Month are reported in parentheses.
Individual Transactions Multiple Transactions
(1) (2) (3)
1[−1.00,−0.05) 4392.7∗∗∗ 2669.5∗∗∗ -397.4
(597.4) (78.5) (467.8)
1[−0.05, 0.00) 46.1 54.2 79.2
(631.8) (98.2) (475.6)
1[0.00, 0.05) -1951.6∗∗∗ 138∗ 751.1
(597.7) (80.5) (468.3)
1[0.05, 0.10) -1576.2∗∗∗ 39.1 -59.9
(597.2) (80.8) (469.3)
1[0.10, 0.15) -1135.7∗ 84.6 -736.6
(628.1) (211.6) (538.5)
1[0.15, 0.20) -459 501.9 -1840.4∗∗
(854.1) (390.5) (762.2)
1[0.20, 1.00) -1617.9∗∗∗ 5.06 -438.1
(601) (100.7) (559.2)
Fit statistics
Observations 155,079 162,629 21,043
R2 0.05856 0.00231 0.1135
Adjusted R2 0.05843 0.00222 0.11295
Two-way (CLO Deal & Year×Month) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A31: Price Pressure
The table reports the results of the following regression: discountj,t = β1Shockedi,j,t +
β2Shockedj,t × Posti,j,t + Xj,tδ + εi,j,t, where discountj,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,t), Pj,t is the price of
loan j at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j selling volume by shocked
CLOs is above median, Posti,j,t is a dummy equal to one after loan j has received an above me-
dian selling volume by shocked CLOs, Xj,t is a matrix containing various fixed effects and controls.
Column (1) includes issuer and year×month fixed effects; column (2) adds year×month×time-
to-maturity fixed effects; column (3) adds year×month×rating fixed effects; column (4) adds
year×month×industry fixed effects; column (5) adds year×month×interest rate fixed effects. In-
terest and time-to-maturity fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the continuous variable in
ten groups. Two-way clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in
parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked -0.520∗∗∗ -0.144∗ -0.069 -0.073 -0.067
(0.095) (0.078) (0.056) (0.051) (0.054)
Shocked×Post 1.02∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.121) (0.091) (0.086) (0.089)
Fixed-Effects
Issuer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 738,354 738,354 738,354 738,354 738,354
R2 0.421 0.432 0.533 0.564 0.540
Within R2 0.324 0.312 0.224 0.218 0.223
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A32: Price Pressure - Purchases
The table reports the results of the following regression: discountj,t = β1Shockedi,j,t +
β2Shockedj,t × Posti,j,t + Xj,tδ + εi,j,t, where discountj,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,t), Pj,t is the price of
loan j at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j selling volume by shocked
CLOs is above median, Posti,j,t is a dummy equal to one after loan j has received an above me-
dian selling volume by shocked CLOs, Xj,t is a matrix containing various fixed effects and controls.
Column (1) includes issuer and year×month fixed effects; column (2) adds year×month×time-
to-maturity fixed effects; column (3) adds year×month×rating fixed effects; column (4) adds
year×month×industry fixed effects; column (5) adds year×month×interest rate fixed effects. In-
terest and time-to-maturity fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the continuous variable in
ten groups. Two-way clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in
parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked -1.4∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.121) (0.089) (0.089) (0.086)
Shocked×Post -0.068 -0.338∗∗∗ -0.199 -0.199 -0.207
(0.110) (0.121) (0.131) (0.131) (0.134)
Fixed-Effects
Issuer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 746,956 746,956 600,004 600,004 598,787
R2 0.48686 0.48926 0.56682 0.56815 0.5695
Within R2 0.0068 0.00438 0.00173 0.00172 0.00165
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A33: The Dynamics of the Shock - Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked×1(t− 6) -0.122 -0.122 -0.042 -0.095 -0.090
(0.114) (0.114) (0.099) (0.086) (0.084)
Shocked×1(t− 5) -0.228∗∗ -0.228∗∗ -0.121 -0.108 -0.069
(0.103) (0.103) (0.088) (0.082) (0.080)
Shocked×1(t− 4) -0.144 -0.144 -0.081 -0.128∗ -0.072
(0.088) (0.088) (0.084) (0.072) (0.073)
Shocked×1(t− 3) -0.106 -0.106 -0.017 -0.014 0.025
(0.126) (0.126) (0.108) (0.109) (0.106)
Shocked×1(t− 2) -0.164 -0.164 -0.037 -0.021 0.033
(0.146) (0.146) (0.137) (0.128) (0.126)
Shocked×1(t− 1) -0.188∗ -0.188∗ -0.108 -0.096 -0.027
(0.105) (0.105) (0.112) (0.110) (0.107)
Shocked×1(t) -0.342∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.197∗ -0.120
(0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.108) (0.105)
Shocked×1(t + 1) -0.466∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗
(0.100) (0.100) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102)
Shocked×1(t + 2) -0.502∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.111) (0.107) (0.104)
Shocked×1(t + 3) -0.445∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗ -0.245∗∗ -0.198∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.112) (0.108) (0.107)
Shocked×1(t + 4) -0.492∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗
(0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.101) (0.099)
Shocked×1(t + 5) -0.269∗∗ -0.269∗∗ -0.117 -0.171 -0.162
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.109) (0.103)
Shocked×1(t + 6) -0.254∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.090 -0.127 -0.102
(0.092) (0.092) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101)
Continued on next page
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Table A33 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked×1(t + 7) -0.121 -0.121 -0.0010 -0.042 -0.036
(0.108) (0.108) (0.116) (0.107) (0.109)
Shocked×1(t + 8) -0.212∗∗ -0.212∗∗ -0.069 -0.088 -0.084
(0.106) (0.106) (0.118) (0.116) (0.117)
Shocked×1(t + 9) -0.148 -0.148 -0.047 -0.045 -0.043
(0.099) (0.099) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106)
Shocked×1(t + 10) -0.140 -0.140 -0.040 -0.061 -0.054
(0.098) (0.098) (0.105) (0.102) (0.102)
Shocked×1(t + 11) 0.070 0.070 0.154 0.148 0.124
(0.120) (0.120) (0.123) (0.119) (0.120)
Shocked×1(t + 12) 0.020 0.020 0.075 0.070 0.055
(0.097) (0.097) (0.088) (0.081) (0.081)
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×IndustryNo No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 435,712 435,712 435,712 435,712 435,712
R2 0.5226 0.5226 0.57876 0.61972 0.63059
Within R2 0.00238 0.00238 0.00152 0.00129 0.00096
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A34: Probability of Default Conditional on Having a Defaulted Loan
The table reports the results of the following regressions: y = α + βdefaulti,t + εi,j,t. The outcome
variable is y = defaulti,j,t or y = defaulti,j,t→t+12. defaulti,j,t is a dummy variable equal to one if loan
j from issuer i is in default at time t; defaulti,j,t→t+12 is a dummy variable equal to one if loan j from
issuer i defaults between time t and t+ 12. The independent variable is defaulti,t, a dummy variable
equal to one when any of the loans of issuer i are in default at time t. Two-way clustered standard
errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in parentheses. The sample contains only









Adjusted R2 0.15203 0.22163
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A35: Par Building - Placebo Test: Downgrades to B2
The table reports the difference in par built between CLOs that have received a shock to the
bucket of securities rated B2. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the following re-
gressions: gaini,j,t = α + β1Constrainedi,t + β2Shockedi,t + β3Constrainedi,t × Shockedi,t + εi,t,











for sales; Constrainedi,t is a dummy variable equal to one
whenever the Junior (column (1)) or Senior (column(2)) slack of CLO i is between 0% and and
5% in period t; Shockedi,t is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the loans of CLO i
have been downgraded to B2. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the following regres-











other variables are defined as above. Constrainedi,t refers to Junior tests in column (3) and to Senior
tests in column (4). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and they are double clustered at the
Year×Month & CLO Deal level.
Individual Transactions Multiple Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Intercept) -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.009) (0.003)
Shocked 0.0005 0.000 0.010 -0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.009) (0.003)
Constrained 0.002∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗
(0.0004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.027)
Shocked × Constrained -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.011 -0.001
(0.0004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.028)
Fit statistics
Observations 309,028 303,160 30,156 29,034
R2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
OC Test Junior Senior Junior Senior
Two-way (Year×Month & CLO Deal) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table A36: Price Pressure - Placebo Test: Downgrades to B2
The table reports the results of the following regression: discountj,k,t = β1Shockedj,t +
β2Shockedj,t × Postj,t + Xj,tδ + ε j,t, where discountj,k,t = 100 × log(100/Pj,k,t), Pj,k,t is the price
of loan j issued by firm k at time t, Shockedj,tis a dummy variable equal to one when loan j sell-
ing volume by CLOs that experienced downgrades to B2 is above median and their slack is be-
tween 0% and 5%, Postj,t is a dummy equal to one after loan j has received an above median
selling volume by CLOs with downgrades to B2, Xj,t is a matrix containing various fixed effects
and controls. Column (1) includes year×month fixed effects; column (2) adds year×month×time-
to-maturity fixed effects; column (3) adds year×month×rating fixed effects; column (4) adds
year×month×industry fixed effects; column (5) adds year×month×interest rate fixed effects. In-
terest and time-to-maturity fixed effects are constructed after bucketing the continuous variable in
ten groups. All the regressions include the lagged average discount on the issuer computed as Avg.




s=1 discountj,k,s, where Jk is the number of loans by issuer k actively
traded. Two-way clustered standard errors at the year×month and issuer level are reported in
parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shocked 0.713∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.145) (0.112) (0.106) (0.106)
Shocked×Post -0.180 0.039 0.083 0.088 0.109
(0.135) (0.117) (0.098) (0.093) (0.092)
Avg. Discountt−1 0.852∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Fixed-Effects
Year×Month Yes No No No No
Year×Month×TTM No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Rating No No Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month×Industry No No No Yes Yes
Year×Month×Interest No No No No Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 332,118 332,118 332,118 332,118 332,118
R2 0.489 0.504 0.597 0.636 0.644
Within R2 0.406 0.388 0.290 0.276 0.274
Two-way (Year×Month & Issuer) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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A.5 Additional Figures
Figure A7: Fraction of Caa (CCC) and Defaulted Securities - Time Series
The upper plot displays the times series of the median fraction of securities rated Caa (CCC) or be-
low. The lower plot displays the times series of the median fraction of defaulted securities. Shaded
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Figure A8: Fraction of Caa (CCC) and Defaulted Securities by CLO Deal’s Age
The plots report the median fraction of securities rated Caa (CCC) or below, on the left, and the
median fraction of defaulted securities, on the right, as a function of a CLO deal’s age. The upper
plots measure age as a fraction of the total age of each deal, while the bottom plots measure age in
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Figure A9: Loan Prices
The upper plot reports the time series of the median price of loans traded by CLOs by month, while
the lower plot refers to the average price weighted by the volume of trades. Blue lines include all
the transactions by CLOs, red lines include only loans purchased by CLOs while green lines include
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Figure A10: Fraction of Variation in Discounts Explained
The plots reports the fraction of variation in discounts explained by various characteristics as the R2





, Pj,t is the price of loan j at time t and Xj,t is a matrix of fixed effects. (1) includes
Year × Month fixed effects; (2) interested rate fixed effects interacted with Year × Month fixed
effects, where the interest rate of a loan is grouped in ten buckets; (3) includes time-to-maturity
fixed effects interacted with Year × Month fixed effects, where time-to-maturity is grouped in ten
buckets; (4) includes industry fixed effects interacted with Year ×Month fixed effects; (5) includes
rating fixed effects interacted with Year ×Month fixed effects; (6) includes loan issuer fixed effects;
(7) includes all the previous fixed effects; (8) includes issuer × Year × Month fixed effects; (9)
includes issuer × Year × Month fixed effects and, separately, interest, time-to-maturity, industry
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Figure A11: Securities Held by CLOs by Type
The figure plots a histogram of the securities held by CLOs bucketed by their type. The upper plot
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Figure A12: Securities Held by CLOs
The topmost figure plots a histogram of the securities held by CLOs bucketed by the first time they
appear in sample. The middle histogram refers to the last date each security appears in sample. The
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Figure A13: OC Tests Slack
The plot reports the monthly time series of the median slack for over-collateralization (OC) tests
together with their 25th and 75th percentiles. Senior OC tests are in red, while Junior OC tests are




senior slack for each deal is obtained as the median slack of tranches A and B, while the junior slack
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Figure A14: Weighted-Average Rating Factor
The plot reports the time series of the median weighted-average rating factor, in red, and its average,
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Figure A15: Number of Transactions Per Loan
The upper panel displays the average number of transactions per loan per month. The bottom
panel displays the median number of transactions per loan per month. Blue lines represent loans
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Figure A16: Par Gained and OC Test Slack
The plots report the gain in par as a function of the slack in Junior OC tests. Observations are
binned following Cattaneo et al. (2019). Each panel fits a separate polynomial of order p = 1, 2, 3, 4
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Figure A17: Rating Factor and OC Test Slack
The plots show the average rating factor for loans sold (left) and purchased (right) by CLOs as a
function of the slack of their Junior OC tests, by reporting the coefficients of the following regres-
sion: RFi,j,t = ∑Ss=1 βs1s + εi,j,t; where RFi,j,t is the rating factor of loan j, sold by CLO i at time t;
1s is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the Junior slack belongs to bucket s of the following
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Figure A18: Rating Factor and OC Test Slack
The plot reports the coefficients of the following regression: ∆WARFi,t = ∑Ss=1 βs1s + εi,t, where
∆WARFi,t = ∑j RFi,j,t ×
Amt. Purchasedi,j,t
∑j Amt. Purchasedi,j,t
− ∑j RFi,j,t ×
Amt. Soldi,j,t
∑j Amt. Soldi,j,t
; RFi,j,t is the rating factor of
loan j, sold by CLO i at time t; 1s is a dummy variable equal to one whenever the Junior slack
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Figure A19: Probability of Selling Securities Above Par Around a Downgrade to
Caa (CCC)
The plot reports the difference between CLOs that just passed their OC test and those that failed
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Figure A20: Probability of Selling Caa (CCC) Rated Securities Around a Down-
grade to Caa (CCC)
The plot reports the difference between CLOs that just passed their OC test and those that failed
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Figure A21: The Dynamics of the Shock - Sales






























































Figure A22: Average Discount for the Treated Loans
The plots reports the average discount for treated loans by around the month they are sold by
shocked CLOs obtained from the following regression: discountj,t = ∑12s=−6 βs1(t + s) + ε j,t, where




, Pj,t is the price of loan j at time t and and 1(t + s) is a set of
dummies that are equal to one s = −6, 5, ..., 11, 12 months around the event of the sale at time
t. Error bars reports the two-standard errors confidence intervals. Standard errors are two-wat
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Figure A23: The Dynamics of the Shock - Purchases















































































Figure A24: Loan Primary Use of Proceeds
The plots reports a histogram of the count of loans in the SDC Platinum dataset grouped by the
primary use of proceeds. General includes general corporate purposes and payment of fees and
expenses; Acquisition includes acquisition finance, future acquisitions, real estate and property ac-
quisition and acquisition of securities; Refinancing includes general refinancing, bank refinancing,
payments on previous borrowed money, payment on long-term borrowings, and down payments
of previously borrowed money; LBO refers to leveraged buyouts; Lev. Recap. to any recapitaliza-
tion; Proj. Finance to general project finance, recourse and non-recourse project finance; SBO refers
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Figure A25: Assets Under Management and Number of Facilities Matched in CLO-
i
The upper panel reports the amount of assets under management in the CLO-i dataset measured
in $ Billions. The lower panel reports the number of facilities by year. Blue lines refer to the full
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Figure A26: Amount and Number of Facilities Matched in SDC Platinum
The upper panel reports the amount of loans issued by year in the SDC Platinum dataset measured
in $ Billions. The lower panel reports the number of facilities issued by year. Blue lines refer to
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B. Appendix to Revealed Expectations and
Learning Biases
B.1 Tables
Table B1: Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for the data used. Column x̄ reports the sample average of
each variable, column σ its standard deviation, Min the smallest observation, Q1 the first quartile,
Median the 50th percentile, Q3 the third quartile, Max the largest observation and N the number
of observations. The first panel reports summary statistics regarding average and median past re-
turns experienced by managers. The second panel reports six measures of expected excess returns
computed as Σ̂twi,t. Rows (1)-(3) report results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the compu-
tations only strictly positive weights; rows (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that belong to the
manager’s investment universe. Rows (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t , rows (2) and
(5) use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂2t and rows (3) and (6) use Ledoit and Wolf (2004)
covariance matrices Σ̂3t in the computation of Σ̂twi,t. The third panel reports summary statistics on
managers’ careers; experience refers to the number of quarters since the first time a certain stock
appeared in the manager’s portfolio; max.experience refers to the maximum experience achieved
for each manager-stock pair; tenure refers to the number of quarters since the first time the manager
appeared in sample.
x̄ σ Min Q1 Median Q3 Max N
Experienced Returns
average 0.024 0.100 -0.557 -0.010 0.026 0.063 0.607 13, 912, 677
median 0.014 0.111 -0.871 -0.026 0.021 0.062 1.198 13, 912, 677
Expected Excess Returns
(1) 0.012 0.015 -0.282 0.004 0.007 0.014 1.336 5, 416, 032
(2) 0.011 0.014 -0.208 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.806 5, 416, 032
(3) 0.011 0.015 -0.161 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.764 5, 416, 032
(4) 0.012 0.015 -0.278 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.766 12, 707, 119
(5) 0.011 0.015 -0.292 0.003 0.006 0.012 1.086 12, 707, 119
(6) 0.011 0.015 -0.319 0.003 0.006 0.013 1.034 12, 707, 119
Managers Careers
experience 13.158 12.853 1 4 9 17 139 13, 912, 677
max. experience 13.884 11.981 1 6 11 17 139 1, 223, 610
tenure 26.896 21.943 1 10 21 39 139 75, 179
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Table B2: The Effect of Average Experienced Returns
The table reports the parameter estimates obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t − r f =
βr̄i,j,t + Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period ahead return of
manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t is the standardised equal-weighted average experienced return,
Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered
at the same level of the fixed effects and are reported in parentheses. Columns (1)-(3) report results
without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations only strictly positive weights; columns
(4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that belong to the manager’s investment universe. Columns
(1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t , columns (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015) covari-





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 1, 270, 823 1, 270, 823 1, 270, 823 2, 856, 830 2, 856, 830 2, 856, 830
R2 0.781 0.765 0.773 0.709 0.692 0.695
Within-R2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.009
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B3: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Five Buckets
The table reports the parameter estimates obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t − r f =
∑5q=1 βq r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period ahead
return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
, q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, is the standardised average
return in the q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect. To
be included, a manager-stock pair must have at least 5 quarters of experience. Standard errors are
clustered at the same level of the fixed effects and are reported in parentheses. Columns (1)-(3) re-
port results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations only strictly positive weights;
columns (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that belong to the manager’s investment universe.
Columns (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t , columns (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015)
covariance matrices Σ̂2t and columns (3) and (6) use Ledoit and Wolf (2004) covariance matrices Σ̂
3
t
in the computation of Σ̂twi,t.
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.276∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
β2 0.134∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
β3 0.041∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
β4 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
β5 0.238∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 796, 021 796, 021 796, 021 1, 958, 072 1, 958, 072 1, 958, 072
R2 0.798 0.786 0.792 0.720 0.705 0.708
Within-R2 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.042
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B4: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Ten Buckets
The table reports the parameter estimates obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t − r f =
∑10q=1 βq r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period ahead
return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
, q ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10}, is the standardised average
return in the q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect. To
be included, a manager-stock pair must have at least 10 quarters of experience. Standard errors are
clustered at the same level of the fixed effects and are reported in parentheses. Columns (1)-(3) re-
port results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations only strictly positive weights;
columns (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that belong to the manager’s investment universe.
Columns (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t , columns (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015)
covariance matrices Σ̂2t and columns (3) and (6) use Ledoit and Wolf (2004) covariance matrices Σ̂
3
t
in the computation of Σ̂twi,t.
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.276∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.039) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.007)
β2 0.147∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.023) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
β3 0.100∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
β4 0.060∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
β5 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
β6 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
β7 0.020∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
β8 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
β9 0.080∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
β10 0.206∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 442, 353 442, 353 442, 353 1, 073, 779 1, 073, 779 1, 073, 779
R2 0.824 0.812 0.820 0.750 0.736 0.738
Within-R2 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.039
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B5: The Effect of Experienced Returns by Number of Managers
The table reports the parameter estimates obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t − r f =
∑Qq=1 βq,n r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period ahead
return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
, q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, is the standardised aver-
age return in the q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed
effect. Each column reports the results for the sub-sample of managers working in a team of
ni,t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4 or more}, members at time t. Standard errors are clustered at the same level of
the fixed effects and are reported in parentheses. The first four columns report results for measure
(1), using sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t and no wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations
only strictly positive weights; the last four columns report results for measure (4), using sample co-




Nr. Managers 1 2 3 ≥ 4 1 2 3 ≥ 4
β1 0.276∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
β2 0.133∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
β3 0.040∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
β4 0.072∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.074∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
β5 0.237∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.237∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 796, 021 580, 367 1, 000, 968 790, 078 1, 958, 072 1, 455, 284 2, 773, 180 2, 181, 406
R2 0.798 0.912 0.991 0.989 0.720 0.866 0.984 0.978
Within-R2 0.042 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.043 0.003 0.001 0.000
wi,j,t = 0 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B6: Managers Who Have Switched Funds - Five Buckets
The table reports the parameter estimates obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t − r f =
∑5q=1 βq r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period ahead
return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
, q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, is the standardised average
return in the q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect.
To be included, a manager must have in his current investment universe a stock that he has previ-
ously held in a different fund. A manager-stock pair must have at least 5 quarters of experience.
Standard errors are clustered at the same level of the fixed effects and are reported in parentheses.
Columns (1)-(3) report results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations only strictly
positive weights; columns (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that belong to the manager’s in-
vestment universe. Columns (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t , columns (2) and (5)
use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂2t and columns (3) and (6) use Ledoit and Wolf (2004)
covariance matrices Σ̂3t in the computation of Σ̂twi,t.
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.224∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.031) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022)
β2 0.133∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
β3 0.048∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
β4 0.066∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
β5 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
N 110, 037 110, 037 110, 037 225, 676 225, 676 225, 676
R2 0.892 0.885 0.889 0.843 0.834 0.842
Within-R2 0.034 0.038 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.040
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B7: Managers Who Have Switched Funds - Ten Buckets
The table reports the parameter estimates obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t − r f =
∑10q=1 βq r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period ahead
return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
, q ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10}, is the standardised average
return in the q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect.
To be included, a manager must have in his current investment universe a stock that he has previ-
ously held in a different fund. A manager-stock pair must have at least 10 quarters of experience.
Standard errors are clustered at the same level of the fixed effects and are reported in parentheses.
Columns (1)-(3) report results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations only strictly
positive weights; columns (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that belong to the manager’s in-
vestment universe. Columns (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t , columns (2) and (5)
use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂2t and columns (3) and (6) use Ledoit and Wolf (2004)
covariance matrices Σ̂3t in the computation of Σ̂twi,t.
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.246∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.055) (0.017) (0.021)
β2 0.129∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.011) (0.013)
β3 0.071∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
β4 0.054∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
β5 0.027∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
β6 0.026∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.015 0.029∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
β7 0.011 0.019∗ 0.013 0.027∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
β8 0.044∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
β9 0.090∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
β10 0.183∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
N 78, 920 78, 920 78, 920 160, 237 160, 237 160, 237
R2 0.914 0.915 0.914 0.869 0.865 0.867
Within-R2 0.038 0.037 0.039 0.044 0.040 0.039
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B8: Learning Parameters







+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period
ahead return of manager i for stock j at time t, rj,t+1−k is the realised return of stock j from time
t− k to t + 1− k, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect. Weights







errors are in parentheses. Columns (1)-(3) report results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in
the computations only strictly positive weights; columns (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that
belong to the manager’s investment universe. Columns (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices
Σ̂1t , columns (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂
2
t and columns (3) and (6) use
Ledoit and Wolf (2004) covariance matrices Σ̂3t in the computation of Σ̂twi,t.
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β 0.146∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
λ1 -1.901∗∗∗ -1.838∗∗∗ -1.873∗∗∗ -1.663∗∗∗ -1.700∗∗∗ -1.683∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.064) (0.064) (0.034) (0.038) (0.035)
λ2 -1.659∗∗∗ -1.487∗∗∗ -1.563∗∗∗ -1.574∗∗∗ -1.610∗∗∗ -1.590∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.116) (0.108) (0.053) (0.061) (0.053)
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B9: Risk Aversion - Pooled Regressions
The table reports the parameter estimates obtained from the following pooled regression: rj,t+1 −
r f = α + γ(Σtw∗i,t)j + εi,j,t+1, where rj,t+1 − r f is the realised excess return of stock j from time t
to t + 1, and (Σtw∗i,t)j is the demand of manager i for stock j at time t scaled by the conditional
covariance matrix Σt. α is the pooled estimated bias across managers and time, γ is the pooled es-
timated risk aversion across managers and time. Standard errors are clustered at the manager-time
and stock-time level and reported in parentheses. Columns (1)-(3) report results without wi,j,t = 0,
namely including in the computations only strictly positive weights; columns (4)-(6) include zero
weights on stocks that belong to the manager’s investment universe. Columns (1) and (4) use sam-
ple covariance matrices Σ̂1t , columns (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂
2
t and
columns (3) and (6) use Ledoit and Wolf (2004) covariance matrices Σ̂3t in the computation of Σ̂twi,t.
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
γ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ 1.283∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.082) (0.080) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078)
N 5, 383, 850 5, 383, 850 5, 383, 850 12, 545, 295 12, 545, 295 12, 545, 295
R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B10: Risk Aversion and Bias - Summary Statistics
The table reports the summary statistics of the parameter estimates α̂i and γ̂i obtained by running
one regression per manager with the following specification: rj,t+1 − r f = αi + γi(Σtw∗i,t)j + εi,j,t+1,
where rj,t+1 − r f is the realised excess return of stock j from time t to t + 1, and (Σtw∗i,t)j is the de-
mand of manager i for stock j at time t scaled by the conditional covariance matrix Σt. The reported
results are obtained under measure (1), using sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t and no wi,j,t = 0,
namely including in the computations only strictly positive weights.
α̂i γ̂i
mean 0.007 1.236
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B.2 Figures
Figure B1: Explained R2
The figure reports the fraction of variation in expected excess returns explained by various fixed
effects. For (1), (2) and (3) we report the R2 of the following regression µi,j,t − r f = Hk + εi,j,t. (1)
reports results for manager fixed effects, i.e., Hk = Hi; (2) for stock fixed effects Hk = Hj; (3) for
time fixed effects Hk = Ht. (4) reports the R2 for separate manager, stock and time fixed effects, i.e.,
µi,j,t − r f = Hi + Hj + Ht + εi,j,t. (5) reports the results for manager-time and stock fixed effects,
i.e., µi,j,t − r f = Hi,t + Hj + εi,j,t. (6) reports the results for manager and stock-time fixed effects, i.e.,
µi,j,t − r f = Hi + Hj,t + εi,j,t. (7) reports the results for manager-time and stock-time fixed effects,
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Figure B2: Managers’ Careers
The upper panel shows the distribution of starting date for the managers’ careers, as the first date
we can track the manager in sample. The bottom panel shows the distribution of tenure across
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Figure B3: Stock-Manager Experience
The upper panel depicts the starting date of each manager-stock pair ti,j,0, as the first date in which
we observe a certain manager i holding a certain stock j. The middle panel shows the distribution
of stock-manager experience, i.e., for any date t, manager i and stock j experiencei,j,t = t− ti,j,0. The
bottom panel reports the distribution of the maximal experience achieved for each manager-stock
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Figure B4: Weights on Past Experience
The figure reports the parameter estimates for βq obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t −
r f = ∑
Q
q=1 βq r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period
ahead return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
is the standardised average return in the
q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect. The upper panel
reports the results for Q = 5, while the bottom panel for Q = 10. To be included in the upper panel,
a manager-stock pair must have at least 5 quarters of experience, while 10 quarters are needed
for the bottom panel. Measures (1)-(3) report results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the
computations only strictly positive weights; measures (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that
belong to the manager’s investment universe. Measures (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices
Σ̂1t , measures (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂
2
t and measures (3) and (6) use
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Figure B5: Weights on Past Experience by Number of Managers
The figure reports the parameter estimates for βq,n obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t −
r f = ∑
Q
q=1 βq,n r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period
ahead return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
, is the standardised average return in the
q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect. The horizontal
axis refers to q, while each line to ni,t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4 or more}. The top row reports the results for
Q = 5, the bottom for Q = 10. The left column plots coefficients for measure (1), namely expected
excess returns are computed without wi,j,t = 0 and using the sample covariance matrix Σ̂1t ; the right
column for measure (4), namely expected excess returns are computed with wi,j,t = 0 and using the
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Figure B6: Weights on Past Experience - Managers Who Have Switched Funds
The figure reports the parameter estimates for βq obtained from the following regression: µi,j,t −
r f = ∑
Q
q=1 βq r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered expected one-period
ahead return of manager i for stock j at time t, r̄i,j,t∈∆Tqi,j,t
is the standardised average return in the
q-th bucket, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect, and Hj,t is a stock-time fixed effect. The upper panel
reports the results for Q = 5, while the bottom panel for Q = 10. To be included, a manager must
have in his current investment universe a stock that he has previously held in a different fund. In
the upper panel, manager-stock pairs have at least 5 quarters of experience, while 10 quarters are
needed for the bottom panel. Measures (1)-(3) report results without wi,j,t = 0, namely including in
the computations only strictly positive weights; measures (4)-(6) include zero weights on stocks that
belong to the manager’s investment universe. Measures (1) and (4) use sample covariance matrices
Σ̂1t , measures (2) and (5) use Touloumis (2015) covariance matrices Σ̂
2
t and measures (3) and (6) use
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Figure B8: Empirical Weighting Function
The figure plots the weights implied by the parameter estimates obtained from the following re-






+ Hi,t + Hj,t + εi,j,t, where µi,j,t − r f is the recovered
expected one-period ahead return of manager i for stock j at time t according to measure (1), rj,t+1−k
is the realised return of stock j from time t − k to t + 1 − k, Hi,t is a manager-time fixed effect,







. The upper panel reports weights for a manager with stock-specific expe-
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Figure B9: Bias and Risk Aversion
The figure shows the empirical distribution of the parameter estimates α̂i,t and γ̂i,t obtained by run-
ning one regression per manager with the following specification: rj,t+1 − r f = αi + γi(Σtw∗i,t)j +
εi,j,t+1, where rj,t+1 − r f is the realised excess return of stock j from time t to t + 1, and (Σtw∗i,t)j is
the demand of manager i for stock j at time t scaled by the conditional covariance matrix Σt. The
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Figure B10: Bias and Risk Aversion by Tenure
The figure plots the parameter estimates α̂τ and γ̂τ obtained by running one regression per tenure
τ with the following specification: rj,t+1 − r f = ατ + γτ(Σtw∗i,t)j + εi,j,t+1, where rj,t+1 − r f is the
realised excess return of stock j from time t to t + 1, and (Σtw∗i,t)j is the demand of manager i for
stock j at time t scaled by the conditional covariance matrix Σt. Bias is the estimated parameter
α̂τ , while Risk Aversion is the estimated parameter γ̂τ . Tenure is measured in quarters since the
first observation where we can identify the manager. The shaded grey area covers two standard
deviations around the point estimate. The left panel reports results for measure (1), using sample
covariance matrices Σ̂1t and no wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations only strictly positive
weights; the right panel reports results for measure (4), using sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t and
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Figure B11: Bias and Risk Aversion by Date
The figure plots the parameter estimates α̂t and γ̂t obtained by running one regression per date with
the following specification: rj,t+1 − r f = αt + γt(Σtw∗i,t)j + εi,j,t+1, where rj,t+1 − r f is the realised
excess return of stock j from time t to t + 1, and (Σtw∗i,t)j is the demand of manager i for stock j
at time t scaled by the conditional covariance matrix Σt. Bias is the estimated paramater α̂t, while
Risk Aversion is the estimated parameter γ̂t. The shaded grey area covers two standard deviations
around the point estimate. The left panel reports results for measure (1), using sample covariance
matrices Σ̂1t and no wi,j,t = 0, namely including in the computations only strictly positive weights;
the right panel reports results for measure (4), using sample covariance matrices Σ̂1t and including
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B.3 Optimal Portfolio Choice
In what follows we provide four examples of optimal portfolio choice and describe
how we can (or cannot) achieve identification of beliefs. We first look at an investor
facing borrowing constraints, second an investor facing short sale constraints, third
we look at an investor worried about model misspecification and, finally, an in-
vestor who is tracking a benchmark. We show that we can identify beliefs in the
first three cases, while the last one requires us to make additional assumptions.
B.3.1 Borrowing Constraint
We follow the approach of Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992), Xu and Shreve (1992) and
Tepla (2000). There exists a standard filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[0,∞), P)
where all the usual regularity conditions are satisfied. We assume that the investor
maximises his expected utility over terminal wealth E0[U(WT)]. Returns follow
a geometric Brownian motion and the investor faces a borrowing constraint. He











= r f dt, B0 = 1 (B.2)
dSt
St


















w′t1 ≤ k (B.5)








, r f is the instantaneous risk-free rate, µt is the vector of
stock return drifts, wt is the vector of stock portfolio weights, Σ
1
2
t is the matrix
of instantaneous loadings on the Brownian motion processes Zt, 1 is a vector of
ones and k is a real number. Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992) show that the problem
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in (B.1)-(B.5) is equivalent to an unconstrained problem with modified drifts, i.e.,
where (B.2) and (B.3) are replaced by:
dBt
Bt
= (r f + δ(vt))dt (B.6)
dSt
St




where the support function δ(x) = supw′1≤k(−w′x), vt is such that δ(vt) < ∞.
Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992) show that the optimal v∗t and portfolio weights w
∗
t
can be obtained by solving the ’dual’ Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation1. In par-




Σ−1t (µt − r f1− v∗t ) (B.8)




t vt||2 + 2γδ(vt)
]
and θt = Σ
− 12
t (µt −
r f1). Tepla (2000) shows that v∗t = v̄




borrowing constraint binds, and zero otherwise. Notice that the above result im-
plies that the solution to the constrained optimisation problem is equivalent to that
of an unconstrained problem with a risk-free rate shifted by the scalar v̄∗. Identifi-
cation of beliefs is easily achieved in (B.8) by saturating the model with manager-
time fixed effects in order to absorb any variation in manager-specific borrowing
constraints. Specifically, for each manager i solving the above problem, the subjec-
tive beliefs can be expressed as:
µi,t − r f1 = γiΣtw∗i,t +Hi,t (B.9)
where the manager-time fixed effect is equal toHi,t = v̄i∗1.
1See Sections 12 and 15 of Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992). In particular, see equations (15.1), (15.2)
and (15.10).
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B.3.2 Short Sale Constraints











= r f dt, B0 = 1 (B.11)
dSt
St


















−wj,t ≤ 0 ∀j = 1, 2, ..., N (B.14)
The problem (B.10)-(B.14) can be solved by using Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992) and
Xu and Shreve (1992)’s dual approach, similarly to the previous section. The sup-
port function now becomes δ(x) = sup{−wj,t≤0 ∀j=1,2,...,N}(−w
′x). As before, we









−vt ≤ 0 (B.16)
Denote the vector of Lagrange multipliers on the the constraint in equation (B.16)
by λt = [λ1,t, ..., λN,t]′. Taking first-order conditions of the above minimisation
problem yields:
Σ−1t (µt − r f1+ v∗t ) + λt = 0 (B.17)








have divided between assets for which the short sale constraint does not bind and
those for which it does. We can also partition the vector of expected excess returns
2This problem is similar to the discrete problem analyzed by Koijen and Yogo (2019) as γ→ 1.
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and the covariance matrix: µt − r f1 = [(µ
(1)
t − r f1)′ (µ
(2)







Standard results imply that the inverse of the covariance matrix can be partitioned
as:
Σ−1t =






























Using the above, rewrite equation (B.17) as:
0 =






























Multiplying the second row of (B.18) by Σ(1,1)−1t Σ
(1,2)
t and adding it to the first row









t − r f1
)
(B.19)




















t − r f1
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 (B.20)
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Multiplying the second row by Σ(1,1)−1t Σ
(1,2)
t and adding the two rows together










t − r f1
)
(B.22)
Intuitively, the optimisation program of a short sale constrained investor results in
an unconstrained portfolio allocation over the set of assets for which the constraint










In this section we follow the approach of Maenhout (2004) and analyse the be-












= r f dt, B0 = 1 (B.25)
dSt
St




















where we are vague about the functional form of the value function. Standard
dynamic optimisation arguments yield the following HJB equation:
0 = sup
{wt,Ct}
{ f (Ct, Jt)dt + Et [dJt]} (B.28)
Equation (B.28) assumes that the investor is certain about the value of Et [dJt] and
chooses his portfolio accordingly. An investor worried about model misspecifica-
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tion will choose the optimal allocation given the worst-case scenario. Following
Anderson et al. (2003), Maenhout (2004) shows that the wealth of the investor un-
der the endogenously chosen model for u(Wt) will evolve according to:
dWt = Wt
(



























where Et[dJt|ut] is computed under the law of motion in equation (B.29). Among
all the models for u(Wt) the investor chooses the least favourable one in terms of




































The agent will choose u(Wt)∗ = −JWt Ψ. The optimal portfolio, therefore, will be:
w∗t = −
JWt
[JWtWt − J2Wt Ψ]Wt
Σ−1t (µt − r f1) (B.32)
An investor concerned about model misspecification will behave like an otherwise







case, identification follows in a way similar to the standard model presented in the
main text.
B.3.4 Benchmarking
In the spirit of van Binsbergen et al. (2008), consider an investor who has his objec-
tive function defined over his terminal wealth WT relative to a benchmark portfolio
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= r f dt, B0 = 1 (B.34)
dSt
St















































t dZt − (wt − βθt)
′Σtβθtdt
(B.38)












In this case, it is not obvious that we can identify beliefs. However, if there is
no variation in the objective function in the cross-section of managers adopting
the same benchmark portfolio θt, stock-time fixed effects would suffice to recover
expectations. Although the above model requires an additional assumption to
achieve identification, this is consistent with the common practice of evaluating
managers using summary statistics such as CAPM alphas (Berk and van Binsber-
























Var0(rW,T − βrM,T) (B.40)
where rW,T = log WT/W0 and rM,T = log MT/M0 are log-returns. The manager
is maximising α = E0[rW,T]− βE0[rM,T] subject to the tracking error penalisation
(γ−1)
2 Var0(rW,T− βrM,T)3. In this case−
JXt
JXtXt Xt
= 1/γ and we could recover beliefs
using:
µi,t − r f1 = γΣtw∗i,t +Ht (B.41)
Notice that each element of the vector Ht varies at the stock-time level, i.e.: Ht =
(1− γ)βΣtθt.
3As it is well known, the agent penalises tracking error for any value of γ > 0, even for 0 <
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B.4 Data Construction
In this section we provide details on the construction of the data that are used
in the paper. We start with the universe of mutual funds in the CRSP database.
We remove funds whose manager name clearly does not refer to a person4. Af-
ter having obtained a list of names of managers, we look for cases in which the
same manager is spelled differently, e.g. ”John Smith”, ”J. Smith”, ”J Smith” or
just ”Smith”. To be sure that the pairing is done correctly we proceed in the fol-
lowing way: first, we compute a matrix of distances between names using cosine,
Jaccard and Jaro-Winkler methods. We then keep pairs that have a distance below a
distance-specific threshold (0.10, 0.17, 0.10 for the cosine, Jaccard and Jaro-Wrinkler
methods, respectively) that is set to make sure that we avoid false negatives. We
then proceed to manually check over 15,000 pairs to guarantee proper matching
with the help of online resources and common sense. After having obtained a list
of managers with the dates in which they manage a specific fund, we follow Evans
(2010) and Benos et al. (2010) to screen for equity mutual funds. First, if avail-
able, we keep funds with the following Lipper class: EIEI, G, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE,
MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE. We then keep
the funds with missing Lipper class and the following Strategic Insight Objective
Code: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, SCG. If neither of the previous are available,
we use the following Wiesenberger Fund Type Codes: G, G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI,
GRO, LTG, MCG, and SCG. We then keep all the funds with policy equal to CS.
Finally, we remove funds with less than 80% of holdings in common equity, simi-
larly to Kacperczyk et al. (2006). To check for possible mistakes we keep funds with
CRSP objective code starting with E and M and remove those starting with EF.
This provides us with a manager-by-manager history of the funds managed that
we subsequently match with the S12 type1 file from the Thomson-Reuters Institu-
tional Holdings database, using Russ Wermer’s MFLinks tables. We then proceed
by joining with the S12 type2 and type3 files to obtain a history of holdings.
4We use various automatic screens like “advisors”, “ltd”, “limited”, etc..., paired with manual
inspection.
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We continue by adding stock return and balance sheet data using CRSP and
Compustat, respectively. From the CRSP Compustat Merged Database we select
LinkTypes LU and LC and LinkPrim P and C for stocks with share codes of 10
and 11. After we have merged the two datasets, we compute dividends using
CRSP returns and returns not including distributions, similarly to Koijen and Yogo
(2019). From Compustat we compute the following quantities: me as market equity,
beme as the book to market equity ratio, dp as the ratio between dividends and
market prices, profitability as the ratio between operating profits and book equity
and investment as the growth rate of assets similarly to Fama and French (2015).
We then proceed with the construction of the scaled demands Σ̂twi,t. We start
from CRSP daily return data and compute covariance matrices using the previ-
ous year. We compute three daily covariance matrices: Σ̂d,1t which is the sample
covariance matrix, and two Bayesian shrinkage estimates. The first one follows
Touloumis (2015) and shrinks the daily sample covariance towards a target diag-
onal matrix with the sample variances on the diagonal, i.e., the resulting estima-
tor is Σ̂d,2t = λΣ̂
d,1
t + (1− λ)Σ
target
t , with Σ
target
t = IN ∗ Σ̂
d,1
t , where ∗ denotes the
Hadamard product and IN is an N×N identity matrix with N being the number of
stocks. The third covariance estimator follows Ledoit and Wolf (2004) and shrinks
the daily covariance matrix towards a diagonal matrix with the average variance
on the diagonal, i.e., Σ̂d,3t = λΣ̂
d,1
t + (1− λ)Σ̃
target





tr(Σ̂d,1t ) is the trace of the daily sample covariance matrix. The shrinkage intensity
λ is chosen similarly to Touloumis (2015) to minimise the risk function E[||Σ̂d,kt −
Σdt ||2F] where ||S||2F =
tr(S′S)
dim(S) denotes the Frobenius norm of matrix S, which re-














2 − 2 1
PT3
∑s 6=h 6=k X′sXhX′sXk +
1
PT4
∑s 6=h 6=k 6=w XsX′hXkX
′
w with Xj being
the vector of stock returns for which we have T observations and Pba =
b!
(b−a)! . Fi-
nally, we can scale the matrices Σ̂d,kt by the average number of trading days in a





t . We can then proceed to compute scaled de-
mands as Σ̂ktwi,t. We compute two vectors of scaled demands for each estimator:
one that does not include stocks that currently have zero weights, but belong to the
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investment opportunity set of the manager, and one that does, i.e., in the first case
all the wi,j,t in wi,t are different from zero, while in the second wi,t has some zero
elements. The investment opportunity set is constructed similarly to Koijen and
Yogo (2019) and includes all stocks that are currently held or have ever been held
by the manager in the past 11 quarters.
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B.5 Parametric Estimation
As described in Section 2.5, we estimate the model in equation (2.22) via non-linear
least squares (NLS). In particular we obtain the coefficients θ̂ = (β̂, λ̂1, λ̂2)′ by min-
imising the sum of squared errors:
















− Hi,t − Hj,t
2
(B.42)
We perform the minimisation with (λ̂1, λ̂2) ∈ [−5, 5]× [−5, 5] via Simulated An-
nealing and limited-memory BFGS5. Fixed effects are partialled out by demeaning












. To compute standard errors, we can
rewrite (B.42) as:







(yp − ϕ(xp;θ))2 (B.43)
where the index p is a short-hand for all the P combinations of i, j, t. We next fol-
low the approach of Davidson and MacKinnon (2001) and recover standard errors
using Gauss-Newton Regressions. Consider the 3× 1 gradient vector Ψ(xp;θ) =
∂ϕ(xp;θ)
∂θ and the following regression:
yp − ϕ(xp; θ̂) = Ψ(xp; θ̂)′b+ up (B.44)
where we regress the residuals yp − ϕ(xp; θ̂) on the estimated gradient Ψ(xp; θ̂)6.
Denote the P× 3 matrix of gradient observations as Ψ̂ = [Ψ(x1; θ̂), ..., Ψ(xP ; θ̂)]′,
then we can estimate the covariance matrix of the coefficients b using the standard
clustered “sandwich” estimator:
S(b̂) = (Ψ̂′Ψ̂)−1Ψ̂′Ω̂Ψ̂(Ψ̂′Ψ̂)−1 (B.45)
5Notice that, conditional on λ1 and λ2, β can be estimated via OLS and, therefore, is left uncon-
strained.
6For expositional reasons we exclude the estimated fixed effects from θ. Given that they enter
linearly in ϕ(xp;θ), their gradients are identical to the matrix containing the full set of dummies
and, therefore, can be taken care of by including dummies on the right hand side of (B.44) or by
demeaning.
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Davidson and MacKinnon (2001) show that the covariance matrix of b in (B.45) is
a consistent estimator for the covariance of θ.
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B.6 Additional Tables and Figures
Table B11: The Effect of Average Experienced Returns
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β 0.148∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
profitability -0.002 -0.0010 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
investment 0.040∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
BE/ME 0.012 0.020∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.016∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
ME 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.0009 0.008
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
D/P -0.019∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
N 1, 153, 333 1, 153, 333 1, 153, 333 2, 596, 853 2, 596, 853 2, 596, 853
R2 0.591 0.583 0.588 0.546 0.538 0.536
Within-R2 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.021 0.019 0.021
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B12: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Five Buckets
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.297∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
β2 0.137∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
β3 0.061∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
β4 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
β5 0.266∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
profitability -0.005∗ 0.0009 -0.005 -0.010∗∗ -0.006 -0.008∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
investment 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.019∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
BE/ME 0.066∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ME -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.012 -0.017 -0.013
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
D/P -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
N 724, 999 724, 999 724, 999 1, 783, 648 1, 783, 648 1, 783, 648
R2 0.594 0.587 0.591 0.556 0.547 0.545
Within-R2 0.066 0.064 0.065 0.070 0.067 0.069
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B13: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Ten Buckets
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.259∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
β2 0.123∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
β3 0.098∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
β4 0.078∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
β5 0.059∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
β6 0.061∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
β7 0.067∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
β8 0.074∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
β9 0.107∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
β10 0.243∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
profitability -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 -0.013∗∗ -0.009 -0.011∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
investment -0.015∗ -0.011 -0.015∗ -0.005 -0.011∗ -0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
BE/ME 0.076∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
ME -0.019 -0.014 -0.011 -0.022 -0.028 -0.021
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
D/P -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 0.006 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
N 403, 968 403, 968 403, 968 980, 175 980, 175 980, 175
R2 0.598 0.588 0.596 0.567 0.557 0.555
Within-R2 0.065 0.061 0.063 0.070 0.070 0.071
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B14: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Three Buckets
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.283∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
β2 0.077∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
β3 0.229∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
N 1, 031, 564 1, 031, 564 1, 031, 564 2, 483, 275 2, 483, 275 2, 483, 275
R2 0.777 0.762 0.769 0.704 0.688 0.690
Within-R2 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B15: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Three Buckets
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.280∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
β2 0.073∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
β3 0.236∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
profitability -0.001 -0.000 -0.002∗ -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
investment 0.019∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
BE/ME 0.048∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ME -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.014 -0.007
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
D/P -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
N 937, 382 937, 382 937, 382 2, 258, 925 2, 258, 925 2, 258, 925
R2 0.582 0.573 0.578 0.545 0.536 0.535
Within-R2 0.056 0.055 0.056 0.058 0.056 0.059
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B16: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Three Buckets and k = 4 Quarters
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β2 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
β3 0.161∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 618, 451 618, 451 618, 451 1, 499, 594 1, 499, 594 1, 499, 594
R2 0.812 0.799 0.807 0.744 0.729 0.733
Within-R2 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B17: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Three Buckets and k = 4 Quarters
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.208∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
β2 0.093∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
β3 0.215∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
profitability -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 -0.013∗∗ -0.010 -0.011∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
investment -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
BE/ME 0.056∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
ME -0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
D/P -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
N 564, 287 564, 287 564, 287 1, 367, 732 1, 367, 732 1, 367, 732
R2 0.598 0.590 0.597 0.570 0.560 0.558
Within-R2 0.042 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.045
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B18: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Three Buckets and k = 8 Quarters
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β2 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
β3 0.137∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 343, 058 343, 058 343, 058 753, 526 753, 526 753, 526
R2 0.870 0.864 0.866 0.834 0.821 0.824
Within-R2 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.021
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B19: The Effect of Experienced Returns - Three Buckets and k = 8 Quarters
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 0.168∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
β2 0.067∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
β3 0.179∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
profitability -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.016∗ -0.014 -0.014
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
investment -0.029∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
BE/ME 0.093∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
ME -0.015 -0.007 -0.008 -0.023 -0.027 -0.021
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
D/P -0.001 0.004 -0.007 0.014 0.009 0.015
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
N 314, 557 314, 557 314, 557 691, 634 691, 634 691, 634
R2 0.671 0.661 0.666 0.655 0.644 0.644
Within-R2 0.034 0.031 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.036
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
APPENDIX B. REVEALED EXPECTATIONS AND LEARNING BIASES 223
Table B20: The Effect of Experienced Returns by Number of Managers
Expected Returns
(1) (4)
Nr. Managers 1 2 3 ≥ 4 1 2 3 ≥ 4
β1 0.280∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ -0.001 0.014∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ -0.001 0.008∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
β2 0.149∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.002 0.008∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
β3 0.101∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.002 0.005 0.101∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
β4 0.060∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.001 0.059∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
β5 0.028∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.029∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.003∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
β6 0.022∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.021∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
β7 0.020∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.003∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
β8 0.041∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 0.044∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
β9 0.077∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.000 -0.002∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
β10 0.203∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002 0.204∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 442, 353 579, 965 558, 722 428, 591 1, 073, 779 1, 454, 292 1, 524, 108 1, 158, 163
R2 0.824 0.912 0.993 0.991 0.750 0.867 0.988 0.982
Within-R2 0.039 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.039 0.012 0.000 0.001
wi,j,t = 0 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B21: Learning Parameters
Expected Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β 0.203∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
λ1 -2.225∗∗∗ -2.223∗∗∗ -2.157∗∗∗ -1.800∗∗∗ -1.929∗∗∗ -1.854∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.119) (0.114) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065)
λ2 -2.362∗∗∗ -2.313∗∗∗ -2.265∗∗∗ -1.881∗∗∗ -2.012∗∗∗ -1.951∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.126) (0.121) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072)
wi,j,t = 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
FE Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time Mgr×Time












Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B22: Risk Aversion and Bias Including Zero Weights - Summary Statistics
α̂i γ̂i
mean 0.006 1.501
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(f) Σ̂3tw∗i,t, wi,j,t ≥ 0
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(f) Σ̂3tw∗i,t, wi,j,t ≥ 0
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C. Appendix to Living on the Edge: the




Price Transaction price for the property as recorded by HM Land Registry
Council Tax Amount of council tax payable per year
Band Council tax band. One of: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H
Year Calendar year of the transaction
Month Calendar month of the transaction
Size Total floor area measured in squared meters
No. Rooms Number of habitable rooms in the property as defined in the EPC
Property Type One of: detached, semi-detached or terraced house and flat
Newly-built Equals 1 if the property is newly-built
Leasehold Equals 1 if the property is under a leasehold agreement
Energy Cost Sum of the annual heating, hot water and lighting costs for the property
One of very low, low, medium, high and very high expenditures
Baseline = very low
CO2 Emissions CO2 emissions in tonnes/year
One of very low, low, medium, high and very high
Baseline = very low
No. Lighting Outlets Number of fixed lighting outlets in the property, standardised
Energy Rating A-G energy rating fixed effects with A being the most efficient
Glazed Type Indicates the type of glazing
Various categories of single, double or triple glazing according to
the British Fenestration Rating Council or manufacturer declaration
No. Storeys > 3 Equals 1 if the building has more than 3 storeys
Glazed Area Estimate of total glazed area of the property
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
One of: Normal, Less than Normal, More than Normal
Baseline = Normal
Fireplaces Equals 1 if the property has open fireplaces
No. Extensions Number of extensions added to the property
One of: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
Floor Height Average storey height in metres
One of: less than 2.3, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 3 or more
Built in Age band when the building was constructed
One of: before 1949, 1950-1982, 1983-2002, after 2003
Grid ID An indicator for the grid square in which the property is located
Pair ID An indicator for the pair of matched properties
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C.2 Tables
Table C1: Evidence of Selection
The table shows the estimates of a simple regression of house prices on council tax amounts,
namely: pibdt = βτbdt + δbt + ζ ′xibdt + εibdt where pibdt is the price of house i in band b, Borough
d at time t; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in band b, Borough d at time t; δbt are band-
year fixed effects; and xibdt are controls. All columns include band-year and month fixed effects.
All other variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard errors double-clustered at the Borough and
year level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax -231.2∗∗∗ -263.3∗∗∗ -228.7∗∗∗ -229.2∗∗∗
(71.8) (86.4) (78.0) (78.3)







Band × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes Yes Yes
Property Type No No Yes Yes
Obs. 889,925 889,925 889,925 889,925
R2 0.530 0.573 0.578 0.578
Within R2 0.022 0.064 0.058 0.058
Two-way (Borough & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C2: Evidence of Selection - Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax -255.9∗∗∗ -225.0∗∗ -259.6∗∗∗ -220.1∗∗
(85.6) (80.0) (88.2) (78.2)
Size 2,747.2∗∗∗ 2,266.9∗∗∗ 2,534.4∗∗∗ 2,310.4∗∗∗
(911.3) (734.5) (780.3) (784.4)
Energy Cost Low -26,896.1∗ -15,049.6∗∗
(13,515.0) (7,107.5)
Energy Cost Medium -47,312.9∗∗ -24,385.3∗∗
(22,380.7) (11,482.6)
Energy Cost High -69,359.2∗∗ -32,869.7∗∗
(30,818.3) (15,291.8)
Energy Cost Very High -94,269.8∗ -39,075.4
(45,563.6) (22,987.4)
CO2 Emisions Low -17,677.3∗∗ -14,199.3∗∗∗
(7,006.9) (4,857.3)
CO2 Emissions Medium -26,558.8∗∗ -23,257.6∗∗
(11,971.2) (8,475.0)
CO2 Emissions High -36,052.5∗ -31,559.2∗∗
(18,323.2) (12,521.6)
CO2 Emissions Very High -32,523.2 -26,343.9
(28,385.1) (17,461.3)
No. Lighting Outlets 20,870.4∗∗∗ 19,659.8∗∗∗
(5,833.9) (5,317.1)
No. Storeys > 3 -3,140.4 632.9
(5,841.7) (6,385.2)
Glazed Area Less than Normal 6,923.6 851.3
(11,930.2) (10,981.8)








Continued on next page
APPENDIX C. THE SALIENCE OF PROPERTY TAXES 231
Table C2 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Built in 1950-1982 -43,868.7∗∗∗-29,435.6∗∗∗
(8,169.9) (5,870.5)
Built in 1983-2002 -22,756.2∗∗ -30,012.4∗∗∗
(9,533.2) (8,919.4)
Built after 2003 -21,575.1 -31,925.1∗∗
(13,706.9) (15,196.7)
Fixed-effects
Band × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Energy Rating Yes No No Yes
Glazed Type Yes No No Yes
No. Rooms No Yes No Yes
Property Type No Yes No Yes
No. Extensions No Yes No Yes
Floor Height No Yes No Yes
Obs. 889,925 889,925 889,925 889,925
R2 0.566 0.580 0.564 0.583
Within R2 0.095 0.059 0.092 0.063
Two-way (Borough & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C3: Evidence of Selection - Median Price per Borough, Band, Year
The table shows the estimates of the following regression: εmedbdt = βτbdt + δbt + ηbdt, where ε
med
bdt is the
median residual price of all houses in band b, Borough d at time t obtained from a hedonic regres-
sion of prices on house characteristics; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in band b, Borough
d at time t; and δbt are band-year fixed effects. The explanatory variables used to computed the
hedonic residuals are reported in the panel First-stage controls. All variables are defined in Section
C.1. Standard errors double-clustered at the Borough and year level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax -183.6∗∗∗ -334.0∗∗∗ -324.3∗∗∗ -325.1∗∗∗
(56.4) (84.7) (83.5) (83.1)
Fixed-effects
Band × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage controls
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size No Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes Yes Yes
Property Type No No Yes Yes
Newly-built No No No Yes
Leasehold No No No Yes
Obs. 5,014 5,014 5,014 5,014
R2 0.804 0.501 0.503 0.500
Within R2 0.055 0.122 0.117 0.118
Two-way (Borough & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
APPENDIX C. THE SALIENCE OF PROPERTY TAXES 233
Table C4: Evidence of Selection - Average Price per Borough, Band, Year
The table shows the estimates of the following regression: ε̄bdt = βτbdt + δbt + ηbdt, where ε̄bdt is the
average residual price of all houses in band b, Borough d at time t obtained from a hedonic regres-
sion of prices on house characteristics; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in band b, Borough
d at time t; and δbt are band-year fixed effects. The explanatory variables used to computed the
hedonic residuals are reported in the panel First-stage controls. All variables are defined in Section
C.1. Standard errors double-clustered at the Borough and year level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax -195.6∗∗∗ -368.4∗∗∗ -358.6∗∗∗ -358.9∗∗∗
(64.9) (93.9) (92.8) (92.5)
Fixed-effects
Band × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage controls
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size No Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes Yes Yes
Property Type No No Yes Yes
Newly-built No No No Yes
Leasehold No No No Yes
Obs. 5,014 5,014 5,014 5,014
R2 0.797 0.512 0.513 0.511
Within R2 0.053 0.123 0.118 0.118
Two-way (Borough & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C5: Grid Regressions
The table shows the estimates of a regression of house prices on council tax amounts, namely:
pibdgt = βτbdt + δbgt + ζ ′xibdgt + εibdgt, where pibdgt is the price of house i, in band b, Borough d, grid
square g at time t; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in band b, Borough d at time t; δbgt
are band-grid ID-year fixed effects; and xibdgt are controls. All columns include band-grid ID-year
and month fixed effects. The squares are constructed from a 50 × 50 grid of London. All other
variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard errors double-clustered at the grid-ID and year level
are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax 50.3 12.6 13.4 14.3
(50.9) (48.0) (45.3) (44.7)







Band × Grid ID × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes Yes Yes
Property Type No No Yes Yes
Obs. 71,734 71,734 71,734 71,734
R2 0.696 0.771 0.773 0.773
Within R2 0.000 0.103 0.010 0.101
Two-way (Grid ID & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C6: Grid Regressions - Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax 7.98 15.0 9.19 17.5
(42.3) (45.4) (40.1) (43.4)
Size 5,855.9∗∗∗ 4,522.7∗∗∗ 5,318.7∗∗∗ 4,787.6∗∗∗
(1,585.1) (1,366.3) (1,353.6) (1,548.8)
Energy Cost Low -66,317.8∗∗ -35,546.7∗∗
(23,418.5) (14,809.1)
Energy Cost Medium -108,665.0∗∗ -57,508.8∗∗
(38,438.8) (23,978.0)
Energy Cost High -147,580.7∗∗ -77,036.8∗∗
(52,657.2) (33,410.5)
Energy Cost Very High -195,178.8∗∗ -106,670.2∗
(79,418.3) (52,374.7)
CO2 Emissions Low -32,054.7∗∗∗ -28,497.1∗∗∗
(10,727.2) (9,893.5)
CO2 Emissions Medium -48,961.2∗∗ -47,738.6∗∗∗
(17,139.3) (16,123.8)
CO2 Emissions High -75,329.8∗∗ -71,914.7∗∗∗
(27,138.1) (24,295.9)
CO2 Emissions Very High -69,844.7 -66,123.0∗
(41,209.7) (33,075.1)
No. Lighting Outlets 21,965.9∗∗ 19,370.8∗∗
(8,176.9) (7,921.1)
No. Storeys > 3 -20,775.9∗∗∗ -22,481.8∗∗∗
(6,704.8) (7,545.2)
Glazed Area Less than Normal -25,624.5 -18,393.5
(18,311.0) (17,084.0)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Built in 1950-1982 -33,647.4∗∗∗-31,823.5∗∗∗
(8,513.9) (9,833.6)
Built in 1983-2002 43,030.8∗∗ 5,862.8
(19,392.1) (10,375.6)
Built after 2003 37,169.2∗∗ -1,989.2
(16,898.5) (15,825.0)
Fixed-effects
Band × Grid ID × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Energy Rating Yes No No Yes
Glazed Type Yes No No Yes
No. Rooms No Yes No Yes
Property Type No Yes No Yes
No. Extensions No Yes No Yes
Floor Height No Yes No Yes
Obs. 71,734 71,734 71,734 71,734
R2 0.762 0.774 0.759 0.777
Within R2 0.216 0.010 0.209 0.110
Two-way (Grid ID & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C7: Grid Regressions for Different Grids
The table shows the estimates of a regression of house prices on council tax amounts, namely:
pibdgt = βτbdt + δbgt + ζ ′xibdgt + εibdgt, where pibdgt is the price of house i, in band b, Borough d,
grid square g at time t; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in band b, Borough d at time t;
δbgt are band-grid ID-year fixed effects; and xibdgt are controls. The grids divide London into 50 ×
50, 100 × 100 and 150 × 150 squares in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. All columns include
band-grid ID-year, month, number of rooms, property type, newly-built and leasehold fixed effects,
as well as a control for the property size. All variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard errors
double-clustered at the grid-ID and year level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
Council Tax 14.3 -16.2 28.2
(44.7) (58.4) (32.4)
Size 4,537.0∗∗∗ 6,988.4∗∗∗ 7,737.4∗∗∗
(1,366.9) (1,794.8) (2,319.6)
Newly-built 33,398.5∗∗∗ 22,929.9 -28,536.5
(9,937.9) (20,993.7) (24,742.0)
Leasehold -75,924.3∗∗ -82,738.9∗ -151,551.3∗∗
(27,874.0) (44,068.4) (69,763.6)
Fixed-effects
Band × Grid ID × Year Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms Yes Yes Yes
Property Type Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 71,734 21,446 6,954
R2 0.773 0.792 0.827
Within R2 0.101 0.139 0.154
Grid 50 × 50 100 × 100 150 × 150
Two-way (Grid ID & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C8: Grid Regressions for Different Grids - Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Council Tax 17.5 -11.8 75.4∗∗
(43.4) (62.0) (33.1)
Size 4,787.6∗∗∗ 7,579.1∗∗∗ 7,516.7∗∗∗
(1,548.8) (1,968.4) (2,014.1)
Newly-built 23,142.1∗ 23,012.5 -17,873.0
(11,929.6) (23,337.2) (11,886.9)
Leasehold -81,662.8∗∗∗ -100,958.8∗ -180,856.2∗
(28,274.4) (48,348.3) (92,255.8)
Built in 1950-1982 -31,823.5∗∗∗ -36,770.1∗∗ -46,677.3∗
(9,833.6) (13,202.8) (22,562.5)
Built in 1983-2002 5,862.8 26,842.2 -20,068.4
(10,375.6) (22,698.3) (26,632.8)
Built after 2003 -1,989.2 -30,612.1 -68,073.3
(15,825.0) (29,315.1) (66,304.7)
No. Storeys > 3 -22,481.8∗∗∗ -19,920.1∗∗ -10,496.4
(7,545.2) (9,293.2) (10,564.8)
Glazed Area Less than Normal -18,393.5 -37,901.5 41,021.3
(17,084.0) (25,339.4) (69,940.7)
Glazed Area More than Normal 12,980.2 4,587.5 -102,420.2
(8,365.9) (19,443.3) (63,902.4)
Fireplaces 32,533.3∗∗∗ 41,107.7∗∗∗ 49,004.1∗∗∗
(6,832.4) (12,251.9) (16,591.1)
Energy Cost Low -35,546.7∗∗ -55,601.8∗∗ -62,161.9∗∗∗
(14,809.1) (20,340.8) (16,726.8)
Energy Cost Medium -57,508.8∗∗ -93,685.8∗∗∗ -85,741.3∗∗∗
(23,978.0) (31,367.3) (23,759.2)
Energy Cost High -77,036.8∗∗ -141,100.4∗∗∗-161,362.9∗∗∗
(33,410.5) (46,540.7) (41,048.0)
Energy Cost Very High -106,670.2∗ -170,909.0∗∗ -189,343.0∗∗
(52,374.7) (66,032.5) (72,613.7)
CO2 Emissions Low -28,497.1∗∗∗ -46,607.7∗∗∗ -43,592.6∗∗∗
(9,893.5) (14,538.3) (13,312.9)
CO2 Emissions Medium -47,738.6∗∗∗ -73,467.2∗∗∗ -96,311.1∗∗
(16,123.8) (23,582.7) (43,159.3)
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3)
CO2 Emissions High -71,914.7∗∗∗-104,329.4∗∗∗ -141,727.0∗∗
(24,295.9) (32,544.5) (58,712.5)
CO2 Emissions Very High -66,123.0∗ -133,060.2∗∗∗ -150,608.5∗
(33,075.1) (44,218.2) (77,511.2)
No. Lighting Outlets 19,370.8∗∗ 22,306.9 53,060.6∗
(7,921.1) (16,072.2) (30,324.9)
Fixed-effects
Band × Grid ID × Year Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms Yes Yes Yes
Property Type Yes Yes Yes
No. Extensions Yes Yes Yes
Floor Height Yes Yes Yes
Energy Rating Yes Yes Yes
Glazed Type Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 71,734 21,446 6,954
R2 0.777 0.798 0.846
Within R2 0.110 0.150 0.165
Grid 50 × 50 100 × 100 150 × 150
Two-way (Grid ID & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C9: Grid Regressions - Without Stamp Duty Notches
The table shows the estimates of a regression of house prices on council tax amounts, namely:
pibdgt = βτbdt + δbgt + ζ ′xibdgt + εibdgt, where pibdgt is the price of house i, in band b, Borough d,
grid square g at time t; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in band b, Borough d at time t;
δbgt are band-grid ID-year fixed effects; and xibdgt are controls. All columns include band-grid ID-
year, month, number of rooms, property type, newly-built and leasehold fixed effects, as well as
a control for property size. The squares are constructed from a 50 × 50 grid of London. Column
(1) excludes properties sold at a price between £240, 000 and £270, 000; column (2) properties sold
for between £490, 000 and £520, 000; and column (3) excludes both properties sold in the £240, 000
- £270, 000 and £490, 000 - £520, 000 price range. All variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard
errors double-clustered at the grid-ID and year level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
Council Tax 16.1 16.7 18.8
(46.9) (45.3) (47.7)
Size 4,715.8∗∗∗ 4,586.7∗∗∗ 4,765.9∗∗∗
(1,446.6) (1,403.6) (1,487.4)
Newly-built 37,062.1∗∗∗ 30,619.3∗∗∗ 33,964.1∗∗∗
(9,998.4) (9,694.0) (9,549.4)
Leasehold -80,083.0∗∗ -75,897.2∗∗ -80,141.1∗∗
(30,142.0) (28,682.7) (31,002.5)
Fixed-effects
Band × Grid ID × Year Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms Yes Yes Yes
Property Type Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 65,328 70,012 63,606
R2 0.775 0.776 0.779
Within R2 0.105 0.102 0.106
p /∈ [240k-270k] [490k-520k] [240k-270k] & [490k-520k]
Two-way (Grid ID & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C10: Grid Regressions - Median Price per Borough, Band, Grid, Year
The table shows the estimates of the following regression: εmedbdgt = βτbdt + δbgt + ηbdgt, where ε
med
bdgt is
the median residual price of all houses in band b, Borough d, grid square g at time t obtained from
a hedonic regression of prices on house characteristics; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in
band b, Borough d at time t; and δbgt are band-grid ID-year fixed effects. The squares are constructed
from a 50 × 50 grid of London. The explanatory variables used to computed the hedonic residuals
are reported in the panel First-stage controls. All variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard
errors double-clustered at the grid ID and year level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax 92.1∗ 15.4 19.9 19.1
(50.8) (35.4) (36.3) (36.6)
Fixed-effects
Band × Grid ID × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Obs. 19,377 19,377 19,377 19,377
R2 0.866 0.833 0.825 0.823
Within R2 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
First-stage controls
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size No Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes Yes Yes
Property Type No No Yes Yes
Newly-built No No No Yes
Leasehold No No No Yes
Two-way (Grid ID & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C11: Grid Regressions - Average Price per Borough, Band, Grid, Year
The table shows the estimates of the following regression: ε̄bdgt = βτbdt + δbgt + ηbdgt, where ε̄bdgt is
the average residual price of all houses in band b, Borough d, grid square g at time t obtained from
a hedonic regression of prices on house characteristics; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house in
band b, Borough d at time t; and δbgt are band-grid ID-year fixed effects. The squares are constructed
from a 50 × 50 grid of London. The explanatory variables used to computed the hedonic residuals
are reported in the panel First-stage controls. All variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard
errors double-clustered at the grid ID and year level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax 104.5∗∗ 23.6 28.2 26.6
(48.0) (32.7) (33.5) (33.9)
Fixed-effects
Band × Grid ID × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 19,377 19,377 19,377 19,377
R2 0.875 0.835 0.827 0.825
Within R2 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001
First-stage controls
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size No Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes Yes Yes
Property Type No No Yes Yes
Newly-built No No No Yes
Leasehold No No No Yes
Two-way (Grid ID & Year) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C12: Matching Regressions - Euclidean Distance
The table shows the estimates of the following regression: pibdt = βτbdt + δij + ζ ′xibdt + εibdt, where
pibdt is the price of house i in band b, Borough d at time t; τbdt is the council tax amount for a
house in band b, Borough d at time t; δij are pair fixed effects; and xibdt are controls. Housing pairs
from opposite sides of a given border are constrained to be no more than 500 metres away, sold in
the same year, in the same council tax band and to both be either old or newly-built and freehold
or leasehold properties. The closest match for each property is chosen as the one minimising the
Euclidean distance d(i, j) =
√
∑Kk=1(xik − xjk)2. The vectors xi and xj in columns (1) and (2) include
size and number of rooms, while columns (3) and (4) add the energy cost. All variables are defined
in Section C.1. Standard errors clustered at the transaction ID level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax 53.8∗∗ 12.9 50.7∗∗ 9.00




Pair ID Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes No Yes
Property Type No Yes No Yes
Obs. 115,224 115,224 114,646 114,646
Unique Transaction IDs 71,578 71,578 71,656 71,656
R2 0.799 0.836 0.796 0.834
Within R2 0.001 0.042 0.001 0.042
Distance Euclidean 1 Euclidean 1 Euclidean 2 Euclidean 2
One-way (Transaction ID) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C13: Matching Regressions - Linear Distance
The table shows the estimates of the following regression: pibdt = βτbdt + δij + ζ ′xibdt + εibdt, where
pibdt is the price of house i in band b, Borough d at time t; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house
in band b, Borough d at time t; δij are pair fixed effects; and xibdt are controls. Housing pairs from
opposite sides of a given border are constrained to be no more than 500 metres away, sold in the
same year, in the same council tax band and to both be either old or newly-built and freehold or
leasehold properties. The closest match for each property is chosen as the one minimising the fol-
lowing distance: d(i, j) = | p̂it − p̂jt|, where p̂it and p̂jt are model-predicted prices for two matched
property transactions i and j based on a linear model: pit = α + β′xit + εit. The vectors xit and xjt
in columns (1) and (2) include size and number of rooms, while columns (3) and (4) add the energy
cost. All variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard errors clustered at the transaction ID level
are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax 56.8∗∗ 15.3 55.7∗∗ 14.6




Pair ID Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes No Yes
Property Type No Yes No Yes
Obs. 114,904 114,904 113,854 113,854
Unique Transaction IDs 71,588 71,588 71,649 71,649
R2 0.799 0.837 0.798 0.835
Within R2 0.001 0.045 0.001 0.043
Distance Linear 1 Linear 1 Linear 2 Linear 2
One-way (Transaction ID) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C14: Matching Regressions - Linear Distance Less than 30% of Predicted
Prices
The table shows the estimates of the following regression: pibdt = βτbdt + δij + ζ ′xibdt + εibdt, where
pibdt is the price of house i in band b, Borough d at time t; τbdt is the council tax amount for a house
in band b, Borough d at time t; δij are pair fixed effects; and xibdt are controls. Housing pairs from
opposite sides of a given border are constrained to be no more than 500 metres away, sold in the
same year, in the same council tax band and to both be either old or newly-built and freehold or
leasehold properties. Each house i is matched to all possible candidates j that satisfy the following
constraint: d(i, j) = | p̂it − p̂jt| < 0.3×max{ p̂it, p̂jt}, where p̂it and p̂jt are model-predicted prices
for two matched property transactions i and j based on a linear model: pit = α + β′xit + εit. The
vectors xit and xjt in columns (1) and (2) include size and number of rooms, while columns (3) and
(4) add the energy cost. All variables are defined in Section C.1. Standard errors clustered at the
transaction ID level are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council Tax -8.19 -5.24 -7.65 -8.14




Pair ID Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Rooms No Yes No Yes
Property Type No Yes No Yes
Obs. 175,639 175,639 167,704 167,704
Unique Transaction IDs 59,722 59,722 58,917 58,917
R2 0.871 0.875 0.855 0.859
Within R2 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.018
Distance Linear 1 Linear 1 Linear 2 Linear 2
One-way (Transaction ID) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
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Table C15: Model-averaged Posterior Distributions for the Council Tax Incidence
The table displays 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 95%, 99% quantiles, the modal and mean
values of the average posterior distribution for the council tax incidence obtained by using the esti-
mates from Tables C5-C9 and C12-C14. The last column reports the attenuation factor γ computed
as the ratio of the posterior and prior median. Each row refers to a different choice of prior.
Prior 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% mode mean γ
N (−150, 502) -143.50 -110.66 -93.21 -61.85 -22.87 -1.98 18.67 31.04 51.90 -12.08 -31.85 0.15
N (−100, 502) -116.75 -85.88 -69.23 -39.43 -12.79 7.60 29.51 41.86 62.81 -9.86 -16.81 0.13
N (−50, 502) -90.71 -61.45 -45.54 -20.99 -2.17 20.33 42.09 54.20 75.25 -6.78 -1.76 0.04
N (−150, 752) -126.67 -87.78 -67.60 -32.92 -7.49 16.49 41.31 54.86 78.03 -8.24 -10.46 0.05
N (−50, 252) -82.09 -64.43 -54.54 -36.79 -18.64 -4.40 9.15 17.64 32.93 -13.86 -20.87 0.37
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C.3 Figures
Figure C1: A Typical Border
The figure shows an example of a border between two Boroughs in London. Houses on the left side
of the West Eaton Place road belong to the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and have an annual
council tax bill of £2, 279, while houses on the right side belong to the Borough of Westminster and
have an annual council tax bill of only £1, 421.
Figure C2: Time Series of Council Taxes
The figure reports the time series of council tax amounts payable across Boroughs. Each panel refers
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Figure C3: Histogram of Property Prices in London
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London. The













Figure C4: Bunching at Stamp Duty notches
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London around





















(B) Bunching at £500,000
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Figure C5: Histogram of Prices by Band
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London per
band. Each panel refers to properties belonging to different bands. The distribution is truncated































Figure C6: Histogram of Prices by Property Type
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London by prop-
erty type. The distribution is truncated at £2, 000, 000. The red vertical lines represent the median
values computed using the full sample.
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Detached Flat
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Figure C7: Histogram of Prices by Number of Rooms
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London by number
of rooms. The distribution is truncated at £2, 000, 000. The red vertical lines represent the median
values computed using the full sample.
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Figure C8: Histogram of Prices by Age
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London by age.
The top panel reports the histogram of prices for newly-built properties, while the bottom for es-
tablished residential buildings. The distribution is truncated at £2, 000, 000. The red vertical lines
represent the median values computed using the full sample.
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Figure C9: Histogram of Prices by Year of Construction
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London by year
of construction. The distribution is truncated at £2, 000, 000. The red vertical lines represent the
median values computed using the full sample.
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Figure C10: Histogram of Prices by Duration
The figure presents a histogram of the distribution of house transaction prices in London by tenure
duration. The top panel reports the histogram of prices for freehold properties, while the bottom for
leasehold properties. The distribution is truncated at £2, 000, 000. The red vertical lines represent
the median values computed using the full sample.
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Figure C11: Council Taxes and House Prices
The maps show the distribution of council tax payable for properties in band D for each London
Borough, along with the respective distribution of house prices in 2000 and 2018.
(a) Council Taxes in 2000 (b) House Prices in 2000
(c) Council Taxes in 2018 (d) House Prices in 2018
Figure C12: Grids
The maps depict our first identification strategy of dividing London in a grid of equally sized
squares. Panel C12a shows a grid of 150× 150 squares superposed on the map of the city; Panel
C12b shows an enlargement of the central Boroughs. The blue squares denote areas which contain
at least two similar properties located on opposite sides of a border.
(a) Grid (b) Enlargement of the Centre
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Figure C13: Distribution of Distances for the Grid Regressions
The figure depicts histograms for the distribution of distances between houses on opposite sides of
a border that are used in our grid regressions. We report the distributions for three different grids,
namely grids where we have divided London in 50× 50 squares, 100× 100 and, finally, 150× 150.




































Grid 150 x 150 ~ 250m
Figure C14: Model-implied Incidence
The figure plots the relationship between tax incidence on house prices and discount rates, where
the discount rate is defined as r + k as in Section 3.4. The upper panel shows the incidence of the
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Figure C15: Model-averaged Estimate of the Posterior Council Tax Incidence
The figure plots the density of the council tax incidence obtained by taking the model-average of
the posteriors as described in Sections 3.4.1 and C.4. The priors are normally distributed N (b0, σ20 )
in all figures. In panel (a) the priors have constant standard deviation σ0 = 50 and varying means of
b0 = −150,−100,−50, respectively. In panel (b) the standard deviation of the priors is proportional
to the mean, i.e., σ0 = |b0|/2.
(a) Constant Variance (b) Proportional Variance
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Figure C16: Optimal Tax Policy
The figure plots the optimal mix of stamp duty and council tax the Government should choose to
maximise the utility of buyers and maintain revenue-neutrality. Panel (a) displays the variables
as a function of the discount rate r + k, while panel (b) as a function of the attenuation parameter
γ. The top plots of each panel show the optimal amount of council tax in £ and stamp duty tax
as percentage of house price, respectively. The bottom plots provide the relative percentages of
revenue raised through council and stamp duty tax, respectively. In the upper panel we calibrate
the parameters as follows: α = 0.8, g = g̃ = 3.5%, ηS = 0.5, β = 0.99, γ = 0.15; in the bottom panel:


































































































(b) Optimal Taxes as a Function of γ
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C.4 Computation of the Model-averaged Posterior In-
cidence of Council Tax
In Section 3.3 we estimate models of the type:
y = Xmβm + εm (C.1)
where εm|m ∼ N (0, Ωm), with Ωm being the population covariance matrix of the





2 , ...) and β0 is the parameter of interest. We then make the (strong)
simplifying assumption that Ωm is known and assume that the prior distribution of
the parameters is: βm|m ∼ N (bm, Σm). We also assume that the marginal prior dis-
tribution of the parameter of interest is common across models, i.e., p(β0|m) =
p(β0) = N (b0, σ20 ). It follows that the posterior is: βm|y, m ∼ N (((Σm)−1 +
Xm′(Ωm)−1Xm)−1(Xm′(Ωm)−1y + (Σm)−1bm), ((Σm)−1 + Xm′(Ωm)−1Xm)−1). We



















where A[i,j] and a[i] indicate the ij-th element of matrix A and the i-th element of
vector a, respectively. This leads, therefore, to the following approximate posterior




















After having obtained the posterior distribution for β0 for each model we average
using a flat prior across models to obtain the final density p(β0|y) = 1M ∑
M
m=1 p(β0|y, m).
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Returning to the choice of prior distribution for the parameter of interest, we
are guided by the model-implied incidence from Section 3.4. We calibrate the fol-
lowing parameters: g = 0.035, g̃ = 0.035, r = 0.04 and α = 0.81. Given these
values we pick three different means for the prior distribution to match the range
of incidence of the stamp duty tax obtained in Best and Kleven (2018), namely,
b0 = −150,−100,−50, which roughly correspond to stamp duty incidences of:
dp
dτS
= −2,−3,−4. We choose the standard deviations of the prior to be equal to
σ0 = 50 or σ0 =
|b0|
2 to obtain five prior distributions.
1The parameters r and g̃ are consistent with the in-sample average mortgage rate and growth
rate of council taxes in the UK, respectively; α is consistent with a downpayment of 20% which is
common in the UK. We use a conservative expected growth rate of house prices of 3.5% compared
to the in-sample average of 7.3%.
